中方拒见高市早苗，解放军划下禁区，美军导弹已撤离，日底气全无

Group 1 - Japan's lack of sincerity in addressing diplomatic tensions with China is highlighted, as evidenced by the absence of a formal apology from Japanese officials regarding controversial statements made by a politician [1] - The Chinese government has taken concrete actions in response, including issuing travel warnings and indicating no plans for a meeting with Japanese leaders during the upcoming G20 summit [1] - Japan's government has begun to show signs of concern, with officials expressing reflections on previous statements, but this is perceived as insufficient by China [1] Group 2 - The Chinese military has initiated live-fire exercises in the Yellow Sea, which are strategically positioned to exert pressure on Japan and South Korea [3] - The exercises are located approximately 870 kilometers from Japan's nearest islands, indicating a potential shift in military strategy that could be adjusted to be closer to Japan if necessary [3] - The Chinese military's actions are seen as a direct response to the escalating tensions and serve as a demonstration of military capability [3] Group 3 - The United States has notably distanced itself from Japan's political rhetoric, with former President Trump stating that Japan is not a friend of the U.S., which may impact Japan's strategic positioning [4] - The U.S. military has withdrawn significant missile systems from Japan, which could be interpreted as a response to China's growing influence and military capabilities [6] - The withdrawal of the "Tianfeng" missile system reflects concerns among Japanese citizens about potential provocations towards neighboring countries, particularly China [6] Group 4 - The retreat of U.S. military support has led to a decline in confidence among Japanese right-wing factions, who have historically relied on U.S. backing in their confrontations with China [8] - The situation suggests that aspirations for a revival of militarism in Japan are increasingly unrealistic in the current geopolitical climate [8]