Core Viewpoint - The adjustment of the excess performance fee extraction rules by Nanyin Wealth Management has raised concerns among investors regarding the fairness and transparency of such changes, as they make it easier for managers to achieve performance benchmarks and earn additional fees [1][2][3]. Group 1: Adjustments to Performance Fee Rules - Nanyin Wealth Management's product "Nanyin Wealth Management Zhu Lian Bi He An Wen 1910 One-Year Open-End Wealth Management Product" has recently adjusted its performance fee extraction rules, lowering the performance fee benchmark from an annualized return of 3.3% to a range of 2.525% to 2.775% [2][3]. - The previous performance fee extraction rule allowed managers to charge 60% of the returns exceeding 3.3%, while the new rule significantly reduces the threshold for managers to earn excess performance fees [2][3]. - This product has undergone multiple adjustments to its performance fee extraction rules, with the most recent change occurring after November 2024, when it initially did not charge excess performance fees [3]. Group 2: Industry Practices and Concerns - Many wealth management products have similar excess performance fee extraction rules, with varying benchmarks and extraction ratios, often hidden in lengthy product announcements, complicating investor understanding [1][4]. - The common practice in the industry is to set performance fee benchmarks based on performance comparison benchmarks, with extraction ratios typically ranging from 10% to 40%, with 20% being the most common [5]. - There is a growing concern among investors regarding the fairness of one-sided incentives for managers, as they benefit from excess performance fees when returns exceed benchmarks but do not face corresponding reductions in fees when performance is below benchmarks [5][6]. Group 3: Information Disclosure and Transparency - Information disclosure regarding changes to performance fee extraction rules is often inadequate, with adjustments not prominently highlighted, making it difficult for average investors to understand the implications [8][9]. - Experts suggest that the wealth management industry should enhance the convenience of information disclosure, including establishing a tiered disclosure mechanism for significant changes, such as fee adjustments [8][9]. - Recommendations include using clear indicators for key information changes, prominently displaying fee adjustments, and providing examples of how these changes affect investor returns [8][9].

近日，有投资者向中国证券报记者反映，南银理财的一款产品调整了超额业绩报酬提取规则。调整后， 管理人更容易达到业绩报酬计提基准、拿到超额业绩报酬。记者调研发现，该产品已两次调整超额业绩 报酬提取规则，均是以产品要素调整公告的形式告知投资者。截至记者发稿时，南银理财未回应记者关 于业绩报酬提取规则调整原因等采访提问。 事实上，不少理财产品都设置了超额业绩报酬提取规则，其基准和比例各不相同。这些规则常隐藏在冗 长的产品公告中，增加了投资者的理解难度。此外，此类规则为管理人提供的单向激励是否公平，也引 发了投资者热议。 ● 本报记者 李蕴奇 业绩报酬计提基准降低 投资者反映的产品名称为"南银理财珠联璧合安稳1910一年定开理财产品"，该产品近日发布的公告显 示，其业绩比较基准、业绩报酬提取规则等多个要素发生了调整。 调整前的产品说明书显示，在申购/赎回确认日和产品实际到期时，如果当期产品的扣费后年化实际资 产组合收益率超过3.3%时，管理人将对超过部分按60%收取业绩报酬。换句话说，在调整前，如果一段 时间内的产品年化收益率超过3.3%，管理人将提取产品年化收益率超过3.3%部分的60%作为超额业绩报 酬，年化收益率 ...