Group 1 - The core argument is that the development of capitalism in ancient China was hindered by the deeply rooted agricultural natural economy and the political structure based on imperial authority and Confucian ideology [1][4][14] - The political order in a predominantly agricultural society required a cultural capital foundation rather than land resources, leading to a centralized political system through the abolition of feudalism and the establishment of a bureaucratic system [1][2] - The bureaucratic system relied on the Confucian examination system to recruit scholar-officials, who were politically dependent on imperial authority, creating a fragile power dynamic [2][3] Group 2 - The Confucian ideology, while not a religion, served as an ethical framework that reinforced feudal hierarchy and imperial authority, allowing for the externalization of familial governance into public political life [3][4] - Capital accumulation and capitalism were unimaginable in a society dominated by feudal paternalism, where property rights were contingent upon the ruler's discretion [4][5] - In the feudal society, commercial capital had to align with cultural and political capital to gain property protection, leading to a system where merchants became subservient to political power [5][6] Group 3 - The relationship between officials and merchants was characterized by a power imbalance, with officials leveraging commerce for personal gain while merchants relied on officials for trade privileges [6][7] - The case of the Jin merchants illustrates how family ties and examination success facilitated the formation of official-merchant alliances, exemplifying the intertwining of commerce and political power [7][8] - The commercial tax system in the Ming dynasty was heavily skewed towards agriculture, with commercial taxes contributing only a small fraction of total tax revenue, reflecting the state's prioritization of agricultural income [10][11] Group 4 - The instability of the bureaucratic system meant that the protection of merchant interests was precarious, with political changes leading to rapid shifts in wealth distribution [12][13] - The lack of a credible public debt system in ancient China prevented the establishment of a stable relationship between state power and capital, inhibiting the emergence of capitalism [14][15] - The intertwining of commercial and political interests resulted in a fragmented merchant class that lacked the cohesion necessary for collective action, preventing the rise of a self-aware bourgeoisie [16][17]