中金研究 1 月 CPI 同比从 0.8% 回落至 0.2% ，主要受春节错位影响，食品和服务拖累较大。金价上涨和换新需求释放难抵服务拖累，核心 CPI 同比回落至 0.8% 。 PPI 环比涨幅走扩至 0.4% 、同比跌幅收窄至 -1.4% ，主要受国际有色涨价、化工光伏反内卷、 AI 需求推动，但中下游顺价压力仍大。基期轮换对通胀读数影 响不大，但分类和调查的调整关注新消费、新模式和新方法，权数结构变化反映消费结构从商品向服务、从生存型向发展享受型的变迁 [1] 。向前看， 2 月 CPI 同比有望回弹，但后续物价改善幅度还看内需修复速度。 点击小程序查看报告原文 春节错月拖累同比。 1月CPI同比由上月0.8%回落至0.2%，主要受春节错位影响。春节所在月份往往CPI环比较高，今年春节在2月，去年春节在1月，导致 1月食品和服务等价格在高基数、低新增下，同比由前月的1.1%和0.6%回落至-0.7%和0.1%[2]，分别拖累CPI同比0.3和0.2ppt。 1月CPI环比0.2%，弱于十年同期可比均值的0.6%[3]，但考虑到疫情后服务样本更具代表性的调整，这个环比与疫后春节相似的2024年1月相当（0 ...

中金研究 我们在 2024 年 1 月的报告《 从四维指数看行业景气度 》中，综合库存、需求、盈利、供给 4 个维度的指标，初步搭建了一个中观行业的打分卡框架。我 们结合当前宏观经济形势，对该框架做了优化调整并更新了最新情况。截至 2025 年三季报的数据显示，国防军工、汽车、有色金属等行业从供需格局 看得分较高，呈现更高的景气度。基于打分卡构建的行业指数组合，亦可实现一定的超额收益。 点击小程序查看报告原文 基于当前"供强需弱"的宏观背景和前述经济特征，我们对打分卡框架做了优化，提高了需求指标（营收增速）在打分卡中的权重，并增加了外需占比这一 考察维度，将打分卡拓展为5维数据。 具体而言，行业得分是库存水平（库存增速历史分位数，权重10%）、需求增长（营业收入TTM同比增速，权重 40%）、盈利能力（销售毛利率TTM历史分位数，权重20%）、供给扩张（资本开支-折旧摊销的3年滚动之和占固定资产+在建工程+无形资产的比重，权 重20%）、外需占比（海外业务收入TTM占营业收入比重，权重10%）5个维度得分的加权求和。5项得分数值在0-1之间，需求类指标数值越高（表明需 求越好）得分越高，供给类指标数值越低（表 ...

中金研究 我们更新了2026年1月中金存量住房市场监测体系数据。 Source 文章来源 本文摘自：2026年2月10日已经发布的《1月二手房量、价走势趋稳》 李昊 分析员 SAC 执证编号：S0080522070007 SFC CE Ref：BSI853 张宇 分析员 SAC 执证编号：S0080512070004 SFC CE Ref：AZB713 徐曼迪 联系人 SAC 执证编号：S0080124070018 Legal Disclaimer 法律声明 特别提示 点击小程序查看报告原文 1月二手房成交量环比基本 走平、 同比跌幅收窄；同时，成交价环比跌幅显著收窄。 成交量方面，1月中介口径80城二手住宅成交量指数环比微降3%， 同比微降3%（2025年12月-17%，四季度-16%）；1月备案口径15城二手房成交面积环比上升3%，受去年春节假期低基数影响同比上升25%，如不考虑低 基数周则同比微跌3%（2025年12月-34%，四季度-25%）。成交价方面，1月中金同质性二手住宅成交价格指数环比降幅显著收窄至-0.6%。 1月二手房挂牌量微降，挂牌价环比降幅收窄。 挂牌量方面，1月我们监测的130城二手 ...

