基金管理新规落地，张坤、刘格菘、刘彦春近千名基金经理或因业绩不达标降薪30%？

Core Viewpoint - The new regulatory guidelines aim to address the issue of fund managers profiting while investors do not, by linking their compensation to long-term performance and establishing a rigid reward and punishment mechanism [3] Group 1: Regulatory Changes - The recently issued "Performance Assessment Management Guidelines for Fund Management Companies (Draft for Comments)" mandates that the compensation of active equity fund managers be closely tied to long-term performance [3] - Nearly 1,000 fund managers are expected to face at least a 30% salary reduction due to underperformance, while high-performing managers may see salary increases [3] Group 2: Performance Metrics - A total of 3,757 active equity fund products were analyzed, with 1,444 (38.43%) underperforming their benchmarks by over 10 percentage points, affecting 996 fund managers [4] - Notable underperforming funds include those managed by well-known managers, such as Guotou Ruijin's fund with a cumulative return of -26.12%, lagging its benchmark by over 45 percentage points [4] Group 3: Incentive Alignment - The guidelines enhance the alignment of interests by increasing the proportion of fund managers' performance pay tied to their own investments in the funds they manage, from 30% to 40% [5] - Senior management and key business department heads are now required to invest at least 30% of their performance pay in public funds, with a minimum of 60% in equity funds [5] Group 4: Assessment Criteria - The assessment framework now includes metrics such as "fund profit margin" and "percentage of profitable investors," reflecting the actual gains and losses of investors [6] - This shift represents a move from evaluating "product net value" to focusing on "investor wallet" outcomes, deepening the assessment criteria [6]