这不是要跟谁打仗，是中国在规则里找漏洞，一点一点把定价权拿回来，白宫关门只是碰巧，动作早就在计划里了，美国要是还觉得美元没人敢碰，那接 下来的事，恐怕就没那么简单了。 这事不是一时兴起，中国这几年一直在减少买美国国债，现在连铁矿石也开始动手了，铁矿石对中国特别关键，七成以上得靠进口，必和必拓又是最大供 应商，谁掌握铁矿价格，谁就掐住了钢铁行业的脖子，人民币想走出去，过去在石油天然气上没打通，铁矿石反而成了机会，因为交易灵活，定价方式老 旧，正好拿来试试看。 有人觉得这不过是吓唬人的把戏，全球铁矿石八成五还是用美元结账，人民币连百分之五都不到，美国可能拉上印度、日本一起买矿，或者反过来卡住中 国高纯度铝的出口，澳洲那边也没慌，必和必拓股价掉了一点，没断供，还在等中国拿出新办法。 这事早就有迹可循，十年前中国就想自己定稀土的价格，结果搞出了配额制，这次是更进一步，想把铁矿的定价权从普氏指数拉到中国加人民币，2025年 的政府白皮书里明明白白写着，要推动大宗商品用人民币计价，这回就是第一步，要是俄罗斯、伊朗这些产油国也跟着改用人民币，一个绕开美元的贸易 圈就真能成形了。 那天正好是白宫放假的日子，中国矿产资源集团发 ...

Group 1 - The global financial landscape is undergoing a profound restructuring, with the internationalization of the RMB and offshore finance being assigned key strategic missions by the state [1] - The 2023 Central Financial Committee's opinion emphasizes the construction of an offshore financial system that matches the Shanghai International Financial Center, marking a shift in the role of offshore finance to a core pillar of the national financial opening strategy [1] - The 2024 RMB Internationalization White Paper indicates that the RMB has maintained its position as the fifth largest payment currency globally for four consecutive years, but its share in high-value scenarios like trade financing and cash management remains below 20%, highlighting the urgency to accelerate the RMB's internationalization [1] Group 2 - The interdependence between RMB internationalization and offshore finance is crucial, as a robust offshore financial market is essential for the RMB's global expansion, providing necessary services such as clearing, financing, and hedging [2] - The mutual empowerment between offshore finance and RMB internationalization is not merely additive but forms an organic closed loop through demand traction, supply response, and institutional guarantees, which determines the efficiency and quality of strategic advancement [2] Group 3 - Demand-side structural differentiation is evident, with the RMB settlement proportion in goods trade with Belt and Road countries reaching 28% in 2024, a 15 percentage point increase since 2020, but the penetration rate for private enterprises is only 12%, significantly lower than the 45% for state-owned enterprises [3] - The service trade demand is evolving, with a significant increase in the need for financial services across cross-border trade, education, healthcare, and tourism, yet the RMB's share in personal cross-border payments is less than 5% [4] Group 4 - The supply side of offshore RMB services shows a concentration in major financial centers like Hong Kong, Singapore, London, and Dubai, with Hong Kong dominating offshore RMB deposits (60%) and bond issuance (75%) [5] - There is a notable gap in inclusive financial services for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with 80% of outward-oriented SMEs finding offshore financial services too costly and complex [6] Group 5 - Institutional constraints include balancing the demands for openness with risk prevention, as capital account convertibility remains a significant limitation [7] - The direction for institutional innovation should focus on gradual opening and precise risk control, with the need to replicate successful local experiences and establish a coherent regulatory framework [7] Group 6 - International experiences from Japan and the UK/US provide valuable insights, with Japan's "dual-track" profit repatriation mechanism and the US's offshore dollar strategy showcasing different paths to currency internationalization [8][9] - The challenges posed by the dominance of stablecoins in the digital currency landscape highlight the need for proactive measures in the digital RMB space to avoid losing ground in internationalization [12] Group 7 - The lack of inclusive offshore financial services is a core bottleneck for the RMB's internationalization, with a significant gap between the willingness and actual capability of enterprises to use RMB for settlement [13] - The "Matthew effect" in market mechanisms leads to a preference for serving high-net-worth clients, leaving SMEs underserved and highlighting the need for policies that address this imbalance [14] Group 8 - A comprehensive action plan is proposed to enhance the offshore financial ecosystem, focusing on market collaboration, policy incentives, technological empowerment, and capacity building [15] - The establishment of a three-pole network involving Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Dubai is suggested to enhance global service capabilities and facilitate RMB's internationalization [15][16] Group 9 - Policy measures should aim to lower institutional costs and stimulate market participation, including tax incentives and revolutionary simplification of approval processes [17][26] - Enhancing the infrastructure for RMB usage, including upgrading clearing and payment networks, is essential for improving liquidity and convenience [25] Group 10 - Strengthening risk prevention mechanisms and building international trust through intelligent regulatory systems are crucial for the RMB's acceptance as a reserve currency [27] - The long-term strategy for RMB to replace the USD involves maintaining economic and trade leadership, establishing a mature RMB pricing system for commodities, and enhancing the offshore financial market's global service capacity [28][29]