Core Viewpoint - The trust crisis in the venture capital industry is intensifying, with increasing scrutiny on management fees and the relationship between General Partners (GPs) and Limited Partners (LPs) [1][5]. Management Fees - Recent regulations in various regions have changed the management fee structure for GPs, shifting from a traditional 2% of committed capital to a model based on actual investment amounts, which is expected to lower overall management fees [2][3]. - The new fee structures require GPs to demonstrate value through successful project investments rather than relying solely on management fees for income [2][4]. - The evolving management fee landscape reflects heightened expectations from LPs, who are increasingly implementing performance assessments to hold GPs accountable [2][4]. Trust and Relationship Dynamics - The relationship between LPs and GPs is crucial, with management fees intended to cover operational costs rather than serve as the primary income source for GPs [4]. - There is a growing concern about the sustainability of GPs that depend solely on management fees, as the industry moves towards greater professionalism and standardization [4][5]. Buyback Issues - The buyback and "betting" issues have become prominent in the primary market, particularly as many startups face pressure to execute buybacks amid a downturn in the capital market [6][7]. - The current wave of buybacks is seen as a systemic issue, exacerbated by market volatility and historical practices, necessitating collaborative solutions among all stakeholders [12][13]. - Legislative efforts in regions like Hunan and Shandong are encouraging the relaxation or elimination of mandatory buyback clauses, aiming to foster a healthier investment environment [9][10][13]. Future Outlook - The industry is urged to maintain rationality and foster mutual understanding among all parties involved, with a focus on long-term economic growth and the development of new productive forces [14]. - There is a call for improved incentive mechanisms within government investment funds to promote long-term capital investment and rebuild trust between LPs, GPs, and startups [14].

Core Viewpoint - The article narrates the entrepreneurial journey of a character named Xiao Song, highlighting the evolution of his business from initial funding challenges to significant revenue growth and eventual government support for expansion and acquisitions. Group 1: Early Stage and Funding Challenges - Xiao Song's company has achieved 1 million in revenue and is seeking to establish a formal production line while looking for a city to set up operations and raise equity financing [1] - The government expresses concerns about the early stage of the business, suggesting a buyback agreement and a reduced valuation of 30 million, given the net assets of only 10 million [2][3] - The company aims to raise 30 million for production line expansion, with the government indicating that they will invest 30 million but require a 1:2 ratio for funding [4][5][6] Group 2: Growth and Investment Opportunities - As the company grows to 100 million in revenue, investment interest from institutions increases [7] - The government advises Xiao Song to allocate half of the financing quota to local investment firms, suggesting a flexible approach to funding [9][10][11] Group 3: Expansion Plans - With revenue reaching 200 million, Xiao Song plans to expand production lines, R&D centers, and employee accommodations [12] - The government proposes purchasing contaminated land for production and converting a long-abandoned building into an R&D center, as well as a struggling hotel into employee housing [13][14][15] Group 4: Maturity and IPO Considerations - Xiao Song, now referred to as Lao Song, has grown the company to 300 million in revenue and is considering an IPO [18] - The government encourages supporting local brokerage firms by allowing them to handle distribution for the IPO [19][20] Group 5: Recognition and Strategic Growth - Lao Song's company has gone public and reached 500 million in revenue, with the provincial government recognizing it as a model enterprise [22][23] - The government suggests exploring mergers and acquisitions to expand further, particularly in underperforming regions [24][25] Group 6: Continued Growth and Future Aspirations - By 2024, the company has achieved 700 million in revenue, with government officials inquiring about future revenue targets and tax contributions [27][28][29] - The company reaches 1 billion in revenue, with higher-level government officials suggesting acquisitions of struggling upstream companies [30][32] Group 7: Strategic Importance and Long-term Vision - The company grows to 5 billion in revenue, with government officials emphasizing the strategic importance of certain assets related to the business [34][36] - Lao Song reflects on his entrepreneurial journey as he nears retirement age, contemplating the future of his business and his son's career choices [39][40]

Group 1 - The article discusses the reality of buybacks in the investment market, particularly focusing on the dynamics between general partners (GPs), limited partners (LPs), and project founders [2][3] - It explains that the typical duration of a fund is around 7 to 8 years, and GPs may request buybacks from project founders if they anticipate that the projects will not be ready for IPO by the end of the fund's term [3][5][6] - The article highlights that many founders may feel compelled to accept buyback terms due to the pressure of securing funding and the lack of alternatives [8][9][12] Group 2 - It points out that the buyback terms are often predetermined in investment agreements, and founders may not fully understand the implications of these terms [8][10][12] - The article notes that the buyback interest rates have increased over time, with rates now reaching 10% to 12% as GPs seek to ensure their returns within the fund's lifecycle [14][16][17] - It emphasizes that the misalignment between the funding cycle and the development cycle of startups leads to the frequent use of buyback clauses, which can be detrimental to the companies involved [20][22][24] Group 3 - The article concludes that the issues surrounding buybacks reflect the immaturity of the investment market, suggesting that a collective effort from all participants is necessary for improvement [23][24][26] - It also indicates that the perspectives on buybacks vary significantly among different stakeholders in the investment ecosystem, including GPs, LPs, and founders [24][25]

