据阿联酋通讯社1月6日报道，海合会统计中心发布报告称，2024年海合会共同市场持续扩展，区内 经济、投资和服务活动稳步增长。在共同市场政策推动下，海合会内部贸易额达到1460亿美元。允许海 合会公民参与的公众股份公司增至748家，资本总额达5490亿美元；30家商业银行获准跨成员国经营， 全年发放跨国经营许可证9.63万份、跨国置业1.79万起。相关举措促进资本自由流动和金融一体化，区 域投资吸引力进一步增强。 （原标题：2024年海合会区内贸易额达1460亿美元） ...

Core Viewpoint - The discussion on the de-dollarization process emphasizes the necessity of five conditions for the renminbi to potentially replace the US dollar as the primary global settlement currency, as articulated by Xiang Songzuo, who draws from Mundell's theories [2][3]. Group 1: Five Conditions for De-dollarization - The first condition is that the economic scale must be sufficiently large [3]. - The second condition is a strong capability for technological innovation [3]. - The third condition requires a capital market that possesses both breadth and depth [3]. - The fourth condition emphasizes the need for both financial innovation and effective regulation [3]. - The fifth condition is the establishment of a legal system that ensures a secure haven for wealth [3]. Group 2: Mundell's Impossible Trinity - The concept of Mundell's Impossible Trinity suggests that a country cannot simultaneously achieve monetary policy independence, capital mobility, and exchange rate stability; it can only pursue two of these goals at a time [6]. - The US model prioritizes monetary policy independence and capital mobility, allowing the Federal Reserve to adjust interest rates autonomously to respond to domestic economic conditions [8]. - In contrast, the Chinese model focuses on monetary policy independence and relative exchange rate stability, which limits capital mobility and poses challenges for the renminbi's international credibility [9][11]. Group 3: Implications for the Renminbi - The renminbi's status as a currency is hindered by its lack of full convertibility, which is essential for it to be considered a safe haven for wealth [2][11]. - The current discourse should focus on whether the renminbi can open its capital account rather than whether it can replace the dollar as the primary global settlement currency [11].

Group 1 - The core argument presented by U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent is that the notion of the renminbi becoming a major global reserve currency is a "fallacy," and he believes it will not achieve internationalization in the future [1][3] - Bessent's reasoning is based on the traditional view that "capital freedom of movement is a prerequisite for reserve currency," asserting that China's financial market is not sufficiently open, although technological advancements have rendered this standard outdated [3][5] - The cross-border payment system for renminbi is projected to handle 175.49 trillion yuan in 2024, marking a 42.6% year-on-year increase, with participation from 1,683 financial institutions globally, creating a clearing network independent of the Western SWIFT system [3][9] Group 2 - Bessent's claim that 1.4 billion Chinese people wish to transfer assets abroad lacks data support; in 2024, the cross-border renminbi settlement volume is expected to reach 64.1 trillion yuan, with 74.5% of this being capital items primarily used for overseas investments by enterprises [5][7] - Nearly 50% of Chinese enterprises use renminbi for over 20% of their foreign investments, establishing a cycle of "using renminbi to procure Chinese manufacturing overseas" [5][7] - The inclusion of Chinese government bonds in major indices has led to a threefold increase in the scale of renminbi assets held by foreign central banks compared to five years ago, indicating a growing acceptance of the renminbi [5][7] Group 3 - The erosion of trust in the U.S. dollar is attributed to the U.S. itself, with a national debt of $36 trillion and a fiscal deficit of $1.7 trillion in 2023, leading to a decline in global confidence [7][9] - The weaponization of the dollar, exemplified by the freezing of Russian foreign reserves, has prompted many countries to reduce their dollar assets, with Saudi Arabia's dollar reserves dropping from 70% to 55% [7][9] - The rise of the renminbi is not merely a replacement for the dollar but represents a new paradigm, with cross-border supply chain finance addressing overseas receivables risks and enhancing the renminbi's role in the industrial chain [7][9] Group 4 - The digital renminbi pilot has expanded to 129 countries, with daily transaction peaks exceeding 1 trillion yuan, and new models are being explored to bind resources to currency [9] - The integration of onshore and offshore currency accounts in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and real-time cross-border payments through CIPS in ASEAN countries further facilitate renminbi internationalization [9] - The renminbi's internationalization is seen as an inevitable choice for mutual benefit, providing diverse asset allocation channels while mitigating exchange rate risks for other countries [9]