Opening Early Market for Low-Carbon Building Materials by Public Procurement in China
RMI· 2024-11-17 00:18
Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly state an investment rating for the low-carbon building materials industry in China Core Insights - The transition to low-carbon building materials is essential for China to meet its dual carbon targets, as emissions from building materials accounted for over 20% of the country's total emissions in 2020, with cement and steel being the largest contributors [10][12] - Government procurement for public projects is a significant driver of demand for building materials, and utilizing low-carbon procurement can create an early market for these materials, leading to coordinated emissions reductions across the industrial chain [13][36] - The report emphasizes the need for a transition from green procurement to low-carbon procurement, highlighting the importance of establishing clear definitions, improved data transparency, and performance standards for building materials [19][23] Summary by Sections Emissions and Market Potential - In 2020, CO2 emissions from building materials exceeded 2.3 billion tons, with cement and steel contributing 53% and 36% of emissions respectively [10][12] - By 2030, public procurement could generate demand for 45 million tons of low-emissions steel and 277 million tons of low-carbon concrete materials, leading to significant emissions reductions [36][41] Transitioning to Low-Carbon Procurement - The report outlines five critical components for transitioning to low-carbon procurement, including defining the scope, improving data transparency, establishing carbon performance standards, providing incentives, and ensuring effective implementation [23][25] - Current green building materials focus on durability and health metrics, with limited disclosure on CO2 emissions, necessitating a shift towards low-carbon metrics [19][53] Cost-Effectiveness and Economic Benefits - Using low-carbon materials can reduce emissions with minimal cost increases, with an example showing an increase of only 8 RMB/square meter while achieving significant CO2 reductions [43][45] - The report indicates that while near-zero carbon materials may have higher initial costs, advancements in technology could limit these increases significantly by 2030 [43][44] Product Carbon Accounting and Certification - China's carbon footprint management for building materials is in its early stages, with a need for localized material databases and robust standards to enhance low-carbon practices [47][48] - The report highlights the importance of developing Product Category Rules (PCRs) to ensure consistency and comparability in low-carbon building materials [48][49] Implementation and Innovation - Priority areas for low-carbon material applications include infrastructure projects, public buildings, and rural housing, which can benefit from policy-driven low-carbon standards [59][60] - Financial incentives and performance-based standards are recommended to promote the adoption of low-carbon materials in public procurement [63][64]
Climate Adaptation Finance: Unlocking Private Finance
钱伯斯(Baker McKenzie)· 2024-11-16 04:58
Industry Investment Rating - The report highlights a significant gap in climate adaptation finance, indicating a need for increased investment and private sector involvement [3][5] Core Viewpoints - Climate adaptation finance needs to increase fourfold to meet the required levels, with developing countries particularly in need [3][6] - Private sector contributions to adaptation finance are currently modest, making up less than 3% of total sustainable finance [4] - The gap between available and required finance presents a substantial opportunity for institutional investors and commercial banks, with estimates ranging from USD 187-359 billion annually [5] - COP initiatives, such as the Climate Finance Action Fund, aim to catalyze public and private sector collaboration in adaptation finance [11] Key Summaries by Section Introduction - Climate change adaptation is underfunded, with most finance coming from the public sector, while private sector contributions remain minimal [4] COP Initiatives - Developed countries were urged to double their adaptation finance provision by 2025, with new pledges of nearly USD 188 million made during COP28 [9] - The COP29 Presidency is prioritizing the establishment of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) to replace the current USD 100 billion annual climate finance target [10] Barriers to Private Sector Involvement - Lack of standardized definitions and frameworks for adaptation finance compared to transition finance [12] - Insufficient detailed information on climate risks for specific projects, compounded by challenges in data disclosure and sharing [12] - Long timelines for returns and difficulties in pricing risk and return, making it challenging for commercial entities to justify investments [12] Bridging the Gap - Measures to address barriers include greater government support, standardized approaches, and increased disclosure of project-relevant information [13] - Promising funding methods include debt-for-impact swaps and public/private partnerships, which can reduce investment risk and unlock private finance [14][16] Debt-for-Impact Swaps - Ecuador's 2023 debt-for-nature swap, valued at USD 1.6 billion, is a successful example of this model, with savings directed toward marine conservation [14][15] Public/Private Partnerships - Blended finance, combining concessional public finance with private finance, is a key tool for scaling up private investment in adaptation projects [17] Other Financing Instruments - A range of instruments, including project finance, results-based finance, and guarantees, can help bridge the adaptation finance gap [18][19] The Future - Political will and resource allocation are critical to closing the adaptation finance gap, with time being of the essence to address climate change impacts [20]
(Q)SAR Assessment Framework: Guidance for the regulatory assessment of (Quantitative) Structure Activity Relationship models and predictions, Second Edition
OECD· 2024-11-16 04:13
(Q)SAR Assessment Framework: Guidance for the regulatory assessment of (Quantitative) Structure Activity Relationship models and predictions, Second Edition Series on Testing and Assessment No. 405 1 OECD Series on Testing and Assessment No. 405 PUBE | --- | --- | |------------------------------------------------|----------------| | | | | for the regulatory assessment of | | | (Quantitative) Structure Activity Relationship | | | models and predictions - | Second edition | (Q)SAR ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK: GUIDAN ...
