俄罗斯天然气：欧洲不要，龙国为何不全接？

Core Insights - Russia is facing a significant challenge in finding markets for its excess natural gas after losing access to the European market, primarily due to pipeline transportation limitations [1][2][3] - The existing Power of Siberia pipeline, operational since 2019, has a maximum capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year and is expected to reach full capacity by 2025, leaving Russia with a surplus of over 100 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually that cannot be exported [1][3] - Negotiations for a new western pipeline have been ongoing since 2014 but have yet to commence due to disagreements over pricing and market focus, with Russia prioritizing high-profit European sales over Asian markets [1][2][4] Pipeline and Market Dynamics - The Power of Siberia pipeline is currently the only major conduit for Russian gas to China, but its capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of European sales, which are projected to drop to 13% of the EU's gas supply by 2025 [2][3] - Russia's strategy to pivot towards Asia has been slow, with the western pipeline project stalled due to unresolved issues regarding routing and pricing, leading to a significant reduction in gas exports [2][4] - China is diversifying its energy sources, importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Australia and Qatar, which reduces its reliance on Russian gas and mitigates supply risks [2][3] Economic Implications - The shift in focus from Europe to Asia has resulted in a decline in overall Russian gas exports, with a reported 30% increase in exports to China not compensating for the 150 billion cubic meters lost from Europe [4] - Russia's gas production has decreased, and the country is now adjusting its export strategies to seek new markets in Turkey and India, although these markets are smaller and less profitable compared to Europe [3][4] - The economic pressure on Russia is mounting as it faces reduced revenues from gas exports, prompting restructuring within its gas companies and a reevaluation of its energy policies [4]