苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司 第一章 总则 第一条 为强化苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司（以下简称"公司"）董 事会决策功能，做到事前审计、专业审计，完善公司治理结构，根据《中华人民 共和国公司法》（以下简称"《公司法》"）、《上市公司治理准则》《上市公 司独立董事管理办法》《深圳证券交易所创业板股票上市规则》《深圳证券交易 所上市公司自律监管指引第2号--创业板上市公司规范运作》等法律、行政法规、 部门规章及规范性文件的规定，以及《苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司章程》 （以下简称"《公司章程》"）的有关规定，特制定本细则。 第二条 董事会审计委员会是董事会设立的专门工作机构，主要负责公司内、 外部审计的沟通、监督和核查工作。 第二章 人员组成 第三条 审计委员会成员由三名不在公司担任高级管理人员的董事组成，其 中独立董事应当过半数并担任召集人，委员中至少有一名独立董事为会计专业人 士。 （三）聘任或者解聘公司财务负责人； 第四条 审计委员会委员由董事长、过半数独立董事或者全体董事的三分之 一以上提名，并由董事会选举产生。 第五条 审计委员会设主任委员（召集人）一名，由独立董事委员中的会计 专业人士担任，负 ...

苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司 董事会提名委员会工作细则 第一章 总则 第一条 为规范苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司（以下简称"公司"）董 事和高级管理人员的产生，优化董事会组成，完善公司治理结构，根据《中华人 民共和国公司法》（以下简称"《公司法》"）、《上市公司治理准则》《上市 公司独立董事管理办法》《深圳证券交易所创业板股票上市规则》《深圳证券交 易所上市公司自律监管指引第2号--创业板上市公司规范运作》等法律、行政法 规、部门规章及规范性文件的规定，以及《苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司章 程》（以下简称"《公司章程》"）的有关规定，特制定本细则。 第二条 董事会提名委员会是董事会下设的专门工作机构，主要负责对公司 董事和高级管理人员的人选、选择标准和程序进行研究并提出建议。 第二章 人员组成 第三条 提名委员会成员由三名董事组成，独立董事成员需超过半数。 第四条 提名委员会委员由董事长、过半数独立董事或者全体董事的三分之 一以上提名，并由董事会选举产生。 第五条 提名委员会设主任委员（召集人）一名，由独立董事委员担任，负 责主持委员会工作；主任委员（召集人）在委员内选举，并报请董事会批准产生。 第六条 ...

苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司 董事会议事规则 （2025 年 8 月修订） 第一章 总则 第一条 为了进一步规范苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司（以下简称"公 司"）董事会的议事方式和决策程序，促使董事和董事会有效地履行其职责，提 高董事会规范运作和科学决策水平，根据《中华人民共和国公司法》（以下简称 "《公司法》"）、《中华人民共和国证券法》（以下简称"《证券法》"）《深 圳证券交易所创业板股票上市规则》《深圳证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第 宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司章程》（以下简称"《公司章程》"）的有关规定， 结合公司实际情况，制订本规则。 第二条 公司依法设立董事会。董事会是公司经营管理的决策机构，维护公 司和全体股东的利益，负责公司发展目标和重大经营活动的决策。 第三条 制定本议事规则的目的是规范公司董事会议事程序，提高董事会工 作效率和科学决策的水平。 第二章 董事会的组成和职权 第四条 董事会由九名董事组成，其中独立董事三名，职工董事一名。董事 会设董事长一名。董事长由董事会以全体董事的过半数选举产生。 第五条 董事会行使下列职权： （一）召集股东会，并向股东会报告工作； （二）执行股东会的决 ...

苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司 第一章 总则 第一条 为完善苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司（以下简称"公司"）治 理结构，规范公司内部运作，确保公司高级管理人员勤勉高效地履行职责，根据 《中华人民共和国公司法》《中华人民共和国证券法》《深圳证券交易所创业板 股票上市规则》《深圳证券交易所上市公司自律监管指引第2号——创业板上市 公司规范运作》等法律、行政法规、规范性文件及《苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有 限公司章程》（以下简称"《公司章程》"）的规定，结合本公司实际情况，制 定本细则。 第二条 本细则适用人员范围为总经理和《公司章程》所规定的其他高级管 理人员，董事会秘书除外（该职位由《董事会秘书工作细则》另行规范）。 第三条 公司设总经理一名，由公司董事会聘任或解聘，主持公司日常经营 和管理工作，组织实施董事会决议，对董事会负责并向董事会报告工作。 第二章 总经理的任职资格及任免程序 第四条 总经理及其他高级管理人员任职应当具备下列条件： （一）具有较丰富的经济理论知识、管理知识及实践经验，具有较强的综合 管理能力； （二）具有知人善任调动员工积极性、建立合理的组织机构、协调各种内外 关系和统揽全局的能力； （三 ...

