Core Viewpoint - The launch of the floating fee rate fund, Guangfa Value Steady Mixed Fund (024448), is seen as a significant step in aligning fund manager incentives with investor returns, but the effectiveness of this new fee structure remains to be tested in the market [2][12]. Fund Structure and Management - Guangfa Value Steady Mixed Fund adopts a dual fee structure of "base management fee + performance fee," where the management fee is set at 1.5% if annualized excess returns exceed 6%, and reduced to 0.6% if excess returns are negative and below -3% [2][12]. - Wang Mingxu, the proposed fund manager, has a mixed track record, with some funds significantly underperforming their benchmarks [3][11]. Performance Analysis - Wang Mingxu currently manages over 10 billion yuan across seven products, with notable performance discrepancies; for instance, Guangfa Balanced Preferred Mixed Fund (010379) has returned -3.4% since his appointment, lagging its benchmark by 6.3 percentage points [3][11]. - Over the past three years, more than 60% of Guangfa's actively managed equity products have underperformed their benchmarks by over 10 percentage points, raising concerns about the alignment of management compensation with investor returns [11][12]. Employee Compensation and Shareholding - Guangfa Fund's employee shareholding platform has distributed nearly 600 million yuan in dividends over the past five years, with significant amounts going to top executives, highlighting a disparity between management income and investor returns [5][8]. - The shareholding structure includes several high-ranking executives, indicating a strong financial incentive tied to the fund's performance, yet the actual returns for investors have been disappointing [6][12]. Regulatory Context - The floating fee rate initiative is part of a broader regulatory push to reform the public fund industry, aiming to better align fund company revenues with investor returns and establish a performance-based incentive system [2][12]. - The regulatory framework emphasizes the need for fund managers to be held accountable for long-term performance, with penalties for those consistently underperforming [12].

Group 1 - The board of directors of Langzi Co., Ltd. held its 28th meeting of the 5th session on March 24, 2025, to discuss and approve various matters [1][2] - The meeting approved a proposal for joint investment with related parties to accelerate the national layout strategy of the company's medical beauty business [1][2] - The proposal involves the establishment of employee stock ownership platforms to enhance the performance of subsidiaries and incentivize key employees in the medical beauty sector [1][2] Group 2 - The employee stock ownership platforms are structured entities controlled by the company and included in the consolidated financial statements [2] - The independent directors held a special meeting and unanimously agreed to the proposal, with one related director abstaining from the vote [2] - The voting results were 4 in favor, 0 against, and 0 abstentions [2]