近期权益市场受局部地缘冲突、12月美联储降息预期降温以及年底收官部分机构止盈等因素扰动，主要 股票指数呈现高位震荡行情。受此影响，11月以来中证转债、上证转债、深证转债分别上涨1.39%、 1.15%、1.64%。相比主要股票指数，转债指数表现更为强势，转债市场情绪再度达到年内高点，期间 深证转债突破8月高点，创年内新高。(数据来源：Wind，截至2025年11月14日) 转债的全称是 "可转换公司债券"，简单来说，它是一种可以在约定时间按约定价格转换为股票的债 券。转债与普通信用债最大的区别在于转股权，赋予了投资者在一定期间内可以按照一定的规则转换为 本公司的股票(通常称为"正股")的权利。转债的转股权是投资者的一项权利而非义务，投资者既可以选 择行使转股权将手中的转债转换为股票，也可以选择将其作为一只债券持有至到期。 转债主要有四个特征：一是转债仍为债券，它需要定期支付本金和票息;二是在转股期限内转债可以按 照一定规则转换为股票;三是由于转债的转股权，转债价格很大程度上受到正股价格影响;四是转债通常 设置赎回条款、回售条款、向下修正条款等附加条款，这些条款在不同的正股价格水平下会体现出不同 的价值，使得转 ...

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The convertible bond market reached a critical stage in June 2025, a high - incidence period for convertible bond credit events. The report reviews the 2024 convertible bond credit storm and seeks coping strategies [1][9]. - The 2024 credit shock was the most extensive in the history of the convertible bond market. The root cause was the weak performance of the underlying stocks, and there were also other factors such as issuer fundamentals, market structure, and institutional behavior [2][3]. - In 2025, the approach to convertible bond credit risks has changed. The probability of a continuous and significant decline in the equity market has decreased, reducing delisting risks and repayment pressure. It is recommended to appropriately explore opportunities for mispricing repair [4][73]. 3. Summary According to the Catalog 3.1. Revisiting the 2024 Credit Storm: A Lesson from History 3.1.1. Review of Seven Important Credit Storm Events - **Event 1: April 2024 - New Nine - National Policies and Delisting Rules Triggered a Small - Scale Credit Shock**: On April 12, 2024, the new Nine - National Policies and delisting rules were released, causing significant differentiation in the equity and convertible bond markets. Small - cap stocks were under pressure, and nearly a hundred convertible bonds fell more than 5% within two days. Investor sentiment became cautious. After the regulatory clarification, the market recovered, and there was an inflow of incremental funds, but it also laid the groundwork for subsequent adjustments [11][12]. - **Event 2: May 2024 - Concentration of Credit Events of Weak - Quality Individual Bonds Signaled the Brewing of a Major Credit Storm**: In late April, some convertible bonds were affected by ST or non - disclosure of annual reports. In May, credit events such as debt overdue and rating downgrades of Lingnan Convertible Bond, and rating downgrades of Sanfang and Hongtu Convertible Bonds shattered the recovery trend of low - price bond valuations [18]. - **Event 3: Mid - June 2024 - Doubts about the Capital Chain of Photovoltaic Convertible Bonds Led to Institutional Selling**: On June 19, due to concerns about the capital liquidity of a photovoltaic component convertible bond issuer and the actual controller's attempt to reduce holdings, there was a large - scale sell - off of photovoltaic convertible bonds, intensifying market credit concerns [23]. - **Event 4: Late June 2024 - Concentrated Rating Downgrades, Including Unexpected Large - Cap Bonds**: After the adjustment of photovoltaic convertible bonds, there was a concentrated rating downgrade. The rating downgrade of Wentai Convertible Bond on June 20 significantly exceeded expectations, suppressing institutional sentiment and increasing concerns about future rating adjustments [29]. - **Event 5: Self - Rescue of Shanying Convertible Bond**: Shanying Convertible Bond faced repayment pressure. After the issuer announced a series of self - rescue measures on June 21, the bond price rebounded. Eventually, with the recovery of the equity market, the bond's parity rose above the maturity repayment price, and the repayment pressure was greatly relieved [35][36]. - **Event 6: Guanghui Convertible Bond's Repeated Struggles and Final Delisting**: Due to industry and company - specific problems, Guanghui Convertible Bond's underlying stock price fell below the face value, triggering delisting risk. Despite efforts to boost the stock price, it still entered the delisting process on July 18, causing market adjustments [40][41]. - **Event 7: Lingnan Convertible Bond's Default Shocked the Market**: On August 14, 2024, Lingnan Convertible Bond announced its inability to pay principal and interest on schedule, becoming the first convertible bond to default in the market. Its default had a greater impact on the market than previous defaults [45]. 3.1.2. Scar Effect of the Credit Storm - The 2024 credit shock was the most extensive in history, with over 50% of convertible bonds falling below the bond floor, and the proportion of bonds falling below the face value was also at a historical high [47]. - The pricing anchor for weak - quality individual bonds was lost, making it difficult for investors to make decisions. However, considering industry cycles and issuer efforts, the bond floor can still be used as a pricing anchor for debt - oriented convertible bonds [51][52]. - In terms of market structure, cyclical sectors such as agriculture, new energy, and chemicals had a higher proportion of convertible bonds falling deeply below the bond floor. AAA - rated convertible bonds had stronger credit risk resistance [55]. 3.2. Essence and Enlightenment of the Credit Storm - **Root Cause**: The weak performance of the underlying stocks was the root cause of the 2024 convertible bond market decline. When the equity market was weak, credit events would amplify negative feedback. In addition, there were other factors such as low - risk - preference incremental funds, weak issuer fundamentals, regulatory tightening, and market structural "aging" [3][60][64]. - **Coping Strategies**: Monitor the equity market's small - cap sector. Avoid bonds with obvious risks, especially those with high delisting pressure. Adjust positions based on the credit impact on different - quality bonds. During the shock, allocate large - cap and near - bond - floor bonds. Institutions with stable liabilities can consider participating in mispriced markets, while those with sensitive liabilities should wait for positive equity signals [68][69].