Group 1 - The relationship between power asset concentration and local finance exhibits characteristics of "mutual dependence and dynamic game," involving complex dimensions such as changes in investment subjects, imbalanced revenue distribution, and strengthened policy intervention [1] - In the early reform period, the central government's financial share decreased from 41.6% to 36.7%, while local investment rose to 40%, forcing local governments to raise funds for electricity generation to fill the gap [1] - Local governments have become increasingly reliant on hidden debt mechanisms, with local power companies often depending on provincial company guarantees for loans, leading to rising debt ratios [2] Group 2 - New energy investments in the Sanbei region rely on a "central subsidy + local matching" model, but the subsidy funds come from nationwide industrial and commercial electricity price increases, creating a distorted mechanism [3] - The local retention ratio of electricity value-added tax is only 25%, while the central government retains 75%, leading to significant revenue loss for local governments [4] - Local governments use electricity prices as a tool for industrial policy, resulting in substantial fiscal subsidies that create a fragile balance between electricity price subsidies and tax retention [5] Group 3 - Provincial governments engage in implicit tax competition through electricity price dumping, which hinders cross-provincial transactions and increases local fiscal dependence on local power enterprises [6] - The current pricing mechanism restricts provincial grid investment capabilities, leading to significant annual losses in investment returns [7] - Resource-rich western regions have a high proportion of new energy installations but contribute minimally to tax revenue due to policies like immediate VAT refunds [8] Group 4 - The concentration of state-owned assets in the electricity sector is significant, yet the return on capital is low, prompting local governments to seek alternative revenue sources [9] - Local governments are concerned that cross-regional electricity transactions will weaken their tax base, leading to resistance against such transactions [10] - The concentration of electricity assets is reshaping the underlying logic of central-local financial relationships, highlighting the need for institutional innovation to balance economies of scale with local autonomy [10] Group 5 - In the short term (2025-2027), the reduction of new energy grid connection subsidies is expected to expose local hidden debts, with fiscal gaps in the Sanbei region projected to expand to 1.2% of GDP [10] - In the medium term (2028-2030), the establishment of a unified national electricity market will drive reforms in the fiscal and tax system, potentially adjusting the cross-provincial electricity value-added tax sharing ratio to 40%:60% [11] - In the long term (post-2030), new fiscal tools such as green certificates and carbon taxes are expected to replace traditional electricity revenues, reducing local fiscal dependence from 0.38 to 0.25 [11]