Core Viewpoint - The core regulatory principle of "tracing the actual controllers of listed companies to natural persons or state-owned entities, with clear and stable equity" aims to ensure effective corporate governance and protect the rights of minority investors, but it has led to issues due to the predominance of natural persons as actual controllers [1] Existing Issues and Contradictions - There are institutional limitations in corporate governance structures, as the dominance of natural persons as actual controllers in A-share companies leads to a model where ownership and management are combined, restricting modern governance development and causing short-term strategic focus [2] - Natural person controllers face limitations in resources, strategy, governance, and integration, leading to challenges in industry upgrading and sustained growth as companies mature [2] - Private equity (PE) firms are unable to become actual controllers of listed companies, which suppresses effective participation of long-term capital and weakens the long-term growth potential of listed companies [3] - Most private equity funds cannot meet the requirements for actual controllers, leading to a focus on short-term trading in the secondary market, which exacerbates the disconnect between primary and secondary investment markets and diminishes governance levels [3][4] - Regulatory policies often fail to produce sustainable effects, trapping the A-share market in a cycle of limited growth, with IPO controls and merger policies failing to break through the actual controller principle [4] Systemic Reform Suggestions and Path Design - The first phase involves clarifying governance structure reform directions and initiating pilot programs for long-term capital and professional management teams to form evergreen funds, allowing them to participate in the management of listed companies [5] - The second phase encourages the separation of ownership and management, establishing a governance structure linked to long-term development, and allowing evergreen funds to qualify as actual controllers for IPOs [6] - The third phase focuses on comprehensive marketization and modernization of governance, promoting legal reforms to support mergers and acquisitions as a standard growth path for companies [8] Strengthening Long-term Capital Guidance Mechanisms - The goal is to enhance corporate quality and investor confidence, creating a virtuous cycle in the Chinese capital market, fostering competitive companies, and activating substantial financial risk capital [9]

种种迹象表明，金融机构的公司治理正在经历一次深刻改革。据了解，金融机构取消监事会的思路来源 于《中华人民共和国公司法》（以下简称公司法）的修改，为做好公司治理监管规定与公司法的衔接， 金融监管总局曾在去年末下发相关文件为金融机构在公司治理结构上的优化提供了合规空间，鼓励金融 机构探索更适应自身发展的治理模式。 就在近日，金融监管总局又发布新规，对信托公司治理结构进行实质性改革。新规明确，信托公司可依 据公司章程在董事会内设置审计委员会，由董事组成并行使监事会职权，从而无需单独设立监事会或监 事。这一调整打破了传统"三会一层"（股东会、董事会、监事会、高级管理层）的治理框架，是监管部 门优化公司治理结构的重要尝试。 有业内人士表示，从一些金融机构的运营现状来看，监事会的监督职能与董事会下设的审计委员会存在 一定的重叠，导致监督效率低下且增加了运营成本，而取消监事会并由董事会中的审计委员会行使监事 会职权，将为金融机构的公司治理提供更加灵活的选择。 监事会为何被取消？ 金融机构取消监事会的根源始于2024年。2024年7月修订实施的公司法（以下或称新公司法）指出，有 限责任公司可以按照公司章程的规定在董事会中设置 ...