Core Viewpoint - The "Mar-a-Lago Agreement," proposed by the U.S. White House Council of Economic Advisers, aims to reshape global economic governance through high tariffs, dollar depreciation, debt restructuring, and multilateral currency negotiations, reminiscent of the 1985 Plaza Accord [1][2][4] Group 1: Historical Context and Comparisons - The original Plaza Accord aimed to address the overvaluation of the dollar and the growing U.S. trade deficit, resulting in significant dollar depreciation and the accumulation of asset bubbles in Japan [1] - The new "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" is seen as a "Plaza Accord 2.0," attempting to leverage financial measures alongside trade tools to balance U.S. trade relations with other countries [2][4] Group 2: Institutional Implications - The "Mar-a-Lago Agreement" is viewed as a new framework for a Bretton Woods 3.0 system, integrating finance, trade, and security, characterized by U.S. unilateralism and coercive arrangements [4][5] - The agreement may solidify U.S. institutional advantages, potentially leading to a precedent where the U.S. advances its interests under the guise of bilateral negotiations [5][7] Group 3: Dollar Hegemony and Financial Control - The agreement could create a new pathway for dollar hegemony, combining financial alliances, digital currencies, and asset anchoring systems to regain control over capital markets [8][10] - The U.S. is attempting to establish a dominant position in digital assets and rule-setting before the trend of de-dollarization takes hold [10][13] Group 4: Strategic Responses from China - China is urged to develop a systematic alternative to the current rules, particularly in green finance and digital assets, to enhance its credibility and position in the global financial order [15][18] - The need for China to actively participate in shaping global financial agendas and to build alliances with BRICS, RCEP members, and Belt and Road partners is emphasized [18]
从《广场协议》到“海湖庄园协议”:美式重构再次启动
Xin Jing Bao·2025-07-12 07:36