Core Viewpoint - The article highlights the systemic issue of financial fraud in listed companies, particularly focusing on the role of third-party entities in facilitating such fraud, which has become increasingly complex and hidden from regulatory scrutiny [1][11]. Summary by Sections Financial Fraud Cases - The article discusses notable financial fraud cases, such as the Zijing Storage case, which affected 17,000 investors and involved compensation of 1.086 billion yuan from four intermediary institutions [1]. - Since 2020, nearly 70% of the cases punished by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for revenue fraud involved transaction manipulation [2]. Types of Fraud - Transaction fraud has evolved into a primary method of revenue manipulation, accounting for approximately 70% of total fraud cases [3]. - The article categorizes fraud into two main types: transaction fraud, which involves fabricating non-existent transactions, and accounting manipulation, which distorts existing transactions [2][3]. Role of Third Parties - The involvement of third parties in financial fraud is significant, with an average of over 10 third-party entities participating in each fraudulent case, totaling 686 third parties across 58 cases [4][5]. - Third parties include related parties, real customers, and shell companies, often collaborating to create a façade of legitimate business transactions [6][7]. Legal Accountability - Despite the critical role of third parties in facilitating fraud, they often escape severe legal consequences, with only a small fraction facing penalties [9][10]. - The article emphasizes the need for a comprehensive legal framework to hold third parties accountable, as current penalties are insufficient to deter fraudulent behavior [11]. Market Implications - The prevalence of third-party involvement in fraud reflects deeper issues within market governance, including low legal risks and high incentives for fraudulent activities [8][10]. - The article calls for urgent reforms to enhance investor protection and ensure that all parties involved in financial fraud are held accountable [11].

出品：新浪财经上市公司研究院 文/夏虫工作室 核心观点：众泰汽车众泰汽车自重整以来业绩并未好转，整车0产量疑似又陷入生产停滞。至此，我们 疑惑的是，公司经营可持续性有无实质性改善，公司成功摘帽背后是否有猫腻？为何公司摘帽后为何对 相关应收款大幅计提坏账，而非重整期处理？公司重整前后负债率为何反差较大背后又是否藏财技？值 得注意的是，公司出现少计提负债等情形。 随着年报季收关，不少上市公司却出现会计差错。据wind数据统计，2025年已经会计差错更正公司数量 超40家。 对于出现会计差错的公司我们该如何看待？所谓会计差错更正，根据相关定义，即指由于没有运用或错 误运用以下两种信息，而对前期财务报表造成遗漏或误报。需要指出的是，同样是财务列报错误，相比 会计舞弊，会计差错则属于非故意过失。 然而，近年部分财务造假公司却滥用会计差错，以会计差错更正之名掩盖财务造假舞弊之实。如众所熟 知的康美药业，300亿现金会计差错最终被证实财务黑洞；东方集团滥用总额法巨额财务造假，暴雷前 夕以会计差错之名进行调整等等。 基于上述背景，我们将对会计差错公司进行系列复盘，看看其背后隐藏何种风险。 陷入持续亏损 整车生产疑似陷入停滞 ...

Group 1 - Xiamen Bank disclosed its 2024 annual report, revealing the execution status of performance clawbacks for the first time, with a total deferred salary balance of approximately 0.62 million yuan [2] - The bank has determined performance clawbacks for 188 individuals, totaling 3.7012 million yuan, while deferring the payment of 6.022 million yuan in risk deferred compensation for 2024 due to unresolved risk events [2] - The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced that Dongfang Group's financial information from 2020 to 2023 was severely misleading, involving a cumulative inflated revenue of 16.129 billion yuan and inflated operating costs of 16.074 billion yuan over four years [2] Group 2 - Xiamen Bank initiated legal proceedings to recover loans from Xiamen Yinxiang Oil Co., Ltd. (Yinxiang Oil), which has defaulted due to overdue payments and significant economic disputes [3] - The bank's lawsuit includes five requests, such as repayment of principal and interest, exercising priority rights over collateral, and holding Xiamen Yinxiang Group and Dongfang Group jointly liable for repayment [3] - Yinxiang Oil was previously a key client for Xiamen Bank's manufacturing loans, ranking first among the bank's top ten manufacturing loan clients at the end of 2017, 2019, and mid-2020 [3]

5月12日晚，深交所披露了关于对浙江世纪华通集团股份有限公司（ST华通，002602）董监高的监管函。 因ST华通2018-2022年年报商誉有 关情况存在虚假记载；虚构软件著作权转让业务或提前确认收入，导致2020-2021年年报、关于业绩承诺完成情况的临时报告存在虚假记载， 公司7名相关责任人被出具监管函。 值得注意的是，此次公司4名历任董秘均被监管。 文/梧桐小新 | 公司代码 | 公司简称 | 采取监管措施日期 | 监管措施 | 函件内容 | | 涉及对象 | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 002602 | ST华通 | 2025-05-12 | 监管函 | 详细内容 | 董监高 | | 同日，浙江证监局也对上述7人出具了警示函。 2007年8月至2008年9月任浙江世纪华通车业有限公司董事会秘书， 2008年9月26日至2019年8月30日任公司董事会秘书。 2、 郦冰洁 ，女，中国国籍，无永久境外居留权，1994年1月出生，中共党员，大学本科学历，管理学学士、金融学学士。2016年6月至2020 年1月，就职于浙江世纪华通集团股份有限公 ...