点击小程序查看报告原文 1月中旬A股逐步"降温"后，南向转为更多关注港股，再加上新消费、有色和互联网的催化，共同推动港股的一波走高。但随后，全球贵金属动荡、市场 对美联储鹰派的担忧，中美科技龙头"逆风"，使得港股承受了来自风险偏好、流动性和结构上的三重压力。2月以来，恒生指数下跌3%（vs. 上证指数和 标普500小幅下跌1.3%和0.1%），恒生科技下跌6.5%（vs. 科创50和纳斯达克下跌5.8%和1.8%），跌至去年7月以来新低，自10月高点回撤接近20%。 面对近期的波动，尤其是恒生科技的快速回调，很多投资者都担心市场的逻辑和趋势是否被破坏，强势的科技和有色还能继续配置。我们在本文中重点回 答几个问题， 港股为何跑输，何时才能跑赢？市场调整到位了吗？应该如何操作和应对？ 港股为何跑输？流动性收紧担忧、特色结构拖累，宏观基本面偏弱 2025年以来，美A港三地以季度维度切换轮动，呈现此消彼长的"跷跷板"效应： 一季度DeepSeek引领中国资产重估，恒生科技领跑；二季度美国对等关税 后，美股依靠AI龙头业绩与资本开支超预期支撑涨幅，港股新消费和创新药启动，但恒生科技未能收复3月高点，表现落后于美股；三季 ...

Core Viewpoint - The effectiveness of real estate debt reduction in China is beginning to show, but significant challenges remain. A systematic approach to asset revitalization is needed, with financial asset management companies (AMCs) potentially playing a unique role in managing non-performing assets [1][2]. Group 1: Real Estate Debt Situation - Since 2022, the scale of real estate debt in China has been reduced, but it has not yet reached acceptable levels. The process of destocking and deleveraging in the industry will be long-term [2]. - By the end of 2025, the total asset scale of Chinese real estate companies is expected to be approximately 103 trillion yuan, with total liabilities around 79 trillion yuan, reflecting a cumulative decrease of about 10.7 trillion yuan and 12.3 trillion yuan from the end of 2021 [5]. - The structure of liabilities remains a concern, with interest-bearing liabilities expected to be around 21.4 trillion yuan (27.3% of total liabilities) and non-interest-bearing liabilities around 57.3 trillion yuan [5]. Group 2: AMC's Role in Debt Reduction - AMCs are positioned to play a crucial role in the revitalization of real estate assets, focusing on risk resolution and participating in real estate restructuring as a primary business direction [2][31]. - The estimated annual asset scale that AMCs can invest in the real estate sector is in the hundreds of billions yuan, with the potential to leverage even larger asset scales [2]. - AMCs have been supporting real estate restructuring through self-funding, external funding leverage, and resource integration, emphasizing both the "blood transfusion" function of capital injection and the "blood production" capability of resource coordination [2]. Group 3: Challenges and Future Directions - The debt reduction process has shown structural characteristics, with the most significant reductions in contract liabilities, reflecting a policy focus on ensuring housing delivery [6][8]. - The future focus of debt reduction efforts may need to adjust, particularly as the task of ensuring housing delivery is largely complete, and the quality risk of commercial bank loans remains a concern [8][9]. - The overall financial health of the industry is still suboptimal, with the ratio of annual sales to outstanding debt indicating significant room for improvement [9][10]. Group 4: AMC Transformation and Capability Building - Upgrading the capability to manage non-performing assets is critical for AMCs, requiring the establishment of expert teams and a supportive external policy environment [3]. - Collaboration with external resources, particularly with investment banks, banks, and operational institutions, can enhance efficiency [3]. - Transitioning from a "heavy" to a "light" operational model is a long-term goal, relying on differentiated active management capabilities of alternative assets [3]. Group 5: Systematic Asset Revitalization - A systematic asset revitalization framework is essential for addressing the challenges in the real estate sector, with AMCs potentially serving as a bridge among various stakeholders [18][20]. - The development of a multi-layered financial market is crucial for facilitating asset circulation and revitalization, with AMCs playing a pivotal role in this process [19][24]. - The establishment of a robust securitization market, particularly through REITs, is seen as a key factor in enhancing asset pricing and liquidity [23].