The G20 and the promotion of equal opportunities
OECD· 2024-11-16 04:13
The G20 and the promotion of equal opportunities Tackling the root causes of inequality, exclusion and discrimination 1 f The G20 and the promotion of equal opportunities THE G20 AND THE PROMOTION OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES © OECD 2024 PUBE Tackling the root causes of inequality, exclusion and discrimination This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countri ...
Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Chile
OECD· 2024-11-16 04:08
Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry. Core Insights - The report emphasizes the importance of building and maintaining trust in public institutions in Chile, particularly in the context of ongoing socioeconomic and political challenges [5][18][19] - Trust levels in Chilean public institutions have been declining since 2010, which is consistent with trends observed across Latin America [19][35] - The OECD Trust Survey indicates that only 30% of Chileans have high or moderately high trust in the national government, significantly lower than the OECD average [20][21] Summary by Sections Executive Summary - The report outlines that low trust in public institutions can hinder social cohesion and effective governance, especially in addressing complex challenges [18] - It highlights that trust can be fostered through responsive institutions that meet public expectations and adhere to principles of openness and fairness [18] Trust in Context: Chile - The chapter discusses various socioeconomic, political, and institutional factors that influence public trust in Chile, including economic inequalities and the impact of misinformation [30] Trust in Public Institutions in Chile - The report presents findings from the 2023 OECD Trust Survey, revealing that trust in the national government (30%) and civil service (24%) is below the OECD averages [20] - Trust in the police (52%) and local government (36%) is higher compared to national institutions, while political parties (14%) and Congress (19%) are the least trusted [20] Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions - Key drivers of trust include the government's ability to cooperate with stakeholders, transparency in decision-making, and ensuring that citizens feel their voices are heard [24][25] - The report identifies that perceptions of effective checks and balances are crucial for trust in all public institutions [25] Recommendations for Enhancing Trust - The report suggests five areas for improvement: enhancing public service quality, strengthening government preparedness for complex issues, improving communication with citizens, reinforcing public integrity, and promoting fairness across institutions [26] - Specific recommendations include establishing a common vision for public services, enhancing user experience, and implementing training for front-line civil servants [27][28] Trust and Values in Chile - The report notes that perceptions of fairness are low, with only 39% of Chileans believing their applications for government services would be treated fairly [29] - It emphasizes the need for policies that address economic vulnerabilities and discrimination to foster trust among all population groups [29]
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Portugal
OECD· 2024-11-16 04:08
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: Portugal (笑)》 This report presents the Working Group on Bribery's summary and conclusions on Portugal's progress on its implementation of Phase 4 recommendations, its foreign bribery enforcement actions, and developments related to the follow-up issues. It was adopted by the OECD Working Group on Bribery during its plenary meeting on 8-11 October 2024. IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION PHASE 4 TWO-YEAR FOLLOW-UP REP ...
China Brief: China Consumption - Momentum Amid Uncertainty | Greater China
麦肯锡· 2024-11-16 00:08
November 2024 China Brief China Consumption: Momentum Amid Uncertainty Daniel Zipser, Senior Partner and Leader, Asia Consumer & Retail Practice Since my last China Brief, consumption has gained momentum, particularly with the unveiling of a series of economic stimulus measures since September 24. The highly anticipated annual Double 11 Shopping Festival, which ended on November 11, well exceeded industry expectations, further fueling excitement among industry executives around the pickup in consumption. De ...
