光大证券研究·2026-01-04 11:33Core Viewpoint - The article analyzes the evolution of Japan's banking crisis in the 1990s, highlighting the stages of crisis development, causes, reforms, and the subsequent recovery of the real estate and banking sectors [4][5][6][7]. Group 1: Stages of the Banking Crisis - The banking crisis in Japan during the 1990s can be divided into three stages: 1. Following the "Plaza Accord," the Bank of Japan significantly lowered interest rates, leading to increased speculation in the stock and real estate markets as investment returns weakened in the real economy [4]. 2. In the early 1990s, policies shifted to burst the asset bubble, severely damaging the balance sheets of households and businesses, with risks accumulating [4]. 3. The increase in "special loans" and deteriorating asset quality, compounded by the Asian financial crisis, led to risks spreading from small to large institutions [4]. Group 2: Causes of the Crisis - The main causes of the banking crisis include: 1. The wave of financial liberalization intensified "disintermediation," with a lax regulatory environment and aggressive operational styles among institutions, leading to increased stock investments and a focus on real estate lending [5]. 2. The main bank system created a strong bond between banks and enterprises, hindering the timely disposal of problematic assets and increasing risk contagion [5]. 3. The "escort fleet" mechanism resulted in a lack of risk isolation among institutions, with strong administrative protection hindering the clearance of non-performing assets [5]. Group 3: Reforms Post-Crisis - The post-crisis period saw two major phases of concentrated reforms aimed at risk disposal: 1. The late 1990s financial "big bang" reforms abandoned government protection, established the Financial Supervisory Agency, and improved regulatory effectiveness, alongside legal processes for handling failing institutions [6]. 2. The "Financial Revitalization Plan" focused on the disposal of non-performing assets and initiated business rectification for poorly performing institutions, while the government used "preferred shares with conversion rights" to enhance market operations and expedite capital recovery [6]. Group 4: Structural Recovery in Real Estate - In the post-crisis era, Japan's real estate sector experienced structural recovery with regional differentiation: - Major urban areas like Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya saw net population inflows, supporting the real estate market, with a rapid recovery in apartment transaction volumes and prices [7]. - The development of REITs in the early 21st century improved financing channels for real estate companies, enhancing transaction liquidity [7]. - Leading real estate firms shifted from a heavy asset and capital model to a more refined approach, increasing the proportion of light asset and light cycle businesses while expanding into overseas markets [7]. Group 5: Changes in Banking Operations - The banking sector in Japan post-crisis exhibited five key characteristics: 1. The pace of scale expansion slowed, with a focus on defensive asset allocation, increasing the proportion of high liquidity and low-risk assets [8]. 2. Different types of banks showed varied asset allocation behaviors, with urban banks diversifying their business structures and increasing overseas asset allocations [8]. 3. The liability side showed a clear trend towards savings and demand deposits, with a widening duration gap in asset-liability management [8]. 4. Overseas investment styles remained conservative, primarily focusing on investment-grade corporate bonds, with a relatively weak stability in funding sources [8]. 5. The contribution of fee-based and intermediary business revenues increased, with urban banks showing a distinct advantage [8]. Group 6: Lessons from Risk Disposal and Development - Four key lessons can be drawn from Japan's experience in risk disposal and post-crisis development: 1. Risk evolution is characterized by time lags, non-linearity, and diffusion, with regulatory laxity exacerbating crises [10]. 2. Excessive reliance on fiscal injections and administrative restructuring for non-performing asset disposal has slowed the establishment of market competition mechanisms [10]. 3. Caution is needed in overseas expansion regarding geopolitical, exchange rate, and maturity mismatch risks, necessitating dynamic hedging mechanisms for global asset allocation [10]. 4. In an aging and low-interest environment, institutional innovation is required to reshape the financial intermediary function and break inefficient equilibria [10].