Xin Lang Cai Jing·2025-10-12 04:25Core Insights - The article outlines the implications of China's rare earth export controls as a response to U.S. technology restrictions, highlighting the ongoing tech rivalry between China and the U.S. [1] - The measures taken by China are seen as a legitimate counteraction to U.S. "long-arm jurisdiction," aiming to reshape global industry power dynamics [4][8] Summary by Sections - U.S. Technology Restrictions The U.S. has weaponized technology controls under the guise of national security, implementing chip export restrictions since 2022 and planning to blacklist 136 Chinese semiconductor entities by December 2024 [1][4] - China's Rare Earth Controls China's new regulations, effective from October 2025, will control not only rare earth materials but also any items with over 0.1% "Chinese content," particularly focusing on sensitive applications like chips below 14nm [4][5] - Impact on Semiconductor Industry The restrictions target critical components in the global semiconductor supply chain, affecting companies like ASML and TSMC, which rely on rare earth materials for high-end chip production [5][10] - Strategic Response China's measures are framed as a defense against the military use of sensitive technologies, contrasting with U.S. sanctions that often invoke "Taiwan-related" justifications [7][8] - Legal Framework China has established a legal framework centered around the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Export Control Law, which further clarifies its operational pathways against U.S. sanctions [8][12] - Global Supply Chain Dynamics A RAND Corporation warning indicates that a 90-day disruption in China's rare earth supply could halt production for 78% of U.S. defense contractors, underscoring the importance of resource management in maintaining competitive advantage [10] - Call for Cooperation The article emphasizes that true technological competition should be based on open cooperation rather than zero-sum games, advocating for respect for sovereignty and adherence to rules in global tech governance [12]