如何决定“谁得到什么”

Core Insights - The article emphasizes that market design is crucial for achieving effective matching in various sectors, particularly in education and other critical areas where price mechanisms alone are insufficient [8][10][16] Group 1: Market Design in Education - The traditional college admission process in China has evolved from a sequential preference system to a parallel preference system, which reduces the risk of high-scoring students being left out [5][6] - The efficiency of college admissions is not determined by tuition fees but rather by the design of the admission system, which can lead to various market failures if not properly structured [5][6][10] - The article draws parallels between college admissions and train ticket purchasing, illustrating how market design can improve fairness and efficiency in resource allocation [6][10] Group 2: Market Failures and Solutions - The article identifies four types of market failures: premature collapse, speed competition, congestion, and insecurity, which can hinder effective matching [9][10] - Nobel laureate Alvin E. Roth's work highlights that market failures often arise not from human greed but from flaws in market mechanisms, necessitating thoughtful design [8][9] - Roth's research suggests that economists should act as market designers, proposing practical solutions to improve market functionality [12][16] Group 3: Real-World Applications - The article discusses the matchmaking market in arranged marriages, noting its inefficiencies due to lack of depth, congestion, insecurity, and premature commitments [13][14] - The doctoral admission process in the U.S. is presented as a well-functioning market, yet it faces challenges such as "explosive offers" that disrupt established rules [14][15] - The need for continuous maintenance and adaptation of market designs is emphasized, as changing environments and technologies can lead to new challenges [15][16]