Group 1 - The external delivery platform subsidy war is cooling down following a meeting with China's State Administration for Market Regulation, which emphasized the need to avoid irrational promotions [1] - The "involution" competition issue remains a concern, as delivery riders and merchants face increased pressure despite short-term gains in order volume and income [1][2] - A medium-sized fast-food company's management reported a 12%-15% decline in dine-in customer flow due to delivery subsidies, with delivery orders increasing from 15% to 22% [1] Group 2 - Over-competition and "involution" can harm market efficiency and fairness, with subsidies failing to cultivate user habits or expand overall market size [2] - The subsidy war may accelerate the "Matthew effect," where financially strong platforms use extensive subsidies to squeeze out competitors, leading to increased market concentration [2] - The dual "involution" in platform economics involves both competition among platforms for user traffic and merchants being forced to participate in subsidies to gain private traffic [2] Group 3 - Recommendations for government regulation include flexible enforcement, such as reminders to platforms to standardize competitive behavior, and utilizing existing laws to regulate predatory pricing [3] - Platforms are advised to avoid short-sighted subsidy competition and instead pursue differentiated development paths through service quality improvement and technological innovation [3]

Core Viewpoint - The competition among food delivery platforms in China is cooling down following regulatory interventions, but the underlying issue of "involution" in competition remains a concern [1][2]. Group 1: Impact of Subsidy Wars - The recent subsidy wars led to a significant increase in order volume, but delivery riders reported heightened stress and physical exhaustion due to the intense workload [1]. - A mid-tier fast-food company's management noted a 12%-15% decline in dine-in customer traffic due to subsidies, with the proportion of delivery orders rising from 15% to 22% [1]. - Platforms are pressuring merchants to offer additional discounts, resulting in losses of approximately 8 RMB per order for some businesses, which could jeopardize the financial stability of small and medium-sized restaurants in the long term [1]. Group 2: Market Dynamics and Competition - Experts argue that excessive competition and "involution" harm market efficiency and fairness, with subsidies failing to cultivate genuine user habits or expand overall market size [2]. - The "Matthew effect" may be accelerated by subsidy wars, where financially strong platforms dominate the market, leading to increased market concentration [2]. - The dual nature of "involution" in platform economies is highlighted, where platforms compete for user traffic through large subsidies, while merchants are compelled to participate in these subsidies to gain visibility [2]. Group 3: Regulatory and Strategic Recommendations - Recommendations for government regulation include flexible enforcement, such as reminders to platforms to standardize competitive behavior, and utilizing existing legal frameworks to regulate predatory pricing [3]. - Platforms are advised to avoid short-sighted subsidy competition and instead pursue differentiated development strategies by enhancing service quality and technological innovation to gain competitive advantages [3].

Group 1 - The core issue of the article revolves around the "involution" competition in the food delivery industry, highlighted by the recent discussions among major platforms like Meituan, Ele.me, and JD.com, which have committed to ending irrational promotions [1][3] - The intense competition has led to significant pressure on delivery riders and merchants, with riders experiencing increased order volumes but also physical strain, while merchants face declining dine-in traffic and increased losses per order due to platform demands for further discounts [3][4] - Experts emphasize that excessive competition harms market efficiency and fairness, with subsidies failing to cultivate user habits or expand market size, instead leading to a substitution effect between online and offline businesses [3][4] Group 2 - The phenomenon of "double involution" in platform economies is characterized by both inter-platform competition for user traffic through large subsidies and intra-platform merchants being forced to participate in subsidies to attract private traffic [4] - Recommendations for addressing involution competition include flexible regulatory approaches, such as platform reminders to standardize competitive behavior and the use of existing legal frameworks to regulate predatory pricing [4][5] - Experts suggest that platforms should shift from short-sighted subsidy competition to differentiated development strategies, focusing on service quality and technological innovation to gain competitive advantages [5]