□ 《基金管理公司绩效考核管理指引（征求意见稿）》提出：基金经理过去三年业绩差，投资者亏损较 大的，绩效薪酬至少降低30%；三年以上中长期指标占比不少于80%；建立与投资者利益绑定机制，提 高基金经理等人跟投比例；公司高管的基金投资收益指标权重不低于50% □ 有机构研报认为，长期来看新规将倒逼行业文化和经营模式的重塑，推动建立公募行业与客户之间的 信任根基，为公募行业构建以长期回报为导向的高质量发展路径 郭晨凯 制图 ◎记者 赵明超 近日出炉的《基金管理公司绩效考核管理指引（征求意见稿）》（下称"指引"）提出，基金公司要全面 建立以基金投资收益为核心的考核体系，同时建立与投资者利益绑定机制。在业内人士看来，通过薪 酬"指挥棒"作用，强化基金管理公司与持有人的利益绑定，有望破解"基金赚钱，基民不赚钱"的行业困 局，在长期考核指挥棒下，可以更好地实现长钱长投的行业发展生态。 确立标准 改革薪酬分配机制 指引为基金公司薪酬管理明确了标准。基金公司应当建立薪酬总额决定机制，加强薪酬总额管理。其 中，基本薪酬与绩效薪酬应当保持适当比例，避免因薪酬结构不合理引发风险隐患或业务激进行为。 针对过往基金公司内部薪酬分化过大 ...

为健全长效激励约束机制，强化基金管理公司与基金份额持有人的利益绑定，北京商报记者获悉，《基金管理公司绩效考核管理指引（征求意见稿）》（以 下简称《征求意见稿》）于近日下发，明确了基金经理、公募高管的长期考核机制，进一步提高自购比例要求，同时细化对主动权益类基金经理绩效薪酬的 考核要求。在业内人士看来，此次发布的《征求意见稿》有助于行业优胜劣汰，可以留出空间给长期业绩稳定、真正为持有人创造超额回报的人才，从而提 升公募基金整体的长期投资质量和声誉。 明确指标考核权重 整体来看，于近日下发的《征求意见稿》共计七章三十二条，明确了基金管理公司薪酬组成包括：基本薪酬、绩效薪酬、福利和津补贴、中长期激励。其 中，中长期激励包括股权性质的激励和现金激励等。 《征求意见稿》还提到，自新文件生效之日起，2022年6月发布的《基金管理公司绩效考核与薪酬管理指引》（以下简称《指引》）同时废止。相较于《指 引》而言，此次发布的《征求意见稿》新增了部分要求。 例如，在绩效考核方面，《征求意见稿》要求基金管理公司应当全面建立以基金投资收益为核心的绩效考核体系。其中要求，基金投资收益指标中3年以上 中长期指标权重不得低于80%。在高管层 ...

Core Viewpoint - The regulatory body is introducing a new guideline aimed at addressing the industry pain point of "funds making money while investors do not," focusing on performance assessment and compensation reforms in the public fund industry, which manages over 36 trillion yuan in assets [1] Group 1: Performance Assessment Changes - The new guideline emphasizes a performance assessment system centered on fund investment returns, moving away from the previous focus on management scale and sales revenue [2] - Long-term performance metrics will now account for at least 80% of the assessment, effectively curbing short-term speculative behavior [2] - New quantitative assessment indicators will include "fund profit margin" and "percentage of profitable investors," directly reflecting the actual gains and losses of investors [2] Group 2: Fund Manager and Executive Accountability - Fund managers managing multiple funds will have their performance evaluated based on fund size and management duration, with products managed for less than a year excluded from assessments [3] - The guideline mandates that the investment return metric for senior management must account for at least 50% of their performance evaluation [3] Group 3: Compensation Structure - A clear accountability and compensation adjustment mechanism is established, allowing for the recovery of performance bonuses if personnel fail to fulfill their duties [4] - For active equity fund managers, a tiered performance compensation adjustment mechanism is introduced, with a potential decrease of at least 30% in performance pay if their products underperform by over 10 percentage points against benchmarks [4] - The guideline emphasizes fairness and efficiency in compensation distribution, with a focus on increasing pay for frontline and grassroots employees [4] Group 4: Performance Pay Binding - Senior management and key department heads are required to invest at least 30% of their performance pay in funds managed by the company, with a minimum of 60% allocated to equity funds [5] - Fund managers must invest at least 40% of their performance pay in the public funds they manage, with a holding period of no less than one year [6] Group 5: Transition Period - A transition period is set, requiring at least 50% of products to meet performance assessment standards by 2025, and 100% by 2026 [6]