自从能从投资上赚钱以后，一直有一个念想，就是带着老同学，老朋友一起赚钱，保守点， 一个月5000总能有的，风险也不高。毕竟他们很多人现在只是一个普通的打工人，太不容易 了，五千一万不是小数字了。 可是我知道这事情不会有好的结果，这想法有毒，甚至让亲戚反目成仇，朋友也当不下去 了。因为如果认知跟不上，每一步都牵着拉着，太累了。 可是我时不时就会想这些，放不下。 持有小市值 我在过去十年里有三种带亲戚朋友赚钱的方式，列出来供参考 1.账户买断制。 我出30万对方出10万，用对方账户。如果亏钱了我是他们的三倍，他们也没啥好说的，我的 好处也是能用他们账户打新。 多年下来算上新股基本都是20%左右年化。 双方也都挺满意 的。 3.短期借款 拼多多方式打北交所新股，基本都是我离安全多拿100股差几十万的时候问别人借钱，两天就 还。按中介的价格出价。虽然只有几百块，但对于退休没事干的人来说也不错。 当然，这些都是自己和家人长期信得过的朋友，几十万额度讲清楚后基本不会出现利益纠 葛。 因为这几种方式对双方都是互惠互利的，所以哪怕有点风险（资金和关系上），我也敢冒。 单纯的帮别人赚钱，说实话我不愿意也做不到。 蚁工 没有好下 ...

21世纪经济报道记者余纪昕 随着2025年中报季结束，9月一批未能对上半年财报"按时交卷"的发债企业浮出水面。 根据《上市公司信息披露管理办法》规定，半年报应当在每个会计年度的上半年结束之日起两个月内编制完成并披露，即每年 的7月1日至8月31日。 记者梳理公告发现，在48家未能按期披露半年报的发债主体中，多达15家发债人提到审计程序相关问题，这一"审计环节梗 阻"因素本次占到31.25%的比例。 具体理由包括：往年报告未完成审计披露、管理团队无法获取准确财务信息、审计范围扩大、未能聘请年报审计机构、发现半 年度财务数据问题需重新核定、需更多时间整理资料、财务岗位人员缺失，以及原审计机构解约后难以匹配新机构等理由。 经营不确定性因素亦是导致未能按时披露报告的主要原因之一。在48家发债主体中，有13家公告提及自身或关联方正进行债务 重组、合并重整、破产清算或重整计划执行等工作。 例如，中国民生投资股份有限公司（相关债券"18中民G2"）于8月29日公告称，因公司正全力进行债务重组等相关工作，预计 2025年半年度报告将晚于8月31日披露。就在上月，中国民生投资还公告称，因未能按期披露2023年年度报告，且至今仍 ...

1. Report Industry Investment Rating No relevant content provided. 2. Core Viewpoints of the Report - The convertible bond market reached a critical stage in June 2025, a high - incidence period for convertible bond credit events. The report reviews the 2024 convertible bond credit storm and seeks coping strategies [1][9]. - The 2024 credit shock was the most extensive in the history of the convertible bond market. The root cause was the weak performance of the underlying stocks, and there were also other factors such as issuer fundamentals, market structure, and institutional behavior [2][3]. - In 2025, the approach to convertible bond credit risks has changed. The probability of a continuous and significant decline in the equity market has decreased, reducing delisting risks and repayment pressure. It is recommended to appropriately explore opportunities for mispricing repair [4][73]. 3. Summary According to the Catalog 3.1. Revisiting the 2024 Credit Storm: A Lesson from History 3.1.1. Review of Seven Important Credit Storm Events - **Event 1: April 2024 - New Nine - National Policies and Delisting Rules Triggered a Small - Scale Credit Shock**: On April 12, 2024, the new Nine - National Policies and delisting rules were released, causing significant differentiation in the equity and convertible bond markets. Small - cap stocks were under pressure, and nearly a hundred convertible bonds fell more than 5% within two days. Investor sentiment became cautious. After the regulatory clarification, the market recovered, and there was an inflow of incremental funds, but it also laid the groundwork for subsequent adjustments [11][12]. - **Event 2: May 2024 - Concentration of Credit Events of Weak - Quality Individual Bonds Signaled the Brewing of a Major Credit Storm**: In late April, some convertible bonds were affected by ST or non - disclosure of annual reports. In May, credit events such as debt overdue and rating downgrades of Lingnan Convertible Bond, and rating downgrades of Sanfang and Hongtu Convertible Bonds shattered the recovery trend of low - price bond valuations [18]. - **Event 3: Mid - June 2024 - Doubts about the Capital Chain of Photovoltaic Convertible Bonds Led to Institutional Selling**: On June 19, due to concerns about the capital liquidity of a photovoltaic component convertible bond issuer and the actual controller's attempt to reduce holdings, there was a large - scale sell - off of photovoltaic convertible bonds, intensifying market credit concerns [23]. - **Event 4: Late June 2024 - Concentrated Rating Downgrades, Including Unexpected Large - Cap Bonds**: After the adjustment of photovoltaic convertible bonds, there was a concentrated rating downgrade. The rating downgrade of Wentai Convertible Bond on June 20 significantly exceeded expectations, suppressing institutional sentiment and increasing concerns about future rating adjustments [29]. - **Event 5: Self - Rescue of Shanying Convertible Bond**: Shanying Convertible Bond faced repayment pressure. After the issuer announced a series of self - rescue measures on June 21, the bond price rebounded. Eventually, with the recovery of the equity market, the bond's parity rose above the maturity repayment price, and the repayment pressure was greatly relieved [35][36]. - **Event 6: Guanghui Convertible Bond's Repeated Struggles and Final Delisting**: Due to industry and company - specific problems, Guanghui Convertible Bond's underlying stock price fell below the face value, triggering delisting risk. Despite efforts to boost the stock price, it still entered the delisting process on July 18, causing market adjustments [40][41]. - **Event 7: Lingnan Convertible Bond's Default Shocked the Market**: On August 14, 2024, Lingnan Convertible Bond announced its inability to pay principal and interest on schedule, becoming the first convertible bond to default in the market. Its default had a greater impact on the market than previous defaults [45]. 3.1.2. Scar Effect of the Credit Storm - The 2024 credit shock was the most extensive in history, with over 50% of convertible bonds falling below the bond floor, and the proportion of bonds falling below the face value was also at a historical high [47]. - The pricing anchor for weak - quality individual bonds was lost, making it difficult for investors to make decisions. However, considering industry cycles and issuer efforts, the bond floor can still be used as a pricing anchor for debt - oriented convertible bonds [51][52]. - In terms of market structure, cyclical sectors such as agriculture, new energy, and chemicals had a higher proportion of convertible bonds falling deeply below the bond floor. AAA - rated convertible bonds had stronger credit risk resistance [55]. 3.2. Essence and Enlightenment of the Credit Storm - **Root Cause**: The weak performance of the underlying stocks was the root cause of the 2024 convertible bond market decline. When the equity market was weak, credit events would amplify negative feedback. In addition, there were other factors such as low - risk - preference incremental funds, weak issuer fundamentals, regulatory tightening, and market structural "aging" [3][60][64]. - **Coping Strategies**: Monitor the equity market's small - cap sector. Avoid bonds with obvious risks, especially those with high delisting pressure. Adjust positions based on the credit impact on different - quality bonds. During the shock, allocate large - cap and near - bond - floor bonds. Institutions with stable liabilities can consider participating in mispriced markets, while those with sensitive liabilities should wait for positive equity signals [68][69].