“第二战线”的极限施压

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article highlights the intensified pressure from the US, Europe, and Ukraine on Russia's energy revenue as a strategic move in the ongoing conflict [1] - Ukraine has shifted its focus to attacking oil refineries within Russia, with a significant increase in drone strikes targeting these facilities since August 2025, resulting in 21 out of 38 major refineries being attacked [2][3] - The situation in Crimea has led to gasoline rationing, with limits imposed on purchases, indicating the impact of these attacks on local fuel availability [4][5] Group 2 - Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that targeting Russia's oil industry is crucial for forcing negotiations, stating that the most effective sanctions involve attacks on refineries and storage facilities [6] - Despite difficulties in fuel supply within Russia, oil exports have reportedly reached new highs, suggesting that sanctions and refinery attacks alone may not be sufficient to compel Russia to yield [7][8] - The US is considering further support for Ukraine, including the potential provision of long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, although there are doubts about the feasibility of this plan [9][10][13] Group 3 - The French Navy recently seized a tanker allegedly part of Russia's "shadow fleet," which is used to transport sanctioned oil, indicating a proactive stance against such operations [14][15] - The "shadow fleet" has doubled in size since the onset of the conflict, primarily to meet the demand for transporting Russian oil, highlighting the challenges of enforcing sanctions [18] - The EU estimates that the "shadow fleet" contributes over €30 billion annually to Russia's budget, which is significant for funding the war in Ukraine [22] Group 4 - The article discusses three potential scenarios for Russia regarding the ongoing conflict, including a complete military victory, a prolonged low-intensity conflict, or a negotiated ceasefire [26][31] - The article suggests that the prospect of lifting sanctions is becoming less significant for Russia, as the potential benefits do not warrant major concessions [36][37] - Public resilience in Russia towards the economic costs of the war is noted, with historical context provided regarding the slow economic growth prior to the conflict [40][41]