油价寻底途中,等待供应潜力拐点
Dong Zheng Qi Huo·2025-12-25 09:14

Report Industry Investment Rating - Crude oil: Volatile [1] Core Viewpoints - Supply-side still has some negative factors not fully priced in. High maritime inventories and OPEC+ idle capacity are key factors pressuring oil prices. Oil prices are expected to oscillate and bottom out while verifying the supply surplus. Global demand growth remains low. Low oil prices will accelerate the process of supply and demand finding a new balance, and oil prices are expected to show signs of a bottom reversal in H2 2026, with Brent crude expected to fluctuate between $55 - $80 per barrel [5] Summary According to the Table of Contents 2025 Oil Price Trend Review - Surplus Risk Continually Pressuring Oil Prices - In 2025, oil prices showed a volatile downward trend, with the average Brent crude price expected at $68 per barrel, a significant decrease of about $10 per barrel compared to the previous year. In early April, the US announced a reciprocal tariff policy, and OPEC+ unexpectedly accelerated exiting voluntary production cuts, worsening expectations for both supply and demand, causing the oil price fluctuation range to shift downward. In H2, as market concerns about the surplus intensified, the monthly spread gradually declined, and oil price volatility decreased compared to Q2. In Q3, tariff risks eased, and global onshore inventories did not accumulate significantly. Although OPEC+ continuously raised production targets, the surplus contradiction did not emerge during the peak demand season, and oil prices rebounded moderately. Since Q4, rising maritime crude inventories have intensified concerns about supply surplus, and the oil price center decreased significantly compared to the previous two quarters. Brent crude briefly fell below $60 per barrel at the end of the year. Geopolitical conflicts were frequent throughout the year, but without substantial supply losses, risk premiums mainly caused pulse-like oil price fluctuations [17] Geopolitical Conflicts Adding Supply Uncertainties, Limited Expectations of Supply Damage Russian Oil Procurement Facing New Obstacles, Attention on Establishing New Sales Channels - In 2025, Russia's oil supply remained resilient. Maritime crude oil exports averaged about 3.45 million barrels per day, a year-on-year decrease of 0.05 million barrels per day. Since July, due to attacks on refineries, Russia's crude oil exports were significantly higher than seasonal levels, but were expected to decline after November. Oil product exports decreased to the lowest level since 2021, averaging 2.25 million barrels per day in the first 11 months, a year-on-year decrease of 0.18 million barrels per day. Crude oil maritime exports were mainly to India, China, and Turkey, with volumes of 1.72 million, 1.19 million, and 0.32 million barrels per day respectively, all decreasing in November compared to the previous month. Oil product trade flows were more dispersed, mainly exported to Africa, Asia, and Turkey, with a small amount to South America [20] - In October 2025, the UK and the US successively announced sanctions on two major Russian oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, and their subsidiaries. On October 23, the EU passed the 19th round of sanctions against Russia. Before finding ways to avoid sanctions, buyers usually reduce purchases from sanctioned Russian entities. The market is concerned about the progress of Russia-Ukraine peace talks and has not priced in the scenario of the US fully restricting Russian oil exports, as it would lead to a significant increase in oil prices, contrary to the Trump administration's goal of maintaining low oil prices [22] - Russia's oil supply is concentrated in four major companies. In 2024, Rosneft and Lukoil's crude oil production was expected to be 4.88 million barrels per day, accounting for 46% of Russia's total production. Their combined crude oil exports were 1.7 million barrels per day, and oil product exports were 0.87 million barrels per day. Currently, Russia's top four oil companies have all been included in the US sanctions list. After Gazpromneft and Surgutneftegaz were sanctioned in January, their direct crude oil exports gradually decreased to less than 1%. Some new exporters entered the market, with exports exceeding 1 million barrels per day from October to November, indicating the market's ability to adapt to sanctions and maintain trade flows. It is expected that more Russian oil exports will be carried out by non-sanctioned entities or newly established exporters in the future [23] - India and Turkey are sensitive to US sanctions. India is one of the largest buyers of Russian oil, with Russian oil accounting for about 36% of India's total oil imports, and about 70% from sanctioned entities. After the US imposed a 25% tariff on India in July, some Indian state-owned refineries reduced purchases from Russia, but the reduction was small. After