Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the ongoing control struggle at ST Luton (300555.SZ), highlighting the conflict between new major shareholder Wu Shichun and the existing management team, which has led to a series of dramatic events and challenges regarding board restructuring [1][2]. Group 1: Shareholder Dynamics - Wu Shichun, chairman of Meihua Venture Capital, has been actively acquiring stakes in listed companies, becoming the largest shareholder of ST Luton by acquiring 7.44% of shares for 150 million yuan [6][5]. - The ownership structure of ST Luton has been unstable since its listing in 2016, with multiple changes in controlling shareholders and a trend of declining revenue and net profit [6][7]. - In May, Wu Shichun and other shareholders initiated a challenge against the current board, seeking to remove existing directors and appoint new ones [9][10]. Group 2: Board Restructuring Attempts - The board of ST Luton has repeatedly rejected Wu Shichun's proposals to restructure the board, citing legal compliance and stability concerns [12][13]. - Despite attempts to convene extraordinary shareholder meetings, the management has consistently blocked these efforts, claiming that the proposals violate regulations regarding board elections during acquisition transitions [15][18]. - The independent directors' positions have been ambiguous, with some supporting the management while others have expressed concerns about the legality of the board's actions [17][16]. Group 3: Controversial Share Transfer Agreements - A significant twist occurred when Wu Shichun and his associates announced the termination of a share transfer agreement, citing non-compliance with regulatory requirements [20][19]. - The original agreement involved a unique arrangement where the actual recipient of the shares was a yet-to-be-established partnership, raising questions about the legitimacy of the transaction [23][22]. - The sudden termination of the agreement has created confusion regarding the control of the company, as Wu Shichun still holds over 10% of shares through other means, allowing him to propose changes to the board [24][27]. Group 4: Regulatory and Compliance Issues - ST Luton faced regulatory scrutiny for failing to disclose shareholder proposals to remove directors, leading to a warning issued to the chairman [25][26]. - The management's defensive actions have been undermined by their own procedural flaws, raising questions about the legitimacy of their claims against Wu Shichun [26][27]. - The ongoing conflict serves as a case study for corporate governance and compliance in the context of control changes in listed companies, emphasizing the need for adherence to regulatory frameworks to avoid detrimental outcomes for all parties involved [27].

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the ongoing power struggle between new and old shareholders of ST Luton, highlighting the complexities and controversies surrounding venture capital firms entering publicly listed companies through judicial auctions and board restructuring efforts [1][2][6]. Group 1: Background of the Conflict - Wu Shichun, a prominent investor, acquired a 7.44% stake in ST Luton for 150 million yuan, becoming the largest shareholder and proposing a board restructuring that was unanimously rejected by the existing board [1]. - The conflict has raised questions about the legitimacy of the original controlling shareholder's board nominations and the implications of Wu's acquisition strategy [2][3]. Group 2: Legal and Regulatory Considerations - The dispute centers on whether the original controlling shareholder's board nominations remain valid despite their loss of direct shareholding, with legal experts noting that current company law does not explicitly tie board nomination rights to shareholding status [2][4]. - Concerns have been raised regarding potential violations of information disclosure obligations by ST Luton's board, as they failed to notify shareholders of a temporary shareholders' meeting [5]. Group 3: Market Perception and Terminology - The strategy employed by Wu has sparked debate over whether it constitutes "barbarian" tactics, with legal experts clarifying that Wu's method of acquisition through judicial auction is distinct from traditional hostile takeovers [3][4]. - The term "white knight" has also been questioned, as the motivations behind venture capital firms acquiring public companies may not always align with altruistic intentions [6][7]. Group 4: Implications for the Industry - The article suggests that the entry of venture capital firms into public companies could either facilitate industry consolidation or serve short-term profit motives, with the true impact requiring further market observation [6][7]. - Experts propose establishing compliance standards for venture capital firms entering public markets, emphasizing the need for transparency in control transitions and the protection of minority investors [7].

Core Viewpoint - The battle for control over Ruian New Materials has intensified, showcasing a classic case of power struggle between state-owned enterprises and original shareholders following the implementation of the new Company Law in China [1][2][10]. Group 1: Control Rights and Governance Structure - The proposal to abolish the supervisory board was aimed at streamlining governance in response to the 2023 Company Law reforms, allowing the audit committee to take over its functions [4][10]. - The proposal was rejected at the annual shareholders' meeting on May 12, 2025, with 43.84% in favor and 54.97% against, indicating strong opposition from the original shareholders [6][10]. - The rejection of the supervisory board abolition reflects the fierce confrontation between the state-owned enterprise and the original shareholders, as it would have weakened the latter's influence in corporate governance [10][22]. Group 2: Shareholder Dynamics and Financial Performance - Following the expiration of the original concerted action agreement in September 2023, Ruian New Materials entered a "leaderless" state, with original shareholders holding approximately 37% of the shares [13][14]. - In 2024, the company reported a total revenue of 1.459 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 20.74%, and a net profit of 252 million yuan, up 87.60%, reversing the downward trend from the second half of 2022 [16]. - The stock price of Ruian New Materials experienced significant volatility, rising 13.3% after a judicial ruling in March 2025 but falling back to around 39 yuan following the rejection of the supervisory board proposal, resulting in a market value decline of over 20% from its peak [10][11]. Group 3: Strategic Implications and Future Outlook - The entry of the state-owned enterprise is driven by the strategic goal of completing the display materials industry chain, which includes trade, engineering, and shipbuilding [14][16]. - The ongoing conflict over control rights not only highlights the challenges of state-owned enterprises acquiring private companies but also raises concerns about potential adjustments in technology direction and governance structures [22][23]. - The original shareholders, led by Liu Xiaochun, are actively defending their operational control and have increased their shareholding to 15% through concerted actions, indicating a robust resistance against the state-owned enterprise's influence [18][19].