反内卷：为何需关注地方政府？

Group 1 - The current "anti-involution" differs from previous efforts by focusing more on regulating local government behavior, particularly in investment attraction and market openness [2][9][76] - The emphasis on "unifying government behavior standards" reflects a shift from previous policies that addressed nationwide supply-demand imbalances to a more localized approach addressing government actions [9][76] - Local governments are increasingly involved in "involution" competition, characterized by creating policy gaps, blindly launching projects, and setting market barriers [14][76] Group 2 - Local governments are under pressure to find new growth drivers due to declining real estate sales and investment, with cumulative declines of 39.7% and 27.3% respectively from 2021 to 2024 [23][30] - The reliance on land finance has decreased, leading local governments to focus on high-tax industries such as manufacturing and wholesale retail, which accounted for 32% and 14% of total tax revenue in 2021 [33][38] - The central government's transfer payments have become increasingly important for local governments, with significant subsidies for emerging industries like renewable energy exceeding revenues by 357.9 billion yuan [41][76] Group 3 - The overlap in industrial planning among local governments has led to excessive investment and competition, particularly in sectors like pharmaceuticals, new materials, and renewable energy, with 19 industries appearing in over 20 provinces' plans [54][77] - Local governments are competing through tax incentives and subsidies to attract industries, resulting in significant disparities in manufacturing tax burdens across provinces, ranging from 9.7% to 30.1% [63][77] - The lack of coordination in industrial planning has resulted in repeated construction and increased regional competition, leading to lower product prices and reduced industry concentration in sectors like automotive [66][77]