Group 1 - The core argument presented by U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent is that the notion of the renminbi becoming a major global reserve currency is a "fallacy," and he believes it will not achieve internationalization in the future [1][3] - Bessent's reasoning is based on the traditional view that "capital freedom of movement is a prerequisite for reserve currency," asserting that China's financial market is not sufficiently open, although technological advancements have rendered this standard outdated [3][5] - The cross-border payment system for renminbi is projected to handle 175.49 trillion yuan in 2024, marking a 42.6% year-on-year increase, with participation from 1,683 financial institutions globally, creating a clearing network independent of the Western SWIFT system [3][9] Group 2 - Bessent's claim that 1.4 billion Chinese people wish to transfer assets abroad lacks data support; in 2024, the cross-border renminbi settlement volume is expected to reach 64.1 trillion yuan, with 74.5% of this being capital items primarily used for overseas investments by enterprises [5][7] - Nearly 50% of Chinese enterprises use renminbi for over 20% of their foreign investments, establishing a cycle of "using renminbi to procure Chinese manufacturing overseas" [5][7] - The inclusion of Chinese government bonds in major indices has led to a threefold increase in the scale of renminbi assets held by foreign central banks compared to five years ago, indicating a growing acceptance of the renminbi [5][7] Group 3 - The erosion of trust in the U.S. dollar is attributed to the U.S. itself, with a national debt of $36 trillion and a fiscal deficit of $1.7 trillion in 2023, leading to a decline in global confidence [7][9] - The weaponization of the dollar, exemplified by the freezing of Russian foreign reserves, has prompted many countries to reduce their dollar assets, with Saudi Arabia's dollar reserves dropping from 70% to 55% [7][9] - The rise of the renminbi is not merely a replacement for the dollar but represents a new paradigm, with cross-border supply chain finance addressing overseas receivables risks and enhancing the renminbi's role in the industrial chain [7][9] Group 4 - The digital renminbi pilot has expanded to 129 countries, with daily transaction peaks exceeding 1 trillion yuan, and new models are being explored to bind resources to currency [9] - The integration of onshore and offshore currency accounts in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and real-time cross-border payments through CIPS in ASEAN countries further facilitate renminbi internationalization [9] - The renminbi's internationalization is seen as an inevitable choice for mutual benefit, providing diverse asset allocation channels while mitigating exchange rate risks for other countries [9]