The Cost of Inaction
世界银行· 2024-11-15 23:03
Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry Core Insights - Climate change is significantly impacting human health, with increasing frequency of extreme weather events, emergence of infectious diseases, and disruptions to food systems. The health impacts are expected to worsen over time, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) which will face a disproportionate burden due to poverty and weak healthcare systems [30][43][15] - The report emphasizes the urgent need for action to address the health crisis arising from climate change, highlighting that the economic cost of inaction could reach between USD 8.6 trillion and USD 15.4 trillion by 2050 under different socioeconomic scenarios [36][37] - The analysis covers 69 LMICs, representing 96% of the total population of all LMICs, and provides estimates for health impacts and economic costs associated with climate change for the years 2026-2030, 2026-2050, and 2026-2100 [33][46] Summary by Sections Introduction - Climate change is accelerating health impacts, including heat-related illnesses and vector-borne diseases, with LMICs expected to face significant increases in morbidity and damage to health facilities [43][44] Methods - The report utilizes climate scenarios from the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) to project health impacts and economic costs, focusing on selected health risks such as extreme heat, waterborne diseases, and vector-borne diseases [46][50] Impacts of Climate Change on Health - Between 2026 and 2050, climate change is projected to cause between 4.1 billion and 5.2 billion cases of health impacts across LMICs, with deaths potentially reaching between 14.5 million and 15.6 million by 2050 [35][36] - Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are expected to bear the brunt of these health impacts, with SSA projected to experience approximately 71% of all cases and nearly half of all deaths caused by climate change [37][40] Economic Cost of Inaction - The economic cost of health impacts due to climate change is projected to reach between USD 11.0 trillion and USD 20.8 trillion under different scenarios, translating to 0.7% to 1.3% of GDP in LMICs [36][37] Policy Implications and Future Directions - The report calls for urgent, transformative action to strengthen health systems and limit the impacts of climate change, advocating for a health systems approach rather than a focus on specific diseases [16][40]
Is There an Underside to Economic Growth? A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Malaysia
世界银行· 2024-11-15 23:03
Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry analyzed Core Insights - The report highlights a paradox in Malaysia's economic growth, where high GDP growth and significant reductions in income poverty and inequality coexist with widespread public discontent [3][8][19] - Despite improvements in material living standards, citizens report challenges such as income-expense imbalances, reliance on dual incomes, growing indebtedness, and ethnic polarization [3][8][19] Summary by Sections Introduction - The paper discusses Malaysia's economic success juxtaposed with social discontent, particularly following the 2018 elections [8][19] - It documents the Malaysian "miracle" through diverse data and qualitative focus group discussions to understand citizen perceptions and challenges [3][8] Economic Success: Miracle vs. Paradox - Malaysia transitioned from a low-income country to an upper-middle-income country, with GDP per capita rising significantly and poverty rates dropping from 49.3% in 1970 to 0.4% in 2016 [19][21] - The New Economic Policy (NEP) aimed to eradicate poverty and restructure society, leading to improvements across ethnic groups [31][35] Focus Group Analysis - The report includes findings from 56 focus group discussions, revealing both positive and negative aspects of intergenerational change, including improvements in education, poverty levels, and infrastructure [46][55] - However, a significant number of participants reported an imbalance between income and expenses, indicating that rising costs of living have outpaced income growth [66] The Downside of Progress - A majority of focus group participants expressed feelings of economic strain despite visible progress, citing the need for multiple jobs and dual-income households to meet basic needs [66] - The qualitative data suggests that while material conditions have improved, many Malaysians feel worse off due to rising living costs and social disparities [66]
Prime Picks for a Green Pivot
世界银行· 2024-11-15 23:03
Investment Rating - The report emphasizes the potential for state-owned financial institutions (SOFIs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to drive green investments in Uzbekistan, suggesting a positive outlook for their role in climate action financing [14][15][26]. Core Insights - The Government of Uzbekistan is committed to a green economic transition, recalibrating investment policies and introducing incentives to spur climate investment, with a target of allocating 30% of state funding to green projects by 2026 [14][41]. - SOFIs and SOEs collectively hold significant financial power, with nine SOFIs providing 70% of all loans in the economy, and state investment funds expected to finance about 10% of GDP in 2024 [15][54]. - The report identifies three prime candidates for green financing: the Entrepreneurship Development Company (EDC), Business Development Bank (BDB), and Uzbekistan Mortgage Refinancing Company (UzMRC), each with specific strategies and goals for green investments [19][20][21]. Summary by Sections Executive Summary - Uzbekistan's government has initiated a green economic transition, aligning investment policies and introducing incentives for climate investment [14]. - SOFIs and SOEs are seen as crucial for mobilizing private sector investments by reducing market risks associated with green technologies [16][26]. Purpose and Approach - The study aims to identify SOFIs and SOEs that can effectively adopt climate change and environmental targets in their financing operations, with a focus on readiness to implement the National Green Economy Taxonomy (NGET) [40][41]. The Footprint of Public Finance - A long list of 26 state funds and 37 SOEs was compiled, with significant government spending projected for 2024, including UZS 99 trillion (7.7% of GDP) from state funds [54][55]. - SOEs are expected to play a vital role in enhancing infrastructure and promoting technological advancements, with a budget allocation of UZS 28.1 trillion (2.2% of GDP) for investments [55]. Priority Entities - EDC aims for 35% of its financing to be green by 2026, while BDB is developing a Sustainable Finance Framework and plans to join international green finance platforms [20][21]. - UzMRC is positioned to lead in green housing finance and is preparing to issue green bonds, contingent on the adoption of industry-wide standards for green buildings [22]. Recommendations - The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) should leverage its shareholder rights to mandate green investment strategies across SOFIs and SOEs, ensuring alignment with national climate goals [17][25]. - A central coordination function for climate finance is recommended to streamline resources and optimize synergies between public incentives and private capital [16][17].