2月8日，泰国举行全国大选，将选举产生500名国会下议院议员。 我们认为尽管短期内政策框架可能调整、市场或出现波动，但大选亦有望成为经济复苏 的催化剂。 泰国2026年大选或将成为政治格局重构的转折点 点击小程序查看报告原文 2023至2026年间，泰国政局经历频繁更迭，三年内先后有三任总理执政。2024年8月，赛塔·他威信（Srettha Thavisin）因内阁任命争议被宪法法院罢免。 继任者佩通坦·钦那瓦（Paetongtarn Shinawatra）执政约一年后，于2025年8月被解除总理职务。同年9月，自豪泰党领袖阿努廷·参威拉军（Anutin Charnvirakul）在与人民党达成联合执政协议后就任总理。为履行此前为争取支持而作出的承诺，阿努廷于2025年12月宣布解散下议院，提前举行大选。 根据2017年宪法，这是首次由民选议员完全主导总理人选与政府组建的选举，军方任命的参议员不再参与总理投票。本次大选同步举行了关于是否修改 2017年宪法的全民公投。截至2月9日中午的初步民调显示，约59.8%的选民支持修宪[1]。 初步计票显示自豪泰党大幅领先 根据选举委员会截至2月9日中午的统计（计票率约 ...

Core Viewpoint - The fuel cell vehicle industry is facing challenges such as slow growth, poor profitability, and accounts receivable backlog, but there is potential for long-term development supported by national hydrogen energy strategies and new application scenarios [1][2][15]. Group 1: Current Industry Status - The sales of fuel cell vehicles have shown insufficient growth momentum since 2024, with a surge in demand observed in 4Q25, yet still falling short of the 2025 targets [1][4]. - The average price of fuel cell systems has decreased by nearly 90% since 2018, creating significant challenges for profitability as the industry remains in a bottoming phase [1][6]. - Three major bottlenecks hindering the promotion of fuel cell vehicles include cost disadvantages due to subsidy reductions, slow construction of hydrogen refueling stations, and long payment cycles for subsidies leading to cash flow pressures for companies [1][10][13]. Group 2: Policy and Strategic Support - Despite short-term pressures, hydrogen energy is positioned as a key component of China's future energy system, with ongoing policy support such as highway fee exemptions and the construction of "hydrogen corridors" [2][23][22]. - The transition from nationwide purchase subsidies to a reward-based system for demonstration areas has stimulated growth in fuel cell vehicle production and sales from 2021 to 2023 [3][4]. - New cities are joining fuel cell vehicle demonstration city clusters, which is expected to accelerate industry development and increase financial support for fuel cell vehicle sales [22]. Group 3: Future Prospects and Applications - The fuel cell application market is expanding beyond transportation to include fixed power generation and energy storage, indicating a second growth curve for the industry [27][29]. - The establishment of hydrogen corridors is expected to enhance the convenience of hydrogen refueling, thereby accelerating the adoption of fuel cell vehicles in logistics and transportation [24][26]. - The National Energy Administration has initiated pilot projects in hydrogen energy, which will further clarify the potential for fuel cells in fixed power generation and energy storage applications [29][30].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the impact of risk prevention measures on banks' ability to hold long-term government bonds, emphasizing that while there may be short-term disruptions, the long-term outlook remains stable as macroeconomic stability is prioritized [1][3]. Regulatory Indicators - The economic value change relative to tier 1 capital (ΔEVE) is a key regulatory indicator, with some banks already reaching the regulatory threshold. In 2024, four major state-owned banks and two joint-stock banks are projected to have ΔEVE exceeding 10%, with three state-owned banks nearing 15% [3][6]. - International experiences indicate that risk prevention does not necessitate rigid adherence to regulatory thresholds. For instance, Japan has adjusted its ΔEVE thresholds for smaller banks, allowing for a more flexible approach [6][12]. International Comparisons - The U.S. has recently relaxed regulatory requirements on supplementary leverage ratios to enhance large banks' market-making capabilities for U.S. Treasury securities. The SLR for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) was reduced from 5-6% to 3.5-4.5% [12][13]. - Unlike Japan and the Eurozone, the U.S. has minimal regulation on banks' interest rate risk, allowing banks to set their own ΔEVE thresholds without a strict 15% limit [12][13]. Macroeconomic Stability - Ensuring macroeconomic stability is deemed the most fundamental risk prevention measure. The article suggests that fiscal and monetary policies should be flexible to adapt to economic cycles, with a focus on maintaining adequate liquidity [1][14]. - Current economic conditions in China indicate a need for fiscal expansion to stabilize overall demand, as private sector leverage and local debt levels remain high [14][20]. Potential Adjustments in Regulation - There is room for adjustment in ΔEVE regulatory requirements, particularly in the assumptions used for interest rate shocks. The article suggests that China's parallel interest rate shock could be around 200 basis points, indicating potential flexibility in regulatory thresholds [17][20]. - The People's Bank of China has significant room for balance sheet expansion, with total assets at approximately 48.2 trillion yuan, which is 34.4% of GDP, indicating a potential for increased liquidity support for government bond issuance [20][22].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the complexities and misconceptions surrounding the opening of China's capital account, emphasizing that while there is a consensus on the necessity of this reform, there are also significant concerns regarding capital outflow and financial stability. It argues for a balanced approach to capital account liberalization that aligns with macroeconomic management and financial reforms [2][3]. Group 1: Capital Account Opening and Safety - The belief that a closed capital account guarantees safety is challenged, as historical examples show that external risks can still impact closed economies through various channels [5][6]. - The article highlights that capital account openness should not be viewed as a binary choice but rather as a process that requires institutional readiness to manage external shocks effectively [7]. Group 2: Concerns Over Capital Outflow - There is a persistent fear that opening the capital account will lead to large-scale capital outflows similar to those seen in 2015-2016. However, the article argues that the conditions that led to those outflows have changed significantly [9][10]. - The article notes that the reliance on foreign currency debt has decreased, and the current macroeconomic environment is less conducive to a repeat of past capital flight scenarios [11][12]. Group 3: Exchange Rate and Foreign Exchange Reserves - The article explains that despite a continuous surplus in the current account since 2016, China's foreign exchange reserves have not increased correspondingly, leading to questions about potential capital outflows [15][16]. - It clarifies that the relationship between current account surpluses and foreign exchange reserves is not straightforward, as companies and individuals may choose to hold foreign currency rather than convert it into reserves [19][20]. Group 4: Fixed Exchange Rate vs. Capital Mobility - The article discusses the historical context of the Bretton Woods system, emphasizing the inherent tensions between fixed exchange rates and capital mobility, which ultimately led to the system's collapse [28][31]. - It argues that a flexible exchange rate is essential for absorbing external shocks and achieving internal and external balance in the context of increasing capital mobility [35][36]. Group 5: Determinants of Exchange Rates - The article posits that while capital flows can influence short-term exchange rate fluctuations, the long-term determination of exchange rates is fundamentally linked to the current account [39][40]. - It emphasizes that understanding the dynamics between capital flows and the current account is crucial for effective policy-making and market expectations [41][42].

