Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the article emphasizes the shift in focus of the "anti-involution" policy towards regulating local government behavior, contrasting with the previous emphasis on supply-side structural reforms in 2015 [1][8][84] - The recent "anti-involution" competition is characterized by local governments creating policy gaps, blindly launching projects, and setting market barriers, which has led to a significant increase in local government involvement in economic activities [1][15][84] Group 2 - The current "involution" competition involves industries where demand is generally improving or stable, with sectors like electrical machinery showing better revenue and fixed asset growth from 2021 to 2024 compared to 2017 to 2020 [2][84] - The automotive industry has experienced a dramatic regional shift, with traditional production areas declining while new energy vehicle production in provinces like Guangdong and Anhui has surged [22][84] Group 3 - Local governments are under pressure to find new growth drivers due to the downturn in the real estate market, with national commodity housing sales down 39.7% and real estate investment down 27.3% from 2021 to 2024 [3][28][84] - The reliance on land finance has decreased, leading local governments to focus on high-tax industries such as manufacturing and wholesale retail, which accounted for 32% and 14% of total tax revenue in 2021, respectively [3][36][84] Group 4 - The "anti-involution" measures may include short-term central government actions to clean up illegal policies and long-term guidance for local governments to establish correct performance views [4][78][85] - Local governments are competing through tax incentives and other policies to attract industries, resulting in significant disparities in manufacturing tax burdens across provinces, with the overall manufacturing tax burden in 2023 being 17.4% [6][69][84]
经典重温 | 反内卷：为何需关注地方政府？（申万宏观·赵伟团队）
申万宏源宏观·2025-09-25 16:03