第一条 为进一步完善苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司以下简称"公司"） 的法人治理结构，加强公司内部控制建设，强化信息披露文件编制工作的基础， 充分发挥董事会审计委员会（以下简称"审计委员会"）在年报编制工作中的作 用，根据《中华人民共和国公司法》《中华人民共和国证券法》（以下简称"《证 券法》"）、《深圳证券交易所创业板股票上市规则》《深圳证券交易所上市公 司自律监管指引第2号——创业板上市公司规范运作》等法律、法规、规范性文 件以及《苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司章程》（以下简称"《公司章程》"） 的有关规定，并结合公司实际情况，制定本制度。 第二条 审计委员会在公司年报编制和披露过程中，应当按照有关法律、法 规、规章、规范性文件、《公司章程》和本制度的要求，认真履行责任和义务， 勤勉尽责地开展工作，保证公司年报的真实、准确、完整和及时，维护公司整体 利益。 苏州宝丽迪材料科技股份有限公司 第一章 总则 第二章 审计委员会年报工作管理制度 第三条 审计委员会在公司年度财务报表审计过程中，应履行如下主要职责： （一）协调会计师事务所审计工作时间安排； （六）中国证券监督管理委员会（以下简称"中国证监会"）、深 ...

Core Insights - SoftBank's Vision Fund 2 has incurred a staggering loss of $22 billion, yet the soaring valuation of OpenAI has propelled SoftBank's stock to new heights, showcasing Masayoshi Son's ability to recover from crises [1][3]. Group 1: SoftBank's Stock Performance - On Tuesday, SoftBank's stock reached a historic high of 14,825 yen, with a market capitalization of $146 billion, reflecting a cumulative increase of approximately 75% this year, largely attributed to Son's investment in OpenAI [2]. - The valuation of OpenAI has surged to $500 billion, effectively doubling its recent valuation, which significantly enhances SoftBank's previous investment value of $9.7 billion in OpenAI [2][3]. Group 2: Vision Fund 2 Performance - Vision Fund 2 has performed poorly since its inception in 2019, with cumulative losses of $22 billion across investments in 280 different companies, representing nearly one-third of its invested capital [5]. - The investment in OpenAI is expected to alter this negative trajectory, as SoftBank employed a high-leverage strategy to acquire shares in OpenAI [6]. Group 3: Investment Strategy and Risks - SoftBank's investment strategy involved complex financial maneuvers, including borrowing tens of billions from various sources, including Japanese banks and private equity firms like Apollo [6]. - An additional investment of $22.5 billion in OpenAI is anticipated by the end of the year, which, if completed, could result in SoftBank holding up to 12% of OpenAI [6][7]. - This investment could lead to potential profits before the funds are even deployed, contingent upon OpenAI's transition to a profit-generating structure [7]. Group 4: Governance and Concentration Risks - Unlike the first Vision Fund, Vision Fund 2 lacks external investors, with Son securing a 17.25% stake for himself, which ties his personal wealth closely to the fund's performance [8]. - Concerns have been raised regarding corporate governance, as Son's personal stake may diminish potential returns for SoftBank's shareholders [9]. - The concentration of investment in OpenAI could account for 34% of Vision Fund 2's total size, reminiscent of past failures like the WeWork investment, raising alarms about risk concentration [10].

Core Viewpoint - The controversy surrounding the chairman of Baiguoyuan's remarks highlights the relationship between consumer sovereignty, corporate governance, and operational realities, especially amid declining revenue and store closures [2] Group 1: Corporate Governance and Consumer Relations - The chairman's comments about educating consumers were met with public backlash, indicating a disconnect between the company's approach and consumer expectations [2][5] - The term "education" in a commercial context can imply a power imbalance, undermining consumer autonomy and dignity [5] - Baiguoyuan's governance structure lacks mechanisms to filter high-risk communications from executives, leading to unfiltered personal views being perceived as corporate stance [6] Group 2: Financial Performance and Market Position - Baiguoyuan's revenue declined by 9.8% year-on-year in 2024, with a net loss of 391 million yuan, marking the first net loss in five years [8] - The company closed 966 stores in 2024, averaging 2.6 closures per day, reflecting a shift in consumer attitudes towards high-end fruit chains [8] - The high-price strategy and the notion of "educating consumers" are increasingly seen as out of touch with market realities, exacerbating the disconnect between consumers and the brand [8] Group 3: Competitive Landscape and Challenges - Baiguoyuan faces competition from platforms like Hema and Dingdong, which leverage scale and instant delivery to alter consumer purchasing habits [9] - The company has encountered multiple food safety issues, undermining its claims of providing high-quality products and further damaging consumer trust [9][14] - The franchise model's sustainability is challenged by high costs and poor profit margins for franchisees, indicating weaknesses in cost control and supply chain management [8][9] Group 4: Implications for Future Strategy - The disconnect between Baiguoyuan's ESG commitments and its operational practices raises questions about the authenticity of its consumer-centric claims [14] - The company must adapt its governance from founder-led to professional management to better align with market dynamics and consumer expectations [16] - To genuinely "educate" the market, Baiguoyuan needs to accept consumer evaluations of its product quality and safety, integrating ESG principles into daily operations [16]