Core Viewpoint - The internal conflicts within Kailitai (300326.SZ) continue, with significant disagreements over the election of the new chairman, management changes, and the contentious share repurchase issue, leading to potential risks for the company [1][2][14]. Group 1: Internal Conflicts - The board of directors' election revealed deep divisions between the second-largest shareholder and the first and third shareholders, affecting key decisions such as the chairman's election and management appointments [1][3]. - The new chairman, Cai Zhongxi, was elected with 4 votes against 3 for the candidate Wang Chong, representing the first and third shareholders [1][5]. - Management changes included the appointment of Xia Tian as the general manager and Guo Haibo as the board secretary, amidst disagreements over these appointments [1][7]. Group 2: Share Repurchase Disputes - The ongoing dispute regarding the share repurchase from Ligetai has resurfaced, with the board previously voting to issue a repurchase notice, but the decision faced opposition from key stakeholders [8][10]. - The board's recent meeting did not pass the proposal to send a repurchase notice, with votes split and some members calling for more information before making a decision [9][11]. - The repurchase agreement was triggered due to Ligetai's failure to complete an IPO by December 31, 2024, leading to legal actions from the second-largest shareholder [8][12]. Group 3: Internal Control Issues - Kailitai is facing internal control problems, with auditors unable to obtain sufficient evidence regarding the valuation of equity investments and related party transactions, leading to a "non-standard" audit opinion for the 2024 financial report [2][14]. - The company announced a delay in the disclosure of its 2024 annual report due to significant disagreements with auditors, which may result in further regulatory scrutiny [14][15]. Group 4: Shareholder Actions - The second-largest shareholder, represented by Yuan Zheng and Wang Zhengmin, has been increasing their stake in Kailitai, now holding approximately 6.38% of the shares, which is close to the first shareholder's 6.99% [15][16]. - The ongoing increase in shareholding indicates a potential power struggle for control and influence over Kailitai's strategic direction [16].

《 对赌回购在投资行业的真实模样 》 今天想分享一下实际在执行层面，回购的样子。 （一）回不回购，合伙人说了算 各位同志，管理层为 2025 年制定的退出金额是 3 亿元，这个金额远高于我们实际触发回购的各项目总 金额。 高于，是因为我们未雨绸缪，针对当前大环境，我们不得不提早回购，未到期回购。同时这也是我们募 资和dpi的需要。 鼓励大家通过老股转让的形式完成退出。如果转不出去，就请大家通过回购的方式。总之，3亿元是刚 性的。 至于那些还没有触发回购的项目，如何说服创始人同意回购，请各位同志开动脑筋，穷尽创造性和积极 性。 小宋，鉴于你 2024 年在退出工作上进步很大， 2025 年希望你承担 1 亿元的退出金额。希望你不要辜负 我们对你的信任。 （二）回购的核心是脸皮要厚 要账，大家都要过吧？或者，至少能想象的到吧？没有技巧，全是歪招。 小宋我见过的要账手段：喝酒，堵门，声东击西，等等。 我真的见过，投资经理和创始人喝了几顿酒，创始人就同意回购了。 关于堵门，不是撕破脸的那种。我以开展投后工作的名义，天天在已投企业呆着。我自费住宿和餐饮， 绝不给企业添乱。 但是企业的一些生产经营会议，我要参加。我时不时 ...

今天想分享一下实际在执行层面，回购的样子。 （一）回不回购，合伙人说了算 各位同志，管理层为 2025 年制定的退出金额是 3 亿元，这个金额远高于我们实际触发回购的各项目总 金额。 高于，是因为我们未雨绸缪，针对当前大环境，我们不得不提早回购，未到期回购。同时这也是我们募 资和dpi的需要。 鼓励大家通过老股转让的形式完成退出。如果转不出去，就请大家通过回购的方式。总之，3亿元是刚 性的。 至于那些还没有触发回购的项目，如何说服创始人同意回购，请各位同志开动脑筋，穷尽创造性和积极 性。 小宋，鉴于你 2024 年在退出工作上进步很大， 2025 年希望你承担 1 亿元的退出金额。希望你不要辜负 我们对你的信任。 （二）回购的核心是脸皮要厚 要账，大家都要过吧？或者，至少能想象的到吧？没有技巧，全是歪招。 《 对赌回购在投资行业的真实模样 》 小宋我见过的要账手段：喝酒，堵门，声东击西，等等。 我真的见过，投资经理和创始人喝了几顿酒，创始人就同意回购了。 关于堵门，不是撕破脸的那种。我以开展投后工作的名义，天天在已投企业呆着。我自费住宿和餐饮， 绝不给企业添乱。 但是企业的一些生产经营会议，我要参加。我时不时 ...

