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世界银行·2025-03-14 23:10

Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry Core Insights - The study evaluates the impact of political favoritism in public procurement on private sector productivity growth, revealing that companies with strong political ties have an 18% to 32% higher likelihood of winning public contracts [4][15][17] - Non-competitive procurement processes lead to stable growth for companies but result in higher profit margins, indicating rent-seeking behavior [17][31] - The absence of favoritism in public procurement could increase the annual total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate by 8%, from 1.5% to 1.63% [17] Summary by Sections Introduction - The research addresses whether political connections only have distributional consequences or also affect economic growth, highlighting the dual nature of political ties [8][9] Data and Methodology - The study combines three novel microeconomic datasets: administrative data on over 4 million companies, public procurement contract data covering over 150,000 contracts, and a new dataset on political connections [12][14][56] - The comprehensive dataset allows for a detailed analysis of how political connections influence public procurement favoritism and its subsequent impact on private sector growth [14][56] Findings - Companies with political ties are more likely to win contracts through unfair competition, with a significant increase in contract awards in non-competitive bidding scenarios [15][17] - The report indicates that only contracts awarded through competitive bidding lead to higher subsequent productivity growth [15][17] - Political connections result in companies receiving higher payments for their products and services, with a rent extraction of 9% to 11% from overpaid contracts [17][31] Conclusion - The findings suggest that political favoritism in public procurement undermines overall economic growth by reducing the efficiency of resource allocation and overall productivity growth [11][25]