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别硬扛了!融资不是“自己悟”的活,找对陪跑人才能跑通IPO
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-11-19 09:14
我见过太多创始人,明明项目做得不错——产品有市场,团队有能力,营收也在涨,但一到融资就栽跟头:路演时把投资人关心的点全漏了,尽调时才发 现股权藏着代持,签TS时没看清条款给自己挖了坑……最后要么融不到钱,要么融到钱却留了一堆后遗症,甚至把好项目拖黄了。 每次遇到这种情况,我都想跟创始人说一句:别再以为自己什么都行、什么都懂了。融资不是"做产品、搞业务",它是一门需要懂资本规则的技术活,不 是你靠"经验""感觉"就能搞定的。就像你不会让设计师去做财务报表,不会让程序员去谈客户一样,融资这件事,也需要专业的人来帮你。 今天就跟你掏心窝子聊聊:为什么你必须找一位懂资本的融资辅导顾问,把他当成"融资陪跑合伙人",陪你走完创业全周期直达IPO。别心疼那点顾问 费,跟你能拿到的融资、能避开的坑比起来,这点钱根本不算什么。 先醒醒:你以为的"懂融资",可能全是错的 很多创始人觉得"我看过几本融资书,听过几场融资课,跟几个投资人聊过,就懂融资了"。但实际情况是,你懂的那点"皮毛",在真正的资本游戏里, 连"入门"都算不上,甚至可能因为这些"错误认知",把融资路彻底堵死。 1.你以为"路演就是讲好故事",其实是"讲对资本想听的 ...
VC变成了高利贷
虎嗅APP· 2025-11-01 02:47
Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the significant differences between the venture capital (VC) investment practices in Silicon Valley and China, particularly focusing on the prevalence of "bet-on agreements" or "valuation adjustment mechanisms" (VAM) in China, which are often seen as a form of gambling rather than a neutral financial term [4][5][9]. Group 1: Differences in Investment Practices - In Silicon Valley, less than 5% of VC agreements include buyback clauses, while over 90% of VC investments in China contain such clauses, typically with a 3-year term [4][6]. - The term "对赌协议" (bet-on agreement) reflects the nature of the Chinese investment ecosystem, where it is viewed as a high-stakes gamble between entrepreneurs and investors [4][5]. - The lack of buyback agreements in Silicon Valley is attributed to a more balanced risk-sharing mechanism through preferred stock, which provides investors with liquidation preferences and anti-dilution rights [6][9]. Group 2: Exit Strategies and Market Conditions - Silicon Valley investors have multiple exit options, with only 20% of exits being through IPOs, while many are through acquisitions by major tech companies [7][9]. - In contrast, 2024 saw a significant decline in IPOs in China, with the total fundraising amount dropping to 67.353 billion yuan, the lowest in nearly a decade [8][11]. - Approximately 65% of acquisition transactions in China involved companies with no prior public financing records, indicating a disconnect between the VC investment landscape and the acquisition market [7][11]. Group 3: The Rise of Buyback Agreements - In 2024, there were 1,741 buyback events involving 1,687 project companies and 978 investment institutions, marking an 8.5% increase year-on-year [11][15]. - The increasing reliance on buyback agreements is seen as a response to the tightening exit channels, with many funds facing pressure to provide returns to limited partners (LPs) [12][11]. - The trend of buybacks has shifted from being a last resort to becoming a mainstream exit strategy, as other avenues have become less viable [15][19]. Group 4: Market Innovations and Solutions - New solutions are emerging, such as third-party buyouts where investors can transfer shares to third parties at a price that includes principal plus an annual interest rate of 8%-10% [15][17]. - S funds, which are designed to acquire illiquid shares from VC/PE investors, are gaining traction, allowing original investors to recover some capital without resorting to litigation [15][17]. - Local government funds are also stepping in to acquire difficult-to-exit projects, providing a safety net for the investment ecosystem [17][19]. Group 5: Systemic Challenges and Future Outlook - The article highlights systemic issues in the Chinese investment landscape, where the pressure for quick exits leads to a reliance on buyback agreements, creating a cycle of financial strain for entrepreneurs [12][13]. - The potential introduction of personal bankruptcy laws and tax reforms could provide much-needed relief for entrepreneurs facing overwhelming debt due to failed investments [18][19]. - Despite these innovations, the fundamental problems of a congested IPO market and a stagnant acquisition landscape remain unresolved, indicating that the market is still searching for sustainable solutions [19].