the EU and US upgraded sanctions, Reliance said it would cut Russian oil imports and cancel long-term contracts with Rosneft. Nayara refinery, which has mainly relied on Russian oil since being sanctioned by the EU in July, is expected to maintain imports of about 0.4 million barrels per day. It is expected that about 0.8 - 1 million barrels per day of supply needs to switch sellers. Although establishing new channels takes time and there is a short-term risk of supply reduction, the market generally expects that Russia-India trade flows will recover with the entry of new exporters [27] - Turkey imports about 0.3 million barrels per day of Russian oil, accounting for about 50% of its total imports, and about 80% from Lukoil and Rosneft. Turkey has also increased imports of diesel and other oil products from Russia since the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Turkey is also subject to the EU's 18th round of sanctions on oil product raw materials, so there is a high risk of a reduction in Turkish imports of Russian oil. A significant decrease in Turkish imports of Russian oil was observed in November [28] - China can absorb some sanctioned oil, but there are obstacles to adjusting trade flows, such as high logistics costs and low cracking profitability of certain oil types. The potential buyers of sanctioned oil are mainly independent refineries. Based on rough calculations of shipping data, the average known non-state-owned arrival volume at Shandong ports in the first 10 months of this year was about 2.15 million barrels per day, with sensitive oil arrivals totaling nearly 1.53 million barrels per day. If the group of Russian oil buyers continues to be restricted, the space for trade flow adjustment will be limited [30] Buyer Limitations and Reduced Transportation Efficiency Causing Floating Storage Inventory to Rise - Since September, floating storage inventory has been rising. As of the third week of December, the inventory of crude oil floating at sea for at least 20 days reached 56 million barrels, the highest since March 2023. Currently, floating storage is mainly composed of sanctioned oil from Iran and Venezuela, possibly due to buyers' lack of quotas at the end of the year and reduced transportation efficiency. With the increasing impact of EU and US sanctions on Russia, the volume of Russian crude oil in transit increased significantly in December, and there is a high possibility that it will turn into floating storage [33] - Iran's supply has been stable, with an average crude oil production of nearly 3.3 million barrels per day and an average export volume of 1.7 million barrels per day in the first 11 months, an increase of 0.12 million barrels per day compared to last year. The conflict in June did not have a continuous impact on Iran's supply. Although exports decreased slightly from June to August, they reached a new high of over 1.9 million barrels per day in September. However, the US has repeatedly expanded sanctions on Iranian oil buyers, ports, and shadow fleets, reducing transportation efficiency and constraining buyers' digestion capacity. The average arrival volume in China decreased by 0.32 million barrels per day compared to the previous year, leading to an increase in floating storage inventory. Compared to the floating storage level of about 70 million barrels in 2022, Iran's current floating storage inventory is nearly 32 million barrels, which may still increase. If buyers' digestion speed cannot improve, high floating storage inventory may restrain exports [34] - Venezuela's average crude oil production is 0.93 million barrels per day, slightly increased compared to last year, and its average export volume is 0.77 million barrels per day, an increase of 0.11 million barrels per day. The increase in Venezuela's floating storage inventory is related to the reduction in exports to the US. After the US government temporarily suspended Chevron's operating license in May, exports to the US were interrupted. Although exports resumed in August, they did not reach previous peaks. Tensions between the US and Venezuela may cause short-term export volume decline, but the medium- to long-term risk of supply interruption is relatively low. However, supply constraints will limit the further increase in export volume [35] - The potential buyers of sanctioned oil floating storage are limited to a relatively fixed group. As maritime inventory continues to rise, price competition for sensitive oil has become more intense. The landed cost discount of Russian ESPO crude oil has significantly weakened to -$7.5 per barrel after the escalation of sanctions to attract buyers. The small amount of new crude oil import quotas issued by China at the end of the year may boost short-term import demand. However, due to the threat of sanctions, ports have strengthened supervision of shadow fleets, slowing down the unloading speed and limiting the digestion of floating