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代码的消亡与数据的崛起:AI 时代的软件经济学变革
Xin Lang Cai Jing· 2026-01-27 03:58
代码已死:一个经济学命题 来源:TechFirst 当大语言模型将代码生成的边际成本压缩至相对于人力成本可忽略不计的水平,软件产业的底层逻辑正 在发生根本性变化。本文从经济学视角剖析这一变革,揭示竞争壁垒如何从"编码能力"转向"数据资 产",并前瞻性地探讨这一转型对金融、法律、医疗等行业的深远影响。 过去数十年,软件工程师一直是数字经济时代的"稀缺资源"。企业愿意支付高薪,正是因为这种能力具 有天然的"竞争性"——一位工程师投入项目 A 的时间,无法同时用于项目 B。 然而,随着 GitHub Copilot、Cursor、Claude Code 等 AI 编程工具的普及,这一逻辑正在快速瓦解。根 据多项行业调研,AI 辅助编程已使开发效率提升 25%~55%,且这一数字仍在快速攀升。更值得注意的 是,相对于传统的人力成本,AI 生成代码的边际成本已可忽略不计——这意味着代码生成从"论人头收 费"变成了近乎"论 Token 收费"。 当某种能力的供给近乎无限、成本大幅下降时,它就失去了作为"稀缺资源"支撑高溢价的经济基础。这 正是"代码已死"的真正含义。 从机器能力到定义能力:编程范式的经济学演进 回顾编程技 ...
中证ESG评价知多少系列——治理维度
Xin Lang Cai Jing· 2026-01-08 10:16
Core Viewpoint - The article focuses on the evaluation of corporate governance within the context of the ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) framework, emphasizing the importance of governance mechanisms in ensuring sustainable operations and protecting stakeholder interests. Group 1: Theoretical Foundation and Core Logic - Corporate governance theory aims to address agency problems through institutional arrangements that ensure scientific decision-making [1][2] - The first type of agency problem arises from the separation of ownership and control, leading to managers prioritizing personal interests over shareholder value [1][2] - Solutions to the first type of agency problem include external mechanisms like control markets and internal mechanisms such as separation of roles, equity incentives, and independent directors [1][2] Group 2: Evaluation Perspective and Indicators - The China Securities Index ESG evaluation framework assesses corporate governance through internal and external mechanisms, focusing on sustainable operations and stakeholder interests [3][4] - The governance dimension includes five themes, nine units, and nearly a hundred indicators, tailored to the characteristics of Chinese listed companies [3][4] Group 3: Themes and Units of Governance Evaluation - **Information Disclosure**: Measures the quality of information disclosure, including timeliness, reliability, and completeness [5][19] - **Governance Structure and Operations**: Evaluates the effectiveness of governance institutions, including board independence and operational efficiency [6][20] - **Shareholder Rights**: Focuses on the protection of minority shareholders and the behavior of controlling shareholders [7][21] - **Corporate Governance Risks**: Assesses risks related to governance issues, including regulatory penalties and legal disputes [8][22] - **Management Operations**: Evaluates financial risks and quality to measure governance effectiveness [9][23] Group 4: Performance of Corporate Governance - Information disclosure has improved, with 1,001 listed companies receiving an A-grade for disclosure quality in 2024, representing 18.6% of the total [10][23] - The incentive and constraint mechanisms have become more robust, with 84.8% of companies implementing equity incentive systems and 95.8% linking executive compensation to performance [11][25] - The behavior of controlling shareholders is generally compliant, with only 0.74% of companies involved in fund occupation issues by major shareholders [12][27]
战略决策中的扭曲和欺骗
3 6 Ke· 2026-01-08 05:09
Group 1 - The core argument of the articles revolves around the impact of cognitive biases and human behavior on strategic decision-making within companies, particularly in high-stakes situations like mergers and acquisitions [1][2][5] - Companies often face challenges in making objective strategic decisions due to the influence of biases such as over-optimism and loss aversion, which can lead to significant misjudgments [5][6][11] - The "agency problem" arises when the interests of employees diverge from those of the company, potentially leading to deceptive practices that distort information and decision-making processes [7][9] Group 2 - Over-optimism and loss aversion are highlighted as the most misleading cognitive biases affecting strategic decisions, often resulting in unrealistic forecasts and underestimating future challenges [5][6] - The articles suggest that organizations can mitigate these biases by fostering a culture of constructive debate and implementing decision-making safeguards that encourage diverse perspectives [16][21][23] - Effective decision-making can be enhanced by recognizing the biases that may influence current decisions and by establishing frameworks that promote rational discussions and critical evaluations of proposals [10][22][23]
特殊目的收购公司(SPAC)发起人的激励机制:价值逻辑与制度优化 | 论文故事汇
清华金融评论· 2025-09-13 10:07