VC变成了“高利贷”
3 6 Ke· 2025-10-31 11:54
Core Insights - The article discusses the significant differences between the venture capital (VC) investment practices in Silicon Valley and China, particularly focusing on the prevalence of "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" (VAM) or "bet-on agreements" in China compared to their rarity in Silicon Valley [1][2][3] Group 1: Differences in Investment Practices - In Silicon Valley, less than 5% of VC agreements include buyback clauses, while over 90% of VC investments in China contain such clauses, typically with a 3-year term [1][2] - The term "对赌协议" (bet-on agreement) is a unique Chinese concept that reflects the competitive nature of the investment ecosystem, contrasting with the neutral term "VAM" used in the U.S. [1][2] - Silicon Valley investors utilize preferred stock with liquidation preferences and anti-dilution rights, providing a more balanced risk-sharing mechanism compared to the debt-like nature of buyback agreements in China [3][4] Group 2: Exit Strategies and Market Conditions - In Silicon Valley, 80% of exits occur through acquisitions rather than IPOs, with major tech companies frequently acquiring startups, while in China, 65% of acquisitions involve companies without prior public financing [3][4] - The IPO market in China is facing significant challenges, with 2024 seeing the lowest fundraising total in nearly a decade at 67.35 billion yuan, while the U.S. Nasdaq continues to see substantial IPO activity [4][5] - The tightening of exit channels in China has led to an increase in buyback events, with 1,741 occurrences in 2024, marking an 8.5% increase from the previous year [5][9] Group 3: Systemic Issues and Responses - The pressure from Limited Partners (LPs) in China, often government-backed, necessitates the inclusion of buyback clauses due to strict exit timelines, which do not align with the longer development cycles of many innovative companies [6][8] - The trend of buybacks has shifted from being a protective mechanism to resembling fixed-income products, indicating a fundamental change in the nature of equity investments in China [6][8] - New solutions are emerging, such as S funds that acquire illiquid shares from VC/PE investors, allowing for a more flexible exit strategy [9][10] Group 4: Future Directions and Innovations - The introduction of flexible buyback terms and the establishment of S funds are part of a broader market correction, aiming to address the systemic failures in funding, exit strategies, and legal frameworks [10][12] - Legislative proposals, such as personal bankruptcy laws, are being discussed to provide legal protections for entrepreneurs, potentially alleviating the burden of personal debt from failed ventures [12][13] - The ongoing exploration of new investment tools, such as convertible bonds, reflects a shift towards more adaptable financial instruments that can better accommodate the realities of the Chinese market [12][13]
【锋行链盟】股权融资流程及核心要点
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-10-17 16:09
Equity Financing Process Breakdown - Equity financing is a crucial method for companies to obtain external funds by offering a portion of their equity, suitable for startups, growth, or expansion phases [2] - The process consists of six stages: preparation, investor matching, due diligence, negotiation and signing, closing and fund transfer, and post-investment management [2] Key Points of Equity Financing - The preparation phase focuses on addressing the necessity of financing, conditions for financing, and strategies to attract investors [3] - Investor matching aims to identify investors who recognize the project's value and can provide complementary resources, avoiding ineffective communication [4] - Clear financing needs should be established, including the amount required, specific use of funds, and equity release ratio, balancing funding needs with founder control [5][5] - A robust business logic and core materials are essential, including financial statements, legal compliance, market data, competitive advantages, and a well-structured business plan [5][5] - Initial valuation calculations are critical, using methods like comparable company analysis, DCF models, and cost methods, with early-stage companies potentially justifying higher valuations [5][5] - The due diligence phase involves a thorough examination of the business's commercial logic, team execution