芯声：没法继续扩大芯片出口封锁范围，是美国不想吗？是做不到

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the recent changes in U.S. semiconductor export controls and their implications for U.S.-China tech competition, particularly focusing on the impact of the Trump administration's policies on the semiconductor and AI industries in both countries [1][2][3]. Group 1: U.S. Policy Changes - The U.S. Department of Commerce has initiated the repeal of the AI diffusion rules signed during Biden's administration and announced additional measures to strengthen global chip export controls, including a ban on the global use of Huawei's Ascend AI chips [1][2]. - The Trump administration's semiconductor control policies indicate a trend towards decoupling the U.S. and Chinese semiconductor industries, with both sides aiming to reduce dependency on each other [2][3]. Group 2: Impact on China - In the short term, Chinese companies will have to endure the impact of U.S. policies and seek partnerships with non-U.S. entities, as the U.S. has limited the autonomy of companies like NVIDIA in supplying AI chips to China [2][3]. - The recent changes in U.S. policy may create opportunities for intermediaries, as traditional smuggling routes could pivot towards AI chip trafficking [4][6]. Group 3: Semiconductor Manufacturing Landscape - The new origin recognition rules for semiconductor products in China aim to encourage domestic manufacturing by defining the origin based on the foundry location, which could lead to a shift in production back to mainland China or other regions like Taiwan and South Korea [7][9]. - The U.S. "Chip Act" has attracted multinational companies to invest in advanced semiconductor production lines in the U.S., but the additional tariffs on exports back to China may diminish the cost advantages of these investments [9][10]. Group 4: Political Implications of Subsidies - The "Chip Act" subsidies have evolved into a political tool, with funding directed towards older semiconductor companies and military-related firms rather than advancing cutting-edge semiconductor capabilities [10][12]. - The timing of subsidy approvals has been strategically aligned with electoral cycles, indicating that the funding has become intertwined with political agendas rather than purely industrial objectives [12][13]. Group 5: International Cooperation and Export Controls - The Biden administration's "small yard, high wall" strategy has pressured allies like Japan and the Netherlands to implement stricter export controls, which could significantly impact China's semiconductor industry [24][25]. - The potential for a new alliance among U.S. allies to enforce semiconductor export controls could strengthen the U.S. position, but uncertainties remain regarding the future cooperation of these allies under a different U.S. administration [27][29].