伊朗总统佩泽希齐扬在伊朗国家电视台11日播出的专访中说，伊朗政府决心解决好伊朗人民面临 的经济困难。他呼吁民众不要从事"破坏活动"，并指责美国和以色列教唆"暴乱者"在伊朗制造动 荡。 伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队情报机构10日发表声明说，一名为以色列情报和特勤局（摩萨德）从事间谍 活动的外国公民被逮捕。（综合新华社） 伊朗塔斯尼姆通讯社11日援引知情人士消息 报道说，"大量人员"近几晚在德黑兰及其他城市发生 的骚乱中死亡。 报道说，"恐怖分子"在骚乱中针对军警人员发动袭击，造成"大量军警殉职"，他们还试图在街头 杀害妇女、儿童等。此外，这些人还袭击营业的商铺、仓库、公共交通工具、政府机构及军警设 施。 当天早些时候，塔斯尼姆通讯社援引伊朗警方消息报道说，8名伊朗安全人员在8日至9日伊朗多个 城市的骚乱中殉职。报道援引伊朗警方特别小组指挥官马苏德·摩萨台的话说，这些安全人员在执 行平息骚乱任务期间牺牲，"大批暴徒向他们开枪，用各类武器袭击他们"。报道援引安全部门的 消息说，伊朗全国已逮捕约200名"恐怖分子头目和行动负责人"，并从骚乱者窝点查获包括手榴弹 和燃烧瓶在内的大量弹药和武器。 ...

据外媒报道，伊朗议长卡利巴夫11日说，如果美国对伊朗发动打击，伊朗将把以色列以及美国在中东地 区的军事基地视为"合法目标"予以还击。 伊朗逮捕一名为以色列摩萨德工作的外国公民 伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队情报机构1月10日发表声明说，一名为以色列情报和特勤局（摩萨德）从事间谍活 动的外国公民被逮捕。 另据《华尔街日报》10日报道，特朗普政府官员已就军事打击伊朗进行了初步讨论，讨论内容包括打击 哪些目标。 《华尔街日报》援引美国官员的话报道称，正在讨论的一个方案是对多个伊朗军事目标进行大规模空 袭。目前尚未就采取何种行动达成共识，也没有为准备打击而调动军事装备或人员。 当地时间11日，以色列能源部长埃利·科恩表示，"以色列应该做好应对任何情况的准备，但不应干预 （伊朗局势）"。 这些官员称，这些讨论属于"常规计划"，"没有迹象表明伊朗即将遭到打击"。 据多家美国媒体10日报道，美国国务卿鲁比奥当天同以色列总理内塔尼亚胡通话。多个知情人士向这些 媒体透露，鲁比奥和内塔尼亚胡在通话中讨论了伊朗局势、叙利亚局势和加沙"和平协议"。 特朗普被曝正考虑对伊朗发动军事打击 美国《纽约时报》10日援引匿名美国官员的话报道称，美国总统特 ...

国家安全部今天发布安全提示文章：截至2025年11月30日，我国快递业务量已突破1800亿件，这个连接千家万户的"小包裹"，正在成为亟需筑牢的国家安 全"隐形防线"。今天，我们就一起来辨识那些可能隐藏在包裹中的风险。 国家安全机关提示 维护寄递安全是全体从业人员、企业和监管部门的共同责任，要严格落实收寄验视、实名收递、过机安检三项安全制度。如发现可能存在危害国家安全的 违禁物品、可疑人员或者行为，可通过12339国家安全机关举报受理电话、网络举报平台（www.12339.gov.cn）、国家安全部微信公众号举报受理渠道或 者直接向当地国家安全机关进行举报。 （总台央视记者 王莉） ——"无声"暗战：小心流通的"秘密"。看似普通的文件，内容却夹带私货；表面是合规资料，实则暗藏玄机。境外间谍情报机关人员常将"秘密""机密"文 件伪装成商业合同，或将地质勘探数据加密后刻录成光盘或其他电子存储载体混入普通包裹。在破获的某境外间谍案中，境外间谍情报机关人员正是通过 快递渠道进行涉密文件的非法传输。 ——谍器暗渡：伪装的间谍工具。微型摄像机伪装成纽扣、窃听器藏在玩具里、GPS追踪器嵌入行李箱把手……这些专业的间谍设备，近 ...

Group 1 - The court in the Houthi-controlled area of Yemen sentenced 18 Yemenis to death for espionage activities on behalf of foreign entities, including the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia [1] - The defendants were accused of providing sensitive political and military information that led to attacks on military, security, and civilian facilities, resulting in numerous casualties [1] - The Yemeni government condemned the ruling, claiming it was a false trial lacking jurisdiction and a misuse of the judicial system [1] Group 2 - Following an Israeli airstrike in August that killed several Houthi officials, the Houthis detained numerous UN aid workers, including those sentenced to death [2] - The Houthis announced the discovery of a spy network linked to the CIA, Israeli intelligence, and Saudi intelligence, indicating a complex web of espionage activities in the region [2]

Core Viewpoint - The Houthi armed group claims to have uncovered a spy network allegedly directed by the CIA, Mossad, and Saudi intelligence, which has been active for years and involved in monitoring strategic locations in Yemen [1][1][1] Summary by Relevant Sections Spy Network Details - The spy network reportedly trained in Saudi Arabia and was equipped with advanced surveillance and encrypted communication systems [1] - Activities included monitoring missile and drone launch sites, military bases, and locations related to Houthi operations against Israel, providing coordinates and collecting intelligence on key personnel [1][1] Houthi Claims and Reactions - The Houthi group described the operation as a "major breakthrough" and indicated that the network had been using humanitarian organizations and diplomatic cover for espionage activities [1] - There has been no official response from the governments of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia regarding these claims [1][1] Historical Context - Previous claims by the Houthi group about similar spy networks have been reported, with the last instance noted in May 2024 [1] - Allegations have also been made against UN staff and humanitarian workers for espionage, but these claims remain unverified [1]

