Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. Core Viewpoints of the Report - In 2H25, the precious metals market may face policy and liquidity risks, with gold constrained by policy and liquidity, and silver facing risks due to industrial demand and allocation shortcomings [14]. - The non - ferrous metals market will see an accelerated differentiation in the risk pattern, with traditional industrial metals facing shortage risks and new - energy metals facing over - supply pressure [46]. - The Chinese steel industry in 2H25 will face risks of weakening demand and over - capacity on the supply side [3]. - The core risks in the global energy market in 2H25 stem from the divergence among geopolitics, OPEC+ production increases, and shale oil decline [4]. - The global agricultural product market in 2H25 will continue to be affected by climate and policy shocks [5]. Summary by Directory 1. Precious Metals: Retreat of Safe - Haven Demand and Geopolitical Risks - **Monetary Policy and Retreat of Safe - Haven Demand** - Inflation may potentially rebound, and the Fed's policy shift may be delayed again. The Fed's "stagflation - style adjustment" of economic forecasts in the June 2025 FOMC meeting shows concerns about economic stagnation and inflation. The probability of a September interest rate cut will significantly decrease if core PCE continuously exceeds 3.2% from June to August [15][23]. - The safe - haven premium is retreating, and there is potential selling pressure on positions. After May, as uncertainties were cleared and safe - haven funds withdrew, the trading logic of gold changed. The market has priced in some tariff premiums, and liquidity contraction may intensify the closing of gold long positions [28]. - There is instability in the trading related to the contraction of the US dollar credit. The long - term weakening of the US dollar credit system is the core driver of the gold bull market, but short - cycle trading needs to be wary of instability caused by over - priced expectations and liquidity disturbances [33]. - **Weakness in Silver's Industrial Demand and Lack of Allocation Interest** - Silver's industrial demand has collapsed. The recession trade may magnify the vulnerability of silver's commodity attributes. The demand for silver in the industrial sector is facing structural risks, and the demand - supply gap in 2025 may narrow [36]. - The lack of monetary attributes leads to a lack of allocation interest. Silver's structural weakness in the monetary credit system makes it difficult to obtain systematic allocation by sovereign funds. Its derivative positions are vulnerable to liquidity shocks [40]. - **Cross - Risks of Unexpected Trade Frictions and Geopolitical Conflicts** - "Black swan" events in trade frictions may cause secondary shocks to the supply chain and liquidity traps. If the US raises tariffs, it will cause a secondary shock to the global supply chain and increase market volatility [44]. - The escalation of geopolitical conflicts will increase safe - haven demand, and its sustainability determines the price elasticity. If the conflict escalates, it will significantly increase safe - haven demand and push up the gold price, and the impact on inflation expectations may also increase the cost of gold production [45]. 2. Non - Ferrous Metals: Differentiation between Traditional Industrial Metals and New - Energy Metals - **Risk Differentiation between Traditional Industrial Metals and New - Energy Metals** - There are co - existing problems of shortages and over - supply. The copper market faces supply shortages, while the lithium market has a significant contradiction between supply growth exceeding demand growth. The supply - side risks of industrial silicon are concentrated in the concentrated resumption of production in Q3 [47][50]. - There are co - existing problems of low and high inventories. Traditional industrial metals have low inventories with potential liquidity risks, while new - energy metals have high inventories, forming a vicious cycle that is difficult to resolve [52][53]. - **Faster - than - Expected Decline in Demand** - The weakness of traditional demand and the decline of new - energy demand have a dragging effect. Traditional demand repair is weak, and new - energy demand is retreating faster than expected, intensifying the demand - supply contradiction [61]. - The weakening of export momentum and the continuous risk of tariff threats. The export growth rate is under pressure, and although some tariffs have been suspended, the US still retains potential tariff tools, which will impact direct and indirect export costs [63]. 3. Black Metals: Crisis in the Context of Weak Supply and Demand - **Exhaustion of Endogenous Momentum on the Demand Side** - The demand for steel in the real estate sector has entered a structural contraction phase. Real estate core indicators are declining, and the systematic pressure on real estate enterprises' capital chains is being transmitted to the black metal market [67][69]. - The incremental demand for steel in infrastructure has reached its peak. The structural differentiation of infrastructure investment is intensifying, and the diversion effect of special bond funds is prominent, making it difficult to offset the shortage of steel demand in the real estate sector [70]. - The manufacturing industry shows a high degree of policy dependence. The growth of the manufacturing industry relying on policies deviates from the market's spontaneous contraction, and policy tools are in a period of decreasing effectiveness [73][74]. - **Parallel Capacity Release and Passive Production Cuts on the Supply Side** - The loosening of iron ore supply is delayed but certain. The global iron ore market is moving towards overall over - supply, and the new production capacity of the Simandou project may reshape the cost curve [79][84]. - The supply pressure of coking coal is insoluble. The coking coal market is in a "triple - high" situation of high production, high imports, and high inventories. The collapse of demand support is accelerating the cost reduction, and the reconstruction of the cost curve is causing systematic risks in the industry [85][91]. 4. Energy: Geopolitical and OPEC+ Production Increase Game - **Escalation of Geopolitical Risks** - Iran's threat to block the Strait of Hormuz has triggered a panic premium in the market. The Strait of Hormuz is a key global energy transportation channel. If blocked, it will cause a panic premium in the market, impact the energy supply of Asian countries, and cause a global shock from chemical products to food [93][97]. - The interruption of Iran's energy - related product supply may cause a global shock. The interruption of Iran's methanol, LPG, and urea supply will have a chain - reaction impact on the global chemical and agricultural sectors [97]. - Shipping costs may soar non - linearly. Historical events show that similar situations have led to significant increases in shipping costs and insurance premiums [99]. - **Differentiation between OPEC+ Production Increase and the Peak of Shale Oil** - There are risks in the implementation of OPEC+'s production increase policy. OPEC+ entered the production increase cycle in April 2025, but there are risks in policy implementation, including the potential re - evaluation of the production increase policy and the ineffectiveness of the compensation mechanism [103]. - The decline of US shale oil production is due to triple exhaustion. US shale oil production has entered a downward channel since March 2025. If the decline rate of shale oil exceeds expectations, OPEC+ may suspend production increases and resume production cuts, but there will be a supply vacuum during the lag period [104][106]. 5. Agriculture: Dual Impact of Climate and Policy - **Climate Risks Driving Price Volatility Upgrades** - Drought risks have substantially increased, leading to a supply crisis in US soybean - producing areas. The drought in the US Midwest and northern plains may lead to a significant reduction in soybean yields, and the decline in ending stocks and the ratio of stocks to consumption will increase price elasticity [108][109]. - La Niña may occur, delaying the South American planting season and putting pressure on the supply side. There is a probability of La Niña, which may delay the South American planting season, affect yields, and disrupt the global soybean trade flow [113]. - **Trade Frictions and Policy Adjustments as Double "Black Swans"** - If the Sino - US tariff deadlock is not resolved, China's import gap in Q4 may reach 3 million tons, and changes in biodiesel policies will cause cross - market disturbances [107]. - The overlap of the climate - sensitive period and the policy window period in late Q3 to early Q4 may increase the volatility of agricultural products [107].