台海观澜 | 再谈日本敢不敢武力干涉中国的统一
Jing Ji Guan Cha Bao·2025-11-19 05:40

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses Japan's potential military intervention in China's unification, questioning whether Japan has the capability or willingness to engage in such actions given the current international dynamics and national interests [1][2][3]. Summary by Sections Japan's Domestic Sentiment - Following provocative statements by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida regarding the Taiwan Strait, a significant portion of the Japanese public appears supportive of the idea of military intervention, with a poll indicating 48.8% in favor of collective self-defense in response to a "crisis" involving Taiwan [2]. - Kishida's cabinet approval rating has increased to 69.9%, reflecting a rise of 5.5 percentage points from the previous month, suggesting a growing public backing for his stance [2]. Taiwan's Political Response - Taiwanese officials, particularly from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have echoed Kishida's sentiments, while opposition parties face backlash for advocating peaceful resolutions, indicating a polarized political environment in Taiwan [2]. International Dynamics and Japan's Constraints - Japan's potential military intervention is primarily influenced by the United States, as Japan would not act independently without U.S. approval, despite recent changes to its security laws allowing for collective self-defense [3]. - The risks associated with military intervention, including potential retaliation from China and the threat of Japan becoming a battlefield, are significant deterrents for Japanese politicians [3]. Geopolitical Considerations - Japan's geographical proximity to Taiwan poses a strategic dilemma, as any conflict in the Taiwan Strait could jeopardize Japan's energy security and national interests, making military intervention a complex decision [3]. - The article emphasizes the need for Japanese politicians to consider the broader implications of their actions on national interests and regional stability [4].