2025年，大宗商品市场呈现明显分化。受AI算力扩张、电力基建需求升温及地缘风险影响，贵金属与工业金属显著走强：黄金、白银全年涨幅分别高达 67%和149%；LME铜、铝亦分别上涨44%和18%并在一定程度上推动A股有色金属板块表现强势。与之相对，能源与农产品偏弱，Brent原油与CBOT大豆 分别下跌18%和3%。2026年初，有色金属与部分化工品延续涨势，A股石油石化、有色金属、基础化工、建材等周期板块一度表现亮眼。但近两周，受前 期交易拥挤度高以及美联储主席提名落地等因素扰动，贵金属、工业金属市场及A股相关板块均出现大幅波动。本文回顾过去20年四轮商品升势与A股的 联动，简析商品周期在A股市场的映射机制。 过去四轮商品行情与A股联动复盘 过去几次商品行情通常源于供需错配与货币环境的共振。 其核心逻辑在于全球经济复苏，带动需求快速回升，而供给端因前期长期资本开支不足、产能 扩张滞后，在需求反弹时缺乏弹性，导致阶段性供不应求。这一基本面格局往往伴随宽信用周期，美元走弱、通胀上行，吸引大量资金涌入，放大商品价 格涨幅。除供需与流动性外，地缘冲突带来的避险需求、极端天气引发的供给扰动等非基本面因素，也可能推动商 ...