storage [36] High Maritime Inventory Intensifying Supply Surplus Risk, Low Prices Potentially Driving Down Growth Potential OPEC+ Idle Capacity Concentrated in Saudi Arabia, Low Prices May Lead to Policy Shift - OPEC+ began to exit voluntary production cuts in April and increased the production target by a total of 2.88 million barrels per day by the end of the year. The production target of the eight voluntary production-cutting countries in December rose to 33.29 million barrels per day. OPEC+ decided to suspend production increases in Q1 2026 at its November and December meetings, indicating a cautious view on short-term market supply and demand [42] - According to OPEC monthly reports, the production of the eight voluntary production-cutting countries rebounded to 32.96 million barrels per day in November, an increase of nearly 2 million barrels per day compared to March, but lower than the increase in the production target. Iraq's production growth was relatively small, and Russia's production increased slightly after September, but both countries' production was about 0.12 million barrels per day lower than the target on average, partially fulfilling compensatory production cuts. Kazakhstan's production increased significantly at the beginning of the year and remained at a high level of 1.84 million barrels per day in most months. However, production decreased from October to November, and the average overproduction scale decreased from 0.33 million barrels per day to 0.16 million barrels per day, mainly due to oilfield maintenance and pipeline attacks. Other voluntary production-cutting countries steadily increased production and were close to their production targets. Among non-voluntary production-cutting countries, Nigeria and Libya's production remained at a high level since 2022, with average production of 1.5 million and nearly 1.3 million barrels per day respectively [43] - The cumulative scale of OPEC+'s compensatory production cuts updated in December was still as high as 4.59 million barrels per day. In several updates this year, the total amount of compensatory production cuts decreased only slightly, indicating that compensatory production cuts have limited binding force on actual production, mainly because Kazakhstan's continuous overproduction offset the production reduction of other countries. The compensatory production cut scale of Iraq, the UAE, Oman, and Russia decreased from 3.27 million barrels per day in April to 1.23 million barrels per day in December, and the actual effect of future compensatory production cuts may still be limited [44] - The impact of OPEC+'s production increase on export volume changes was lagging. From April to August, export volume increased only slightly month-on-month and did not cause a supply shock to the market. However, since September, OPEC+'s export volume has increased significantly. The average export volume of the eight voluntary production-cutting countries from September to November was 21.55 million barrels per day, an increase of about 1.4 million barrels per day compared to the average of the previous eight months. Saudi Arabia's export volume rebounded to around 6.6 million barrels per day, contributing the most to the increase. Russia's export volume increased periodically, but sanctions and attacks on energy facilities added uncertainties. Iraq's average export volume in the first 11 months was 3.34 million barrels per day, slightly lower than the previous year. Exports through the Ceyhan terminal resumed in October after a two-year interruption, but the current export volume is only about 0.2 million barrels per day, half of the normal level, hindering production increase. With the increase in OPEC+'s export volume, the global volume of crude oil in transit at sea has increased significantly. In the short term, a decrease in Middle Eastern refinery processing volume and a decrease in exports from some regions due to sanctions or conflicts are expected to be more conducive to maintaining high export volumes of other alternative oil types in the Middle East [48] - Saudi Arabia has the highest remaining idle capacity, with a potential production increase of about 1.5 million barrels per day based on its historical maximum production. Other members' theoretical idle capacity is relatively low. In terms of production growth potential, Saudi Arabia's high idle capacity and strict historical compliance rate give it high growth potential in the future. Other members are approaching or exceeding their production capacity limits, weakening their further production growth potential. Therefore, future OPEC+ production policy decisions will depend more on Saudi Arabia's willingness to increase production and its bottom line for oil prices. After continuous production increases by OPEC+ and non-OPEC+ countries this year, most supply increments have been realized. As the production growth potential of competitors approaches