在这样的大背景下，铀贸易成了筹码。美国的核燃料供应链从矿石到浓缩再到燃料组件，环节众多，短期替代并不迅速。尽管国会已经为新产能拨款9亿美 元，但要到2028年禁令正式生效并完全转向非俄供应，时间远未到位。普京抛出"持续稳定供应"的承诺，是精确计算后的策略：绑定美国核电站的"连续 性"，就能迫使华盛顿在某些节点上保持基本沟通，而不是一味切割。配合这套策略，他在讲话中评价当前的美国政府"直来直去"，并不玩"虚伪那一套"， 显然是针对特朗普的风格发话。年初，特朗普暂停过一部分对乌军事援助，俄军随即在库尔斯克方向推进了10公里，收复几个村庄；近日他又批准战斧导弹 出口，但库存有限，真正的采购要等到2026年才计划买57枚，更像一纸对内信号。克里姆林宫的估算很朴素：若特朗普的实用主义占上风，乌克兰援助节奏 可能放缓，俄方就有时间"喘口气"。为此，莫斯科的节奏是分步走——先把铀业务稳住，年底前供应量或增一成；再释放合作信息；随后对导弹交易表达关 切，把可能的升级风险标注给对方政界。 索契的那句重话，像是从经济机房里拧出来的阀门。在瓦尔代俱乐部第22届年会上，2025年10月2日，普京公开说，恢复与美国的全面关系符合俄罗斯 ...

Core Viewpoint - The discussion around defense spending in Europe is intensifying, with many leaders claiming to have achieved NATO's target of 2% of GDP for defense spending, but this does not guarantee security without unified command, interoperability, and public support [1][4] Group 1: Current Defense Landscape - European military forces appear strong on the surface but may collapse under high-intensity conflict due to lack of preparedness and outdated infrastructure [1][2] - The reliance on the U.S. for comprehensive security, including airlift, intelligence, and nuclear deterrence, is becoming increasingly problematic as the U.S. shows reduced interest in European security [1][2] - The aging defense infrastructure, built during the Cold War, hampers rapid military deployment across Europe, with logistical challenges leading to significant delays in troop movements [1][2] Group 2: Challenges in Defense Coordination - Europe faces significant challenges in establishing its own intelligence and command systems, requiring substantial investment and long-term political commitment, which is currently lacking [2][4] - The fragmentation of military capabilities across European nations leads to inefficiencies, with numerous weapon systems complicating logistics and operational coordination [2][3] - Public support for defense is waning, with low willingness among citizens in countries like Spain, Germany, and Italy to fight in wartime, contrasting with Ukraine's strong national resolve [2][3] Group 3: National Defense Status - The UK has a reduced military size of approximately 72,000 personnel, the lowest in nearly two centuries, despite recent successful deployments [3] - France emphasizes strategic autonomy but still relies on U.S. intelligence support and faces leadership challenges within the EU [3] - Germany's military readiness is questionable, with key forces not expected to be fully operational until after 2027, and significant personnel shortages [3] - Poland is actively expanding its military budget to 4.7% of GDP and plans to increase troop numbers to 500,000, but faces integration challenges with diverse weapon systems [3] Group 4: Potential for Improvement - The core issue for Europe is not insufficient investment but ineffective investment, as existing forces lack the capability for rapid response and multinational cooperation [4] - Efforts are underway to upgrade critical military transport infrastructure, with over 500 key points being improved [5] - New defense cooperation frameworks between the UK and the EU aim to enhance joint deployments and mobilize approximately €150 billion in defense investments [5] - NATO and the EU are identifying critical capability gaps, indicating a potential strategic awakening, but deeper cultural, political, and financial consensus is needed for real change [5]