Core Viewpoint - The company has faced regulatory scrutiny and penalties over the past five years due to financial discrepancies and has implemented corrective measures to address these issues [1][2][4]. Recent Regulatory Actions and Corrections - The company was penalized by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for inflating revenue and profits in its 2016 financial reports, resulting in a fine of 2 million yuan and a warning to the company and its former financial director [1][4]. - The company has established a special rectification task force led by the chairman to address the issues identified in the regulatory actions and has begun a thorough review of its financial practices since May 2023 [2][5]. - The company has engaged a qualified accounting firm to verify the corrections made to its financial statements from 2016 to 2022, ensuring compliance with disclosure obligations [2][7]. Financial Discrepancies - The company reported inflated revenue of 90.63 million yuan and inflated profit of 22.02 million yuan in its 2016 financial statements, which led to significant discrepancies in its financial reporting from 2016 to 2022 [1][6]. - In 2021, the company initially forecasted a net profit of 10 million to 15 million yuan but later revised this to a loss of 35 million to 38 million yuan, prompting regulatory scrutiny for inaccurate disclosures [4][5]. Internal Control Enhancements - The company has committed to strengthening its financial management and internal audit processes, enhancing communication between departments, and improving its internal control systems to prevent future discrepancies [5][6]. - The former financial director has resigned, and a new financial director has been appointed to oversee the implementation of these improvements [7][8].

Core Viewpoint - The increasing regulatory penalties and disclosures from listed companies are exposing the significant issue of false trading as a method of financial fraud, revealing a growing trend in the scale and duration of such activities [1][2]. Group 1: Characteristics of False Trading - False trading is characterized by the creation of a financial maze through circular transactions or fund lending, leading to financial fraud that reflects a combination of uncontrolled capital operations, ineffective internal controls, and audit failures [1][2]. - Recent cases show that the scale of transactions has increased, and the duration of concealment has lengthened, indicating new trends in false trading practices [1][3]. - The case of *ST Jinguang highlights that the company has been involved in false trading since at least 2018, with fraudulent activities persisting for over seven years [3][4]. Group 2: Regulatory Response - Regulatory bodies, including judicial, state-owned assets, and securities authorities, are intensifying their crackdown on false trading, with many A-share companies now prioritizing compliance in this area [1][10]. - The state-owned enterprise system has issued strict guidelines prohibiting various forms of false trading, emphasizing a zero-tolerance approach to violations [10][12]. - Companies are increasingly incorporating self-checks and financial audits focused on false trading into their compliance frameworks, as seen in the practices of companies like China Zhongche and Datang Telecom [10][11]. Group 3: Financial Implications - False trading practices have been linked to significant financial misreporting, with companies like Dongfang Group inflating revenues by over 16.1 billion yuan from 2020 to 2023 [3][9]. - The phenomenon of financing-type false trading has emerged, where companies use trade as a facade for lending funds, often leading to legal disputes and financial losses for involved parties [8][9]. - The pressure to meet performance metrics, especially in state-owned enterprises, drives the motivation for engaging in false trading, as it can artificially enhance revenue and improve financial statements [9][12]. Group 4: Audit and Compliance Challenges - Auditors are increasingly scrutinizing transactions for signs of false trading, focusing on the commercial substance of trades and the legitimacy of revenue recognition [11][12]. - The involvement of financial companies as "reservoirs" for funds has raised concerns about the potential for misuse in false trading schemes, prompting companies to enhance their disclosure practices regarding financial flows [5][6]. - The need for improved regulatory frameworks and investor protection mechanisms is emphasized to prevent the recurrence of financial fraud in the future [12].

Core Viewpoint - Zhitian Technology (300280.SZ) faces a delisting crisis due to failure to comply with regulatory rectification requirements and ongoing investigations into financial misconduct [2][11]. Group 1: Company Background - Zhitian Technology's main business includes modern services and wholesale retail, specifically internet advertising, cloud services, and e-commerce [3]. - The company was restructured in 2016, with Yao Haiyan and Zheng Lan becoming the actual controllers [3]. Group 2: Regulatory Issues - In February 2024, the Fujian Securities Regulatory Bureau ordered Zhitian Technology to correct false financial records, including inflated revenue and undisclosed major lawsuits [7]. - The company has not hired an auditing firm or submitted a rectification report, leading to a formal investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission [8][12]. - Zhitian Technology has been accused of obstructing regulatory enforcement, with key executives avoiding communication with regulators [5][6]. Group 3: Financial Performance - Zhitian Technology's stock price has plummeted over 80% in the past year, with a market value of approximately 1.4 billion yuan before trading suspension [9][11]. - The company failed to disclose its 2024 annual report and 2025 Q1 report on time, further exacerbating its delisting risk [8][11]. Group 4: Shareholder Impact - Approximately 33,000 shareholders are affected by the company's financial issues, with potential legal recourse for those who purchased shares during specific periods [12].

