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日本楼市崩盘与二十年低迷:政策失误与舆情失控的历史教训
Group 1 - The core argument of the articles revolves around the lessons learned from Japan's real estate bubble and its subsequent collapse, emphasizing the importance of policy balance and timely intervention in crisis management [1][19][25] - Japan's real estate market experienced a significant bubble from the mid-1980s, driven by excessive lending and speculative behavior, which ultimately led to a severe economic downturn known as the "Lost Decade" [2][3][19] - The initial response to the bubble involved aggressive monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan, which was later criticized for being too abrupt and poorly timed, exacerbating the economic crisis [5][6][19] Group 2 - The media played a crucial role in shaping public perception and policy direction, initially promoting the idea of bursting the bubble, but later turning against the government and financial institutions during the crisis [3][15][21] - The introduction of punitive tax measures during the downturn, such as the land tax and increased transaction taxes, further strained the market and led to increased selling pressure among investors [9][10][19] - The proliferation of foreclosed properties, or "law auction houses," created a downward spiral in property prices, significantly impacting market expectations and leading to a broader economic malaise [10][11][17] Group 3 - The Japanese government's financial rescue efforts were criticized for prioritizing banks over the real economy, leading to a prolonged economic stagnation and a lack of effective recovery measures [12][19][25] - The lessons from Japan's experience highlight the need for a balanced approach in policy-making, considering both the prevention of asset bubbles and the support for economic growth [20][21][25] - Japan's post-2013 economic reforms, under the "Abenomics" framework, aimed to revitalize the real estate market and stimulate economic growth, providing insights for other countries facing similar challenges [18][24][25]