2025年下半年海外宏观及大类资产展望：地缘迷雾渐晰，经济视角重归

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Views of the Report - The US GDP growth rate is expected to slow marginally in the second half of 2025, with a low probability of recession. The growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies will continue to narrow. Q3 is relatively cautious, while Q4 and 2026 are moderately optimistic [2][50]. - The US CPI is expected to rebound in Q3 and then decline from Q4 to early 2026. However, recent Middle - East geopolitical risks bring uncertainties to the energy - inflation chain [50][61]. - Globally, there is no macro - environment for demand - inflation - inventory to rise. The employment situation is marginally weakening, and the consumption demand in the second half of the year may not be strong. The manufacturing and inventory cycles may improve slightly, but the space is limited [3]. - If the tariff policy remains stable and geopolitical risks are controllable, there may be a combination of moderate interest rate cuts (1 - 2 times) and moderate fiscal stimulus (tax cuts) in the US in the second half of the year, which may drive the macro - economy positively, but this depends on the situation [3]. - The US dollar index will remain weak in the second half of the year, but the decline rate is expected to slow down, with a target of 95 [3]. - The allocation of 10Y US Treasury bonds may reach its peak in Q3 this year. Looking forward to the second half of the year and 2026, the target yields of 10Y US Treasury bonds are set at 3.95% and 3.42%. There are entry points for long - term US Treasury bond allocation in the second half of the year, and opportunities for a "bullish steepening" of the US Treasury bond curve in Q4 [3]. 3. Summary by Related Catalogs 3.1 2025 H1 Overseas Macroeconomic Main Logic and Major Asset Performance Review 3.1.1 2025 H1 Overseas Macroeconomic Main Logic - The macro - economic cycle in 2025 was predicted to be relatively stable and decline moderately compared to 2024. The US quarterly - on - quarterly annualized rate was expected to decline in H1 and rebound in H2. The inflation continued to decline, and employment weakened moderately [6]. - In Q1, there were differences between the expected and actual US policies. The US economic momentum declined marginally, while non - US economic momentum rebounded. US asset valuations were high, and the core sectors of the US stock market declined [7]. - In Q2, the 4.2 reciprocal tariffs exceeded expectations and then entered an "exemption period" and a "negotiation period". The "stagflation trade" was formed and then eased. The "US exception" was reversed, and the "de - dollarization" trade was strengthened [8]. - Tariff shocks: In Q1, the intensity of tariffs was lower than expected, and in Q2, it suddenly increased and then declined marginally. The average US tariff rate reached a peak of about 26.8% in early April and then stabilized at around 13.45%. The tariff shock had a negative impact on non - US demand and increased US cost - inflation [9]. - Economic momentum: The US economic momentum declined marginally since H2 2024. In Q1 2025, the net export item was a major drag on GDP, but domestic consumption showed resilience. The data showed a structure of "weak expectations and strong reality" [17]. - Dual goals: In H1, there were significant differences between inflation expectations and reality, as well as between long - term and short - term inflation. The actual CPI growth rate was stable, while inflation expectations were strong [20]. - Relative strength: The growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies was narrowing, which was an important fundamental background for the reversal of the "US exception" and the "de - dollarization" narrative. Non - US economies were stronger than the US in terms of economic data surprises [23]. 3.1.2 H1 Major Asset Performance Review - The first half of the year was divided into two stages around April 2. Q1 was characterized by trading the expectation difference after the implementation of Trump 2.0 policies, with the reversal of the "US exception" and the rebound of non - US valuations. Q2 was characterized by the decline of tariff shocks and the rebound of risk assets [27][30]. - In terms of major asset performance, risk assets first declined and then rose, non - US assets were stronger than US assets, valuation repair was faster than demand repair, and supply factors led to differences in commodity performance [35]. 3.2 2025 H2 Overseas Macroeconomic Outlook 3.2.1 Core Conclusion - The US GDP growth rate will slow marginally in H2, with a low probability of recession. The growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies will continue to narrow. Q3 is relatively cautious, while Q4 and 2026 are moderately optimistic [50]. - Inflation will be affected by supply - side shocks in H2, with a rebound in Q3 and a decline from Q4 to 2026. However, Middle - East geopolitical risks bring uncertainties to energy inflation [50]. - Globally, there is no macro - environment for demand - inflation - inventory to rise. The employment situation is marginally weakening, and consumption demand may not be strong in H2. The manufacturing and inventory cycles may improve slightly, but the space is limited [50]. 3.2.2 Economic Growth - The US GDP growth rate is expected to slow marginally in H2, with a low point in Q4. The US economic growth rate gap with the eurozone will continue to narrow. The financial conditions index may face resistance in further improvement, which may lead to a decline in real - time GDP momentum in Q3 [53][54]. 3.2.3 Inflation Trend - The US CPI growth rate is expected to rebound in Q3 and reach its peak in Q4, then decline until 2026. Middle - East geopolitical risks may lead to an increase in energy inflation. In the long - term, if the geopolitical - energy - inflation situation is controllable, there may be an opportunity for inflation to return downward [61][63]. 3.2.4 Cycle Positioning - There is no strong demand cycle globally. Employment may receive positive contributions from consumer and business confidence improvement and seasonal factors, but key sectors may remain weak. Consumption demand may not be strong, and there are uncertainties in the "抢进口" and "抢补库" behaviors. The manufacturing and inventory cycles may improve slightly in H2, but the space is limited [74][84][95]. 3.2.5 Tariff Impact - After the Sino - US Geneva Joint Statement, the US average tariff rate on China decreased, and the average tariff rate on the rest of the world also declined. The probability of further tariff escalation between the US and China is low, but there is high uncertainty in the US - RoW tariff policy. Tariffs still have a negative impact on demand - cost [102]. - From the perspective of supply - chain dependence and tariff cost bearers, "embargo - level" tariffs are not realistic. The US "抢进口" and inventory replenishment have certain characteristics, and the impact of tariffs on prices may be reflected in July [103][112]. 3.2.6 Fiscal Policy - The "One big, beautiful bill" may have different impacts in different time dimensions. In the 10 - year dimension, its impact on long - term US Treasury bonds is limited. In the 3 - year dimension, it may increase the interest rate center. In the 3 - month dimension, it may drive the interest rate up in the short - term [122]. - Stable tariff revenue can offset fiscal expenditure to some extent, but the tariff rate needs to balance tax revenue, trade, and economic stability [133]. 3.2.7 Monetary Policy - The Fed is expected to have 1 - 2 interest rate cuts this year, possibly in September, October, or December. In Q3, the Fed's tone may be hawkish, while in Q4, interest rate cuts may be implemented, and the expectation of interest rate cuts in 2026 will be opened. The Fed's interest rate cuts may be greater than those of other central banks in 2026, which may lead to a weakening of the US dollar index in the medium - term [137][138][139]. 3.3 2025 H2 Major Asset Performance Outlook 3.3.1 2025 H2 US Dollar Index Outlook - The view of a weak US dollar is maintained. In H2, the US dollar index will remain weak, but the decline rate will slow down, with a target of 95. The driving factors will change from valuation regression to the convergence of the growth rate gap between the US and non - US economies and the increase in the hedging demand for US dollar assets [150]. - In the medium - to - long - term, the US dollar is overvalued, and the driving factors for its strength are weakening. The "US exception" in the FX market is reversing, and the US dollar is expected to return to its equilibrium level [151][152][155].