capabilities, and risk management [6] - Negotiation and signing focus on balancing the company's needs with investor protections, including key terms like valuation, anti-dilution clauses, and board control [7][7] - Closing involves completing legal procedures such as business registration changes and fund transfers [9] - Post-investment management is vital for long-term collaboration, emphasizing that financing is just the beginning of a partnership [10] Core Takeaways - Equity financing is fundamentally a trade of equity for resources, requiring a balance between funding needs, equity dilution, and control [12] - Preparation is foundational, with financial and legal compliance, clear business logic, and reasonable valuation being critical for investor engagement [12] - Matching the right investors is more important than quantity, focusing on those specialized in the relevant sector [12] - Due diligence serves as a trust-building exercise, where proactive communication can prevent deal termination due to historical issues [12] - Professional negotiation of terms is essential to understand the implications of clauses like anti-dilution and performance guarantees [12] - Post-investment collaboration is key, viewing investors as partners to maximize resource value [12]
AYRO(AYRO) - 2025 FY - Earnings Call Transcript
2025-10-03 15:00
Financial Data and Key Metrics Changes - The company reported a total of 888,978 shares of common stock outstanding as of September 5, 2025, with a quorum of 364,916 shares present or represented at the meeting [5][14] - The company approved the issuance of approximately 875,000 shares of common stock underlying the Series I preferred stock and warrants, which is significant for compliance with NASDAQ listing rules [10][15] Business Line Data and Key Metrics Changes - The meeting included a proposal to adopt the Fourth Amendment to the Long-Term Incentive Plan, increasing the number of shares available for issuance by an additional 135,627 shares, bringing the total to 400,000 shares [12][15] Market Data and Key Metrics Changes - No specific market data or key metrics changes were discussed during the meeting Company Strategy and Development Direction and Industry Competition - The company is focusing on compliance with NASDAQ listing rules and enhancing its incentive plan to attract and retain talent, which is crucial in a competitive industry [11][12] Management's Comments on Operating Environment and Future Outlook - Management did not provide specific comments on the operating environment or future outlook during this meeting Other Important Information - The meeting was conducted to address three main proposals, all of which were approved, indicating a positive reception from shareholders [15] Q&A Session All Questions and Answers - There were no questions or answers recorded during this meeting, as it concluded without any additional inquiries from shareholders [15]
强盛集团丨项目融资分成设计:让利益分配成为发展的助推器
Sou Hu Cai Jing· 2025-07-08 10:33
Group 1 - The design of profit-sharing mechanisms in project financing is crucial, impacting both the interests of investors and founding teams, as well as the company's future financing capabilities and development momentum [2][4] - A core principle of profit-sharing design is "dynamic matching," where the profit-sharing logic differs significantly between seed rounds and later stages, with seed rounds focusing on protecting founders [2][4] - In growth-stage financing, a "ladder adjustment" mechanism should be introduced, where profit-sharing ratios automatically adjust based on valuation milestones, reflecting the balance of risk and reward [2][4] Group 2 - Clear delineation of responsibilities is essential for profit-sharing design, as many startups face disputes due to unclear boundaries of roles and responsibilities [4][6] - The inclusion of anti-dilution clauses in the profit-sharing framework is necessary to protect early investors from dilution of their profit-sharing rights during subsequent financing rounds [4][6] - Establishing a "dynamic incentive pool" of 10%-15% for core employees is a long-term safeguard, allowing for equity incentives without excessively diluting the founders' shares [6] Group 3 - The ultimate goal of profit-sharing design is to deeply bind the interests of all parties with the growth of the project, fostering a "symbiotic mindset" that ensures motivation for founders and reasonable risk for investors [6]