Core Points - The document outlines the operational guidelines for the General Manager of Shenzhen Kaizhong Precision Technology Co., Ltd, aiming to enhance corporate governance and ensure effective management [2][3] Group 1: General Provisions - The company establishes a General Manager to oversee daily operations and report to the Board of Directors [2] - The General Manager is responsible for implementing board decisions and managing the company's production and operations [2][3] Group 2: Qualifications and Appointment Procedures - The General Manager and senior management must possess extensive economic and management knowledge, practical experience, and strong management capabilities [3] - Specific disqualifications for the General Manager include criminal convictions related to corruption or financial misconduct [4][5] Group 3: Responsibilities of the General Manager - The General Manager is tasked with organizing the company's annual operational plans and investment proposals [6][8] - The General Manager must report to the Board on significant operational issues and ensure compliance with legal and regulatory requirements [12][13] Group 4: Reporting System - The General Manager is required to report work progress to the Board regularly and must communicate any major issues immediately [12][13] - Reports should include the company's long-term development plans, annual plan implementation, and significant contracts [12][13] Group 5: Performance Evaluation and Incentives - The performance of the General Manager is evaluated by the Board, linking compensation to company performance and individual achievements [31][32] - Violations of laws or negligence leading to company losses may result in penalties or legal action against the General Manager [33]

据网传举报材料，此次员工实名举报的核心点，包括高管经济问题、国有资产处置存疑、"一言堂"式人 事决策等。其声称，"不接受徐某静降职降薪及逼迫离职的恐吓，要求公司人力介入去留员工的能力评 估，必须揭露其中饱私囊的事实。" 值得关注的是，此次员工实名举报中还透露了公司裁员等问题，直指今年7月份的一场大规模组织架构 变革，因此备受市场关注。 对于以上问题，金地集团方面接受南都湾财社记者采访时表示，"我司已关注到相关报道，公司高度重 视并已开展核查。" 员工实名举报公司高管 据网传举报材料，傅某于2016年8月1日正式加入金地集团，正值第九个年头，入职负责金地天境项目营 销经理。之后陆续负责奉贤、松江等难点项目。于2019年调至区域跟随徐某静配合管理华东区域营销部 各类工作事项，其间徐某静经常以各类奖励、团建等名义将费用报销至下属名下再私下转回给她，傅某 称希望公司审计可介入核实相关费用真正去向。 在此之后，傅某主动申请远离该"领导"回上海公司，2020年—2023年期间操盘西虹桥虹悦湾、金地西郊 风华、金地嘉源、金地嘉悦湾、金地峯汇、金地悦章，最终因金地悦章操盘失利，愿意回归平台负责上 海公司大宗业务。 傅某还表示 ...

Core Viewpoint - Suzhou Dingjia Precision Technology Co., Ltd. successfully held an online roadshow for its listing on the Beijing Stock Exchange, emphasizing its commitment to investor returns and corporate governance [1] Group 1: Company Strategy and Governance - The company plans to establish a stable investor return mechanism, with a cash dividend ratio of no less than 30% of the annual distributable profits over the next three years [1] - It has implemented systems such as the "Cumulative Voting System Implementation Rules" and "Shareholders' Meeting Online Voting Implementation Rules" to ensure the rights of minority shareholders in decision-making [1] - Independent directors will play a supervisory role in major business decisions to ensure compliance and transparency in corporate governance [1] Group 2: Financial Health - The company's debt-to-asset ratio remains stable at around 30%, indicating a solid financial position [1] - Cash flow is robust, with monetary funds expected to reach 257 million yuan by the end of 2024, demonstrating good dividend-paying capability [1] - The company plans to initiate subscription on July 22, with an issue price of 11.16 yuan per share, aiming for accelerated growth through capital markets [1]