US energy dominance

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高盛:石油行业-关税下调为油价预测带来上行风险;官方表态暗示倾向低油价
Goldman Sachs· 2025-05-14 02:38
Investment Rating - The report indicates an upside risk to oil price forecasts due to recent trade de-escalation, estimating a potential increase of $3-4 per barrel to Brent/WTI oil price forecasts of $60/56 for the remainder of 2025 and $56/52 in 2026 [6][26]. Core Insights - The potential election of President Trump poses both upside risks to oil price volatility and downside risks to prices, primarily through impacts on oil demand from tariffs [5][26]. - Recent trade de-escalation has led to an estimated increase in global oil demand growth forecasts for 2025 and 2026 by 0.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) and 0.1 mb/d, respectively, raising demand growth to approximately 0.6 mb/d and 0.4 mb/d [6][26]. - President Trump's inferred preference for WTI oil prices is around $40-50 per barrel, with a tendency to call for lower prices when WTI exceeds $50 and for higher prices when below $30 [13][22]. Summary by Sections Section 1: Price Forecasts - The report estimates an upside risk of $3-4 per barrel to Brent/WTI oil price forecasts due to trade de-escalation and reduced recession risks [6][26]. - The expected global oil demand growth for 2025 and 2026 has been adjusted upwards due to improved GDP growth outlooks in the US, China, and Europe [6][26]. Section 2: Presidential Influence - President Trump's social media activity indicates a strong focus on energy markets, with nearly 900 posts related to energy since joining Twitter [8][22]. - The analysis reveals that Trump's posts about oil prices tend to increase as elections approach, reflecting his political strategy [8][22]. Section 3: Sanctions and Price Sensitivity - The report notes that Trump's propensity to post about oil sanctions decreases as prices rise, particularly when WTI is in the $60s or $70s, suggesting limited upside risks to prices from potential drops in sanctioned supply [22][26]. - The findings indicate that underinvestment and OPEC+ production quotas are more significant constraints on production volumes than sanctions [22][26].