固定收益专题：低利率时代资管机构之美国银行保险篇

Report Industry Investment Rating No information provided in the given content. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The report focuses on the asset allocation strategies of US banks and life insurance companies during the low - interest rate period and their responses to interest rate reversals, and provides implications for the Chinese financial industry [1][9]. - US banks contract high - risk exposures, increase low - risk asset holdings, and adjust the structure of securities investment accounts according to different interest rate stages. The bankruptcy of Silicon Valley Bank is a typical case of liquidity crisis caused by maturity mismatch [1][2]. - US life insurance companies optimize asset allocation in different accounts, increase equity - based asset investments, lengthen bond durations, and lower bond credit ratings to obtain higher returns [3][5]. Summary by Directory 1. Low - interest Rate Period of US Bank Asset Allocation 1.1 US Bank Asset - side Allocation Situation - US banks contract high - risk exposures, reduce high - risk asset holdings (such as real estate construction and development loans), and increase low - risk asset holdings (such as Treasury bonds). The proportion of real estate construction and development loans dropped from 8.0% in 2007 to 2.9% in Q2 2012, while the proportion of Treasury bond holdings increased during several periods [10]. - In terms of account structure, in the early stage of low - interest rates, the proportion of securities - related assets increased, but the proportion of income decreased. In the later stage, the scale of loan business increased. The proportion of loan - related assets decreased from 61% in Q2 2007 to 55% in Q4 2010 and then gradually recovered [13]. - In securities investment accounts, the proportion of AFS accounts increased in the early stage of low - interest rates and shifted to HTM accounts in the later stage. From 2013 - 2017, the average HTM holding ratio increased by 11.8 percentage points compared with 2009 - 2012, and in 2022, it increased by 15.9 percentage points compared with 2020 - 2021 [16]. 1.2 Silicon Valley Bank Event Occurrence - In 2023, Silicon Valley Bank went bankrupt due to its aggressive business strategy and loopholes in interest rate risk management. During the low - interest rate period, it adopted a single - variety, long - term asset allocation model, ignoring potential interest rate risks. By the end of 2022, the total investment in securities - related assets was as high as $120.1 billion, accounting for 57% of assets [17][20]. - During the rapid interest rate increase period, the negative convexity of MBS lengthened the duration passively, and the accounting treatment concealed the real risk. As of the end of 2022, the unrealized loss of HTM assets was as high as $15.16 billion [29]. - The early business model had a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, and the structural defects on the liability side amplified the crisis. In 2023, due to increased depositor withdrawal demand and difficulty in attracting deposits, it announced the sale of $21 billion of AFS and recognized an $1.8 billion loss, leading to a run and being taken over by the FDIC [31]. 1.3 Silicon Valley Bank Event Disposal and Systemic Risk - After the Silicon Valley Bank event, the treatment measures included takeover, deposit insurance, liquidity support, and mergers. The FDIC estimated that the risk disposal would cost about $20 billion to the US Deposit Insurance Fund [34]. - There are systemic risks during the rapid interest rate increase period in the US. Some small and medium - sized US banks are more affected by spill - over effects, such as Signature Bank and First Republic Bank. A large amount of deposits flowed out of small US banks after the event [35][36]. 2. Low - interest Rate Period of US Life Insurance Asset Allocation 2.1 Optimize Asset Allocation in Different Accounts and Increase Equity - based Asset Investment in Independent Accounts - US life insurance funds are managed through general accounts and independent accounts. In the general account, the proportion of bond investments decreased from about 72.4% in 2010 to 63.8% in 2023, while in the independent account, the average stock investment ratio was about 78.58% from 2009 - 2021 [44][45]. 2.2 Expand the Proportion of Corporate Bonds and Lengthen Asset Duration to Narrow the Duration Gap - US life insurance companies increase the proportion of investment - grade corporate bonds (AAA) and show a characteristic of lengthening bond durations. The weighted average duration of bond investments increased from 10.7 years in 2007 to 12.265 years in 2022 [50]. 2.3 Obtain Risk Premium Returns by Lowering Bond Credit Ratings - US life insurance companies lower bond credit ratings to obtain risk premium compensation. The proportion of Class 1 bonds decreased from 68.15% in 2005 to 59.10% in 2023, while the proportion of Class 2 bonds increased from about 26.11% to 35.88% [59]. 2.4 Increase the Proportion of Independent Account Products on the Liability Side - The independent account's liability side consists of investment - type policies. As interest rates decline, the investment scale of independent accounts expands, and the stable management fee income can support the investment profits of life insurance companies [67]. Implications for China - Banks should contract high - risk exposures, increase low - risk asset holdings, and adjust the structure of securities investment accounts according to interest rate trends [4][68]. - Banks should pay attention to the stability of asset - liability structures, use risk management tools such as stress tests, and make contingency plans for extreme situations [4]. - Financial risk disposal should be prompt and forceful. - Insurance companies should optimize asset allocation in different accounts, appropriately increase equity - based asset investments, and obtain higher returns by lengthening bond durations and lowering bond credit ratings [5][70].