Group 1 - A domestic employee from an energy company, referred to as Yu, was involved in espionage activities after being approached by an agent from a foreign intelligence agency [2][3] - Yu collected sensitive internal information related to China's energy security in exchange for monetary compensation, despite knowing the implications of his actions [2][4] - After resigning from the energy company in 2019, Yu attempted to conceal his past during a recruitment process for a government position, but was ultimately discovered [3][4] Group 2 - The case highlights the importance of adhering to national security laws, as individuals engaging in espionage can face severe legal consequences [4][5] - The National Security Agency emphasizes the need for citizens and organizations to fulfill their obligations in maintaining national security and to report any suspicious activities [5]

Core Viewpoint - Since the implementation of China's Anti-Spy Law in November 2014, at least 17 Japanese individuals have been detained in China, with 12 receiving prison sentences ranging from 3 to 15 years, indicating a significant concern from Japan regarding the treatment of its nationals in China [1][2][3]. Group 1: Detention and Sentencing - Among the 17 detained Japanese individuals, 12 have been sentenced to an average prison term of approximately 8 years, with 70% ultimately serving time [1][3]. - The longest sentence was given to a male detained in March 2017 for illegally obtaining state secrets, resulting in a 15-year prison term and a fine of 100,000 RMB [1]. - The shortest sentence was 3 years for an Itochu Corporation employee detained in February 2018, who was released in February 2021 [1]. Group 2: Allegations of Espionage - It is reported that 9 out of the 12 sentenced individuals provided information to Japan's Public Security Investigation Agency, which China views as espionage activities [2][3]. - A male detained in December 2021 in Shanghai was sentenced to 12 years, with the court citing the Public Security Investigation Agency as the recipient of the information [2]. Group 3: Legal Proceedings and Judicial Transactions - The employee from Astellas Pharma received a sentence of 3 years and 6 months, possibly due to a judicial transaction where he admitted to espionage suspicions [3]. - Only 5 out of the 17 detained Japanese individuals avoided imprisonment, having been released before prosecution [3]. Group 4: Japanese Government Response - The Japanese Foreign Ministry has expressed strong concern over the detentions and has issued warnings to its citizens about potential risks of being perceived as engaging in espionage activities in China [3][4]. - The ministry's warnings include avoiding military management areas and being cautious with activities such as geological surveys that may attract scrutiny from Chinese authorities [4]. Group 5: Corporate Measures - In light of the risks, Japanese companies are implementing self-protection measures for their employees, including avoiding solo business trips to China and ensuring that confidential information is not stored on devices brought into the country [4].

Group 1 - The core viewpoint of the articles highlights the increasing tensions between the US and Iran following the arrest of two American citizens in Iran on espionage charges related to Israel [1][3] - At least 35 individuals, including the two Americans, have been detained in Iran for alleged espionage activities linked to Israel, indicating a broader crackdown on perceived collaborators [3] - Iranian officials, including a Jewish member of parliament, have confirmed that some detainees have been released and that certain espionage charges have been dropped, suggesting a potential easing of tensions for some individuals [3] Group 2 - During the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, Iranian intelligence and security forces arrested over 700 individuals suspected of espionage for Israel, with significant arrests occurring in provinces such as Isfahan, Kermanshah, Fars, and Lorestan [3] - The arrested individuals were reportedly involved in various activities, including operating drones, creating homemade explosives, photographing sensitive military areas, and providing intelligence to the Israeli military [3] - Over 10,000 drones were seized in Tehran alone, indicating a substantial level of espionage activity and the scale of the Iranian response to perceived threats from Israel [3]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the implications of China's anti-espionage law, particularly focusing on the detention and sentencing of Japanese nationals accused of espionage activities related to Japan's Public Security Investigation Agency [1][2]. Group 1: Detention and Sentencing - Since the implementation of the Anti-Espionage Law in November 2014, China has detained 17 Japanese individuals, with 9 of them being convicted of espionage for providing information to Japan's intelligence agency [1][2]. - A Japanese national associated with Astellas Pharma was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in prison for allegedly providing political and economic information to Japan in exchange for compensation [1]. - Another individual, sentenced to 12 years in prison, was noted to have connections with the Public Security Investigation Agency during the court proceedings [1][2]. Group 2: Legal Framework and Implications - The Chinese legal framework includes the Criminal Law Article 110 and the Anti-Espionage Law Article 4, which classify participation in espionage organizations and accepting tasks from such organizations as espionage activities [2]. - The introduction of a de facto "judicial transaction" system in China's revised Criminal Procedure Law in October 2018 allows for lighter sentences for those who confess to espionage charges, with the Astellas employee being the first to admit to such suspicions under this system [2]. - Analysts within the Japanese government suggest that China places greater emphasis on the act of cooperating with Japan's intelligence agency rather than the content of the information provided [2].

Core Point - The German Federal Prosecutor's Office conducted a search of the residence of a staff member at the Turkish consulate in Germany due to preliminary suspicions of espionage activities [1] Group 1 - The search was specifically targeted at the suspect's residence, not the consulate itself [1] - The suspect is currently at large, and the prosecutor's office indicated that a search can be conducted based on initial suspicions of criminal activity [1] - Another suspect, unrelated to the consulate, is reported to be a Turkish-origin police officer from Cologne, suspected of providing information about the Kurdistan Workers' Party from police computers to a contact at the consulate [1]