军事安全
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解放军报文章:日本背离和平宪法,妄图卷土重来
Xin Lang Cai Jing· 2026-01-17 01:15
Group 1 - Japan's cabinet has approved a new "cybersecurity strategy" allowing the Self-Defense Forces to take offensive measures in response to cyberattacks, marking a significant shift from defense to offense in military policy [1][3] - Japan is accelerating the development of military capabilities in emerging fields such as space, electromagnetic, and cyber warfare, moving further away from its pacifist constitution [1][3] - The "low Earth orbit satellite constellation" project is expected to achieve initial operational capability by 2027, focusing on intelligence gathering related to missile launch platforms and troop movements in East Asia [1][2] Group 2 - The establishment of an electronic warfare command in March 2022 and the deployment of electronic warfare units in various locations indicate Japan's intent to monitor regional air and naval activities [2] - Japan is enhancing its cyber warfare capabilities by expanding its Cyber Defense Force and developing an integrated cloud platform for cyber operations, with a focus on collaboration with the U.S. military [3] - The "Proactive Cyber Defense Bill" passed in May 2025 allows Japan to preemptively attack or destroy the networks of perceived attackers, effectively loosening restrictions on offensive cyber operations [3]
台“资通电军”降为专职“网军”
Xin Lang Cai Jing· 2026-01-14 06:16
Core Viewpoint - The restructuring of Taiwan's "Cyber and Electronic Warfare" unit, previously known as the "Cyber and Electronic Army," marks the end of a controversial nine-year period, with communication troops returning to the Taiwan Army's command structure [1][2]. Group 1: Restructuring and Historical Context - The "Cyber and Electronic Army" was established in 2017 to handle electronic warfare, information operations, and cybersecurity, but faced operational challenges due to its separation from the Army's command structure [1][2]. - The recent restructuring involves the re-integration of previously detached units back into the Taiwan Army, which is seen as a necessary correction to past organizational issues [2][4]. - The initial formation of the "Cyber and Electronic Army" was met with criticism, as military experts argued that the diverse functions of the units could not be effectively combined into a single entity [3][4]. Group 2: Operational Challenges and Criticism - The separation of communication units from the Army created significant operational barriers, complicating command and personnel management [1][4]. - Experts have pointed out that the focus on electronic and network warfare does not align with the general communication needs of the military, leading to confusion and inefficiencies [2][4]. - The restructuring aims to improve the understanding of communication operations within ground forces, although it remains uncertain whether this will significantly enhance operational capabilities [4]. Group 3: Cyber Operations and Impact - The "Cyber and Electronic Army" has been involved in multiple attempts to conduct cyberattacks against mainland China, but these efforts have been characterized by a lack of professionalism and technical skill [5][6]. - Reports indicate that the unit has been exposed and targeted by mainland authorities, leading to a decrease in personnel and morale within the unit [5][6]. - The ongoing exposure of personnel involved in cyber operations has created a chilling effect, deterring potential recruits and collaborators [6].