基金圈大消息！最新解读来了

Core Viewpoint - The newly released "Guidelines for Performance Evaluation of Fund Management Companies (Draft for Comments)" aims to deeply bind the interests of fund companies, management, and fund managers with those of investors, promoting a shift in the fund industry from a focus on scale to a focus on returns [1] Group 1: Importance of the Guidelines - The guidelines systematically reinforce the principle of "prioritizing the interests of holders," aiming to achieve a deep binding of interests between management and investors through quantifiable and actionable indicators, thus promoting healthy industry development [2] - The guidelines represent a significant upgrade in regulatory thinking from "patching" to "building a system," marking a new phase in the governance of the public fund industry [2] - The guidelines are a further refinement and implementation of the "Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality Development of Public Funds" issued on May 7, 2025, addressing the pain point of insufficient investor returns [2] Group 2: Focus on Long-Term Performance - The guidelines balance the evaluation of both product and sales sides, guiding public investment from short-term ranking pursuits to long-term return creation [3] - The guidelines stipulate that the weight of long-term indicators (over three years) in fund investment return metrics must not be less than 80%, with performance indicators for active equity fund managers also requiring a minimum weight of 80% [3] - The guidelines aim to bind sales behavior to actual client returns, shifting the focus from "pursuing sales scale" to "focusing on client account profitability," which may help convert short-term trading funds into long-term allocated assets [3] Group 3: Reform of the Evaluation System - The reform emphasizes long-term performance orientation, aiming to address the industry's issues of "guaranteed returns" and "heavy scale, light returns" [4] - The guidelines create a closed-loop evaluation system that emphasizes long-term returns and equitable rights and responsibilities, promoting a return to the essence of fiduciary duty in fund management [4] Group 4: Binding Interests through Compensation Structures - The guidelines introduce deferred compensation, co-investment, and performance-linked pay to bind fund interests with actual investor returns, replacing vague trust with transparent rules [5] - The guidelines increase the co-investment ratio for senior management and key business leaders from 20% to 30%, and for fund managers from 30% to 40%, enhancing the alignment of interests between staff and fund holders [5] - The guidelines require a minimum holding period of one year to prevent short-term selling behavior, establishing a "long cycle, strong binding, hard constraint" incentive mechanism [5][6] Group 5: Accountability and Incentive Mechanisms - The guidelines stipulate that performance-based compensation must have a deferral period of no less than three years, with a minimum deferral ratio of 40%, and establish a clear market mechanism for rewards and penalties [6] - The guidelines allow fund management companies to use various long-term incentive tools, such as equity, options, and restricted stock, to align with the long-term interests of fund shareholders [6] - The design of the reward and punishment mechanisms aims to address the industry's short-term incentive issues and weak accountability, promoting a dynamic balance between constraints and vitality [6]