策略研究专题报告：复盘2013-2016年并购潮，看并购重组的影响

Macro Environment and Policy Support - The 2013-2016 M&A wave was driven by a combination of policy relaxation, liquidity expansion, and overcapacity, with the current macro environment showing similar conditions [2] - During this period, China faced a downward shift in economic growth and entered a critical phase of industrial restructuring, with the tertiary sector surpassing the secondary sector in GDP contribution [9][10] - A series of supportive policies were introduced to address challenges in M&A, including simplifying approval procedures, improving financial and tax policies, and encouraging cross-regional mergers [11][12] Market Performance and Characteristics - The M&A wave began with the IPO suspension in late 2012 and ended with policy tightening in 2016, with the Wind M&A Index achieving a 246% excess return during this period [15][16] - Small-cap and TMT sectors outperformed, with private enterprises and small-to-medium market cap companies dominating the M&A activities [18][19] - The issuance of shares for asset purchases was the most common M&A method, while the purpose of M&A shifted from shell listings to horizontal integration and diversification strategies [20][21] Industry Participation and Trends - TMT, retail, social services, and defense industries were the most active participants in M&A, benefiting from the mobile internet wave and VC/PE exits [22] - The M&A wave significantly boosted the performance of TMT and social services sectors in 2013 and 2015, with a positive correlation between M&A activity and industry returns [27][28] Financial Impact of M&A - M&A activities had a short-term positive financial effect, with EPS and net profit increasing in the year following the merger, but the effect diminished over time [31][32] - Shell listings showed the most significant EPS and profit growth in the short term, while diversification strategies had more sustainable effects [33] - The M&A wave led to a surge in goodwill, with M&A companies accounting for over 50% of total A-share goodwill from 2016 onwards, increasing the risk of impairment [34][35]