Core Viewpoint - Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have emerged as a significant financial tool, capturing over 60% of the U.S. IPO market share and raising more than $220 billion during the 2020-2021 period. Despite regulatory tightening in 2022 leading to a decline in market enthusiasm, SPACs continue to be active and serve as an important supplement to traditional IPOs [3]. Group 1: SPAC Definition and Market Evolution - SPAC stands for Special Purpose Acquisition Company, a financial instrument designed for company listings. It originated in the U.S. in the 1990s and gained traction after becoming legalized post-2005. SPACs operate as "pure cash" shell companies with the sole purpose of acquiring one or more target companies, primarily non-listed firms [5][6]. - The advantages of SPACs compared to traditional IPOs are encapsulated in the "three reductions and one increase": reduced time costs, lower compliance thresholds, diminished market volatility impact, and increased financing certainty. This new pathway to public markets offers previously unknown quality companies unprecedented opportunities [6]. Group 2: Mechanisms and Challenges of SPACs - SPACs face several challenges, including stricter regulatory requirements for information disclosure and conflicts of interest between shareholders and sponsors. The initial funding and IPO costs are primarily sourced from the sponsors, who typically hold about 20% of the issued shares post-IPO. If a merger is not completed, the raised funds are returned to investors, but sponsors can profit regardless of post-merger stock performance [8]. - The case of Churchill Capital III acquiring Multiplan illustrates the potential misalignment of interests, where shareholders suffered significant losses post-merger while the sponsor profited due to their low-cost shares. This raises concerns about SPACs being perceived as tools for wealth transfer rather than value creation [8]. Group 3: Value Analysis of SPACs - Research focuses on the dual characteristics of SPACs, which possess both value-creating capabilities and agency cost issues. A structural model is constructed to analyze the incentive mechanisms and market impacts of SPACs, particularly during the de-SPAC process [10][11]. - The model assumes that SPACs can create value through mergers, but this value creation is influenced by agency costs and information frictions between sponsors and shareholders. Shareholders rely on the sponsor's reputation and transaction terms to infer expected returns, impacting their decisions on whether to redeem shares [11].
以责促优,共筑价值:公募基金ESG尽责管理新范式(一)
ZHESHANG SECURITIES· 2025-08-12 10:58
Investment Rating - The report does not explicitly provide an investment rating for the industry Core Insights - Stewardship management is a new model of corporate governance arising from changes in investor structure, emphasizing the role of institutional investors in enhancing corporate governance and protecting minority shareholders [1][2][5] - The primary focus of stewardship management for public funds in the short to medium term should be on improving corporate governance, particularly the protection of minority shareholder rights [5][6] - The report highlights the importance of a soft governance strategy, where public fund managers should primarily participate and propose secondary, aiming to reduce internal friction in corporate governance [4][42] Summary by Sections Introduction - The report introduces the concept of stewardship management as a systematic practice for institutional investors to enhance corporate governance and long-term value creation [12][13] Deep Demands of Stewardship Management - Stewardship management emphasizes the influence and proactivity of institutional investors, distinguishing it from passive holding [13][14] - The evolution of investor structure in capital markets reflects a shift in corporate governance models, with large asset management institutions gaining significant influence [14][22] Three Major Confusions and Answers - The report discusses three main issues faced by public funds in implementing stewardship management: agency problems, investor structure, and portfolio diversification [24][25] - Agency problems can be alleviated through regulatory requirements and the value of stewardship management [25][27] - The investor structure in A-shares is characterized by a dominant controlling shareholder, which necessitates a soft governance strategy for public funds [36][37] Practical Guide for Stewardship Management - The report outlines a three-stage approach for public funds in stewardship management: passive response, active intervention, and proactive governance [60][61] - It emphasizes the need for a robust internal system and team dedicated to stewardship management, integrating ESG research with investment analysis [63][64] Future Outlook - The most universal issue for stewardship management is the protection of minority shareholder rights, particularly in a governance model dominated by major shareholders [72]