Core Viewpoint - The case of Li Yong, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and General Manager of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), exemplifies cross-border corruption in state-owned enterprises, with over 83% of the illicit funds originating from abroad [3][4]. Group 1: Case Background - Li Yong has worked in the oil sector for nearly 40 years, leveraging his deep understanding of international offshore oil business models to disguise corrupt practices within seemingly legitimate project collaborations [5]. - The investigation into Li Yong began after the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection received tips regarding his suspected serious corruption issues, leading to a comprehensive data-driven inquiry [7][20]. Group 2: Investigation Techniques - Advanced technological methods significantly enhanced the investigation's effectiveness, allowing for rapid identification of key bribery targets through data analysis [9]. - The investigative team utilized a big data platform to analyze Li Yong's business relationships and project documentation, uncovering suspicious activities linked to a businessman named Ren Fengde [10][20]. Group 3: Corruption Mechanisms - Li Yong and Ren Fengde, who had a long-standing personal and professional relationship, engaged in a scheme where Ren acted as a "middleman" to facilitate corrupt transactions while keeping Li Yong's involvement concealed [12][15]. - In a specific instance, Li Yong orchestrated a deal involving an offshore drilling platform, where he arranged for Ren Fengde to receive a commission disguised as a legitimate transaction, effectively masking the bribe [14][17]. Group 4: International Cooperation - The investigation benefited from international cooperation, with the team successfully obtaining critical evidence from multiple countries, thereby closing the evidence chain for the case [22].
不法商人充当“白手套”,在境外代为收受、流转和存放赃款,中海油原总经理李勇:我就觉得在海外没有调查权,鞭长莫及