债务周期专题之二：去杠杆的国际经验与资产表现

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No information provided in the content. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - China's de - leveraging is a proactive risk mitigation under high leverage, aiming for a gradual reduction of the corporate sector's leverage at a high level [2][85]. - Policy paths should draw on US and Japanese experiences, with a low probability of a large - scale "flood - irrigation" fiscal environment in China. Monetary policy has room but must prevent capital idling and avoid further increasing leverage and asset bubbles [2]. - China's de - leveraging pace may be between that of the US and Japan, aiming for a "harmonious de - leveraging" by balancing risk disposal and employment maintenance and resolving risks over time [2][89]. - Asset allocation can refer to US and Japanese experiences. Interest rates may rebound during de - leveraging, and low - interest rates are conducive to debt clearance. Asset price increases should interact positively with the de - leveraging process [2][90]. 3. Summary by Relevant Catalogs 3.1 Debt Cycle: The Clearing Phase Continues 3.1.1 Changes in Leverage Ratios of Each Sector Since the New Round of Debt Resolution - Since 1992, China has experienced two complete large - scale debt cycles and is currently in a continuous and fluctuating de - leveraging large - scale cycle since 2008, with four complete small - scale cycles from 2008 - 2021. In 2024, it was in the de - leveraging phase of the small - scale debt cycle after 2021Q4. In the first half of 2025, debt continued to clear, and in the second half, it was expected to restart the leveraging process, with the restart of the corporate debt cycle being the key [11]. - The household sector's de - leveraging process is relatively advanced and may continue to bottom out. The leverage ratio fluctuation item continued to decline in the first half of 2025, and the 9 - month consumer loan subsidy policy may only ease the decline but cannot reverse the trend. In the long run, the household sector may start a new small - scale debt cycle after reaching the bottom, but the time may be postponed [13][14]. - The corporate sector's leverage ratio fluctuation item is oscillating at a high level, and no de - leveraging trend has been formed. Affected by policy support, the leverage ratio fluctuation item has not shown a trend of de - leveraging. Forecasts indicate a further decline with a gentle slope, and credit financing demand remains weak [16]. - The government sector's leverage ratio fluctuation item is expected to continue to oscillate upward. In 2025, the government bond issuance was concentrated in the early stage. Without new policies in the fourth quarter, the leverage ratio fluctuation item may decline. In 2026, the fiscal policy's debt - issuing scale may expand further, driving the government sector's leverage ratio to rise [19]. 3.1.2 Has the Debt Pressure of the Three Sectors Eased? - The household sector's overall de - leveraging has led to a decrease in mortgage - centered debt costs. Policy - driven interest rate cuts and relaxed mortgage conditions have alleviated the debt pressure, but income growth remains under pressure, and de - leveraging continues [24]. - The corporate sector's interest - payment pressure has decreased, but the increase in the leverage ratio has affected the safety margin of corporate operations. Although financial expenses have decreased, the debt ratio has risen again, and the pressure to reduce leverage remains high [26]. - The government sector's cost - control measures have a greater impact than leveraging, and the interest - payment pressure has stabilized. Interest rate cuts have reduced the weighted average cost of national and local debts, but the debt scale is still expanding. Overall, the interest - payment pressure is controllable [30]. 3.2 International Experience: Two "De - leveraging" Paths in Japan and the US 3.2.1 Japan: After the Economic Bubble Burst in the 1990s, De - leveraging Was Long and Passive - The household sector's debt de - leveraging process was slow due to asset shrinkage and high - cost debts. Asset - side housing and financial asset values declined significantly and were not repaired for a long time, and income growth was weak. On the liability side, high - cost debts and deflation pressure made it difficult to de - leverage [39][42]. - The corporate sector's de - leveraging was difficult. The "convoy system" led to the formation of many zombie enterprises, and the slow disposal of non - performing assets made the de - leveraging process long. Enterprises mainly reduced investment and capital expenditure to repay debts, lacking structural adjustments [50][55]. - The government's policy response was ineffective. Monetary policy fell into a liquidity trap, and fiscal policy was inconsistent. Early large - scale stimulus led to a sharp increase in government debt, and later fiscal tightening and policy mistakes weakened the economic recovery momentum [59][60]. 3.2.2 US: Fast - paced, Market - oriented De - leveraging with Policy Coordination for Rapid Clearing - The household sector quickly de - leveraged through default clearance, active debt reduction, and refinancing restructuring. The Fed's low - interest rate policy and government - led mortgage restructuring programs helped reduce debt pressure, and the release of consumption potential promoted economic recovery [68]. - The corporate sector completed de - leveraging through bankruptcy liquidation, restructuring, investment reduction, asset sales, and equity capital supplementation. The leverage ratio decreased significantly and then stabilized [70]. - The government sector increased leverage significantly during the private sector's de - leveraging period, providing support for the economy. Fiscal stimulus and the Fed's balance - sheet expansion helped transfer private - sector risks to the public sector. As the economy recovered, the fiscal deficit narrowed, and government debt stabilized [73]. 3.3 Asset Allocation: Asset Performance During the "De - leveraging" Phase 3.3.1 Japanese Experience: Reasons and Magnitudes of Interest Rate Rebounds During De - leveraging - Interest rates of 10 - year Japanese government bonds rebounded significantly during de - leveraging, mainly due to recovery and re - inflation expectations and fiscal supply - demand mismatches. There were also some 50 - BP rebounds during the in - depth de - leveraging period in the 2010s [75][76]. 3.3.2 US Experience: Asset Price Repair and Wealth Effect During De - leveraging - The rapid repair of asset prices during the household sector's de - leveraging process had a wealth effect, reducing the leverage ratio, improving consumer confidence, and promoting consumption. The Fed's policies also controlled the government's bond - issuing costs [80][82]. 3.3.3 China's Reference: Balancing Economic Stability and De - leveraging - China's de - leveraging is a proactive adjustment under high leverage, different from the passive de - leveraging in the US and Japan. It aims to gradually reduce the corporate sector's leverage and maintain a reasonable household leverage level [85]. - Policy tools should draw on US and Japanese experiences, combining prudent loosening and targeted support to balance economic stability and de - leveraging [87][88]. - China's de - leveraging pace may be between that of the US and Japan, achieving a "harmonious de - leveraging" by actively resolving risks and maintaining employment [89].