a bottleneck, Saudi Arabia's urgency to increase production has decreased, and its demand to maintain relatively stable oil prices may increase. If oil prices weaken further due to surplus expectations, there is a higher possibility of an OPEC+ policy shift, which will support oil prices [49] US Production Increase Relying on Efficiency Improvement, Low Oil Prices Constraining Production Growth Potential - According to EIA data, the average US crude oil production in the first three quarters was 13.52 million barrels per day, an increase of 0.31 million barrels per day compared to last year. Monthly production continued to reach new highs, with an expected production of 13.84 million barrels per day in October. Falling oil prices have significantly constrained upstream producers' capital expenditure willingness. The number of US oil rigs decreased significantly from late April to early August and then stabilized. As of the second week of December, the number of Baker Hughes oil rigs fluctuated between 410 - 420, a decrease of about 15% from the high point this year. The number of fracturing equipment decreased year-on-year until September and then rebounded slightly, fluctuating between 173 - 179, a decrease of about 18% from the high point [52] - In this US production increase cycle, the peak number of rigs occurred at the end of December 2022, and then the number decreased. Although the decrease in rigs weakens production growth potential, US production has still increased, albeit at a slower rate in the past two years, indicating that current production increases mainly rely on efficiency improvement. Currently, efficiency improvement is mainly reflected in the increase in rig use efficiency, showing that producers are more focused on optimizing capital use efficiency to control capital expenditure in a low oil price environment. According to EIA data, the crude oil production per new well per rig in the Permian shale oil region in the first three quarters increased by 11% compared to the average in 2024. The initial production per unit horizontal well of new wells in the two core Midland and Delaware blocks decreased in the first half of the year compared to last year. Since 2023, the unit production efficiency of the two core blocks has declined, indicating that there is a bottleneck in further improving the production efficiency of existing production areas [58] - Productivity data in shale oil regions show that the number of DUC wells in the Permian region is still gradually decreasing, which can supplement the number of completed wells to some extent when the number of rigs decreases. According to calculations, in two sub-blocks of the Permian, about 50% of unproduced wells are expected to have a break-even price of less than $60 per barrel. Other blocks have higher break-even prices. Therefore, if oil prices fall further, the economic advantage of Permian wells is beneficial for maintaining stable production, while the risk of production cuts in other blocks increases. However, research shows that in major oil-rich regions, after years of development, the gas-oil ratio of new wells has been continuously rising, which may be due to the decline in reservoir pressure in mature production areas, which is more conducive to natural gas recovery and may affect the well decline rate. Therefore, it is more difficult for producers to maintain production. Under capital expenditure constraints, production growth potential may be further constrained [60] - Considering the expected break-even price of about $60 per barrel for large producers in 2025 and the rapid decrease in the number of rigs after the oil price decline in Q2, shale oil producers are highly sensitive to medium-term oil prices. Therefore, without the expectation of a significant increase in the oil price center, producers' willingness to significantly increase capital expenditure remains low, and the situation of limited US production growth potential has not shown signs of reversal. Thanks to the contribution of efficiency improvement to production increase, the EIA has raised its forecast for US crude oil production growth in 2025 to 0.38 million barrels per day and expects a decrease of 0.08 million barrels per day in 2026. However, given the short investment cycle of shale oil and its sensitivity to oil prices, if oil prices rise significantly in the future and are higher than the break-even price, the willingness to increase capital expenditure will increase US production growth potential, and the US production forecast may need to be revised upwards [62] South American Production Peak Has Passed, Expected Significant Decline in YoY Growth Rate in H2 2026 - The IEA expects the total global upstream oil and gas investment in 2025 to be about $570 billion, a 4% decrease compared to the previous year. Since 2020, although the oil price center has been higher than in the previous cycle, upstream capital expenditure has