Core Viewpoint - The recent fund liquidation meetings held by Guolianan Fund have raised concerns due to the sudden surge in shares of its two funds, Xinqian Mixed A and CSI New Materials ETF, before the liquidation vote, leading to a unanimous approval for liquidation, which is seen as a potential manipulation of the voting process by the fund company [1][2][9]. Group 1: Fund Liquidation Cases - Guolianan Xinqian Mixed A saw its shares increase from approximately 1.91 million to 3.948 million in just over ten days, with 203.1 million shares voting in favor of liquidation, resulting in a 100% approval rate [2][6]. - Similarly, the CSI New Materials ETF's shares rose from 21.146 million to 39.146 million within four trading days, with 20.37 million shares participating in the vote, also achieving a unanimous approval [6][9]. Group 2: Voting Mechanism and Investor Protection - The voting rights in fund holder meetings are linked to the number of shares held, allowing large institutional investments to dominate the voting outcomes, especially when retail investors are absent [9][13]. - The occurrence of two consecutive 100% approval votes raises suspicions of organized vote manipulation, undermining the intended protective function of fund holder meetings [9][14]. Group 3: Guolianan Fund's Market Position - Guolianan Fund, established in April 2003, has a market position in the lower tier of the industry, with a non-monetary fund management scale of 109.5 billion, ranking 45th in the industry [10]. - The fund's active equity funds have shown poor performance, with the Guolianan Climate Change Mixed A fund returning -46.44% since inception, significantly lagging behind its benchmark [11][12]. Group 4: Institutional Dependency and Governance Issues - A significant portion of Guolianan's funds are held by institutional investors, with 45 out of 85 funds having over 50% institutional ownership, leading to a skewed voting power that diminishes retail investors' influence [13]. - The reliance on institutional capital for decision-making in fund holder meetings highlights a systemic issue where the governance mechanism may serve the fund company's interests rather than those of the investors [14].