借着同创wy事件，想聊聊回购的真实模样。本文比较长，上周整整写了一周，斟字酌句，改了多稿， 也在不断关注舆论动向，希望读者朋友们给一些耐心。 （一）回购 - 创始人头顶的大山 点进来本文的，应该对一级市场投资行业的几个参与主体比较熟悉了： lp 、 gp 、项目方。 gp 就是常 说的"投资机构"， lp 出钱给 gp ， gp 投项目。 现在一级市场的基金，存续期大概是 7 或 8 年比较常见，大家都能理解哈？ 7 年的意思是， 基金从成 立时点开始算， 7 年后 lp 必须把给到 gp 的钱再拿回来。 那么可能第 6 年的时候， gp 就会和项目方要钱了：从你的财务数据来看，明年你是上不了市的，那就 把我给你的投资款还给我吧。也就是：回购。 然后，上市需要周期的对吧？我 2025 年申报， 2026 年完成上市，就算极其顺利的了。 2026 年如果我上市， 2027 年我的股东能够在二级市场完全出清，也算极其顺利的了。 所以，如果我是 gp ，比如 2027 年我的基金到期，当我预感我投的项目没办法在 2025 年底前申报并受 理，那我可能 2025 年中就提出让项目方回购了。 为什么这么早就要提出回购？ ...

我会做到： 抓牢，抓细，抓实，抓稳，抓深，抓具体，抓落实，一抓到底，常抓不懈。 在艰难的 2024 年，我紧密跟随合伙人的正确领导，圆满完成了年初制定的工作目标。 投资工作中，我完成投资项目两个，均取得了 关于上市退出的对赌回购，创始人无限连带责任。 其中 一个项目还实现 down round ， 我方进入估值低于上一轮，充分提高了我方的安全垫。 返投工作中，我促成返投落地项目一个。在原有城市不同意离开的巨大困难下，我说服该项目 以核心 团队出走，新成立公司的形式，完成实质性的迁总部返投。 退出工作中，针对退出难，回购难的 xx 项目，我召集其他股东，发起集体诉讼，目前诉讼已经判决， 创始人资产正在被强制变卖，充分保障了我方权益。 募资工作中，我敏锐识别到基金的有限合伙协议中存在的某项模糊概念， 抓住 lp 经验不足的弱点 ，最 终以合规手段突破了 lp 的限制，促成了基金第二期资金的到账。 对于 2025 年的工作，我有三点规划： 抓水下项目，抓落地难的项目，抓退出难的项目。 2025 年我还会加强宣传工作。 我致力于为创投行业提高思想， 统一国有资产不流失的认知，明确创始人需要给予对赌回购并配合返 投落地 ...

12 月了，各投资人陆续开始年终总结。我也凑个热闹。 回看我的 2024 ，在 lp 爸爸的大力鞭策下，在证监会交易所的严格要求下，我精进迭代了以下六方面的 能力：对赌回购，返投落地，退出，募资， FA ，副业。 每项技能可能还可以再叠加 buff ，输出 plus 技能。 然后，我先默认点进本文的朋友，都已经能比较好理解 lp ，返投， fa 的概念。 技能 1 对赌回购 技能 1+ 无限连带责任 技能 1++ 差异化定价并购退出 作为国资基金，没有对赌回购肯定是不行的。甚至，需要创始人无限连带，只有公司回购都是不足以让 lp 爸爸满意的。 但是，创始人不同意怎么办？ 今年以来，很多上市公司对初创公司的并购，都采用了叫做"差异化定价"的策略。并购的时候，给投资 人高估值，给团队低估值，大家都有了体面。 甚至，再加个拖售权。拖售权 + 差异化定价，即使没有回购，大概率也是能说服投委的。 要么回购，要么拖售权 + 差异化定价，创始人你选一个吧。 "宋总你这谈判策略太强了" 我说：都是合伙人管理有方。 技能 2 返投落地 说的太好了。感谢lp爸爸给我提升的机会。 技能 3 退出 技能 3+ 带年化利率退出 技能 ...