Core Viewpoint - *ST Zhongcheng (300208), formerly known as Qingdao Zhongcheng, is facing delisting from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange due to significant financial misconduct and negative net assets [1][3] Group 1: Delisting Announcement - On May 7, *ST Zhongcheng received a notice from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange regarding the termination of its stock listing [1] - The delisting decision is based on two main violations: negative net assets in 2023 and a qualified audit report for 2024, along with denied internal control audits [1] - The company has been confirmed to have engaged in systematic financial fraud for six years, as per the investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) [1] Group 2: Regulatory Actions - The company was investigated by the CSRC for information disclosure violations starting January 16 of this year [3] - The CSRC issued an administrative penalty notice on April 30, citing fraudulent financial data related to a fictitious project in the Philippines from 2017 to 2021 and further financial misrepresentation regarding Indonesian mining rights from 2020 to 2022 [3] - The company failed to disclose a significant lawsuit involving 627 million yuan, which accounted for 57.47% of its net assets at the end of 2022, leading to a warning and a fine of 7.5 million yuan from the CSRC [3] Group 3: Financial Performance - In the latest annual report, the company reported a revenue of 137 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 70.21% [3] - The net profit attributable to shareholders was -310 million yuan, reflecting a 73.24% reduction in losses compared to the previous year [3] - The primary reasons for the losses include the completion of the nickel power project, high management costs, and elevated financial expenses [3]

Core Viewpoint - The delisting of *ST Dongfang represents not only a failure of a single company but also a stress test for the market ecology and regulatory system in China, highlighting the issues that arise from the rapid growth of private enterprises [1] Group 1: Company Background and Financial Issues - *ST Dongfang, once celebrated as the "first private listed company in Northeast China," ended its journey at a price of 0.36 yuan per share, marking a significant event in the new delisting regulations era [3] - The company experienced a remarkable stock price increase of 420% over three years after its reverse merger in 2018, but this façade of prosperity quickly unraveled [3] - In 2022, *ST Dongfang reported a suspicious 87% increase in net profit to 320 million yuan, while accounts receivable surged by 214% to 2.87 billion yuan, indicating a disconnect between reported profits and actual cash flow [3][4] Group 2: Fraudulent Activities and Regulatory Failures - The company was found to have inflated revenue by 16.13 billion yuan through fictitious contracts and fraudulent documentation, accounting for 47% of its total disclosed revenue [4] - The audit firm, Dahua, which had been auditing *ST Dongfang since 2011, issued unqualified opinions during the years of fraud, raising questions about its role in the deception [7] - Despite multiple inquiries from the exchange regarding the company's business logic, *ST Dongfang provided vague responses, indicating a breakdown in regulatory oversight [8] Group 3: Consequences and Future Outlook - Following its delisting, *ST Dongfang faces significant challenges, including 4.6 billion yuan in overdue debts and a 2 billion yuan funding gap for a project [9] - Over 5,000 investors have registered for compensation claims, with the potential for a new legal framework to hold the actual controller and audit firm accountable [9] - The delisting serves as a reflection of the contradictions within China's capital market reform, emphasizing the need for a return to fundamental investment logic based on genuine value creation [9][10]

令人震惊的是，锦州港在2024年11月首次被证监会立案调查并处罚后，仍持续造假。值得注意的是，公 司18年至23年年报审计机构均为大华会计事务所，但造假似乎被其无视，多年出具无保留的审计意见类 型。 曾系统性财务造假被立案，虚增利润超1.7亿元 锦州港的财务造假行为最早可追溯至2018年。根据中国证监会2024年6月披露的《行政处罚及市场禁入 事先知书》，公司为"做大收入和利润、满足银行贷款需求"，通过无商业实质的虚假贸易业务，系统性 虚增营业收入、营业成本和利润总额。具体来看： 造假规模：2018年至2021年累计虚增营业收入86.24亿元，虚增利润总额1.79亿元。其中，2018年虚增利 润2070.9万元，2019年3899.9万元，2020年4415.7万元，2021年7511.4万元。 造假手段：通过子公司锦国投（大连）发展有限公司控制上下游供应商及客户的资金流转，形成闭环资 金池。例如，采购资金经大连和境等五家供应商流入锦国投资金池，再通过上海盛辙、舟山丰聚益尚等 公司回流至锦州港，制造虚假贸易流水。 责任认定：时任董事长徐健、副董事长兼总经理刘辉被认定为直接负责的主管人员，财务总监李挺等高 管为 ...