通知提议修订《联邦采购规则》（FAR），以落实2023财年《国防授权法》第5949条关于特定半 导体采购禁令的规定。 该规定禁止行政机构取得可追溯至特定中国企业半导体零件、产品或服务，而"关键系统"限制则更 加严苛，不仅禁止直接采购这些企业的芯片，甚至还包括使用这些芯片设计、生产或提供相关服务 的产品。 换句话说就是，美国正计划进一步收紧对中国半导体产品的采购限制，拟限制政府机构采购使用中 芯国际或长鑫存储、长江存储生产的半导体产品与服务。 对于美国在芯片上的各种限制，半导体行业协会 (SIA)总裁兼首席执行官John Neuffer发布声明 称，反对《芯片安全法案》，内容如下： 如果您希望可以时常见面，欢迎标星收藏哦~ 据外媒报道称，美国联邦采购规则委员会（FAR Council）已于2月17日发布《拟议规则制定通 知》。 我们公司与政府机构、执法部门和其他相关利益攸关方密切合作，以防止和侦查我们产品的非法转 移和滥用行为。我们随时准备与国会合作，探讨有效应对这些风险的途径，并确保美国半导体技术 成为全球人工智能生态系统的基础。 （来源： 快科技 ） 点这里加关注，锁定更多原创内容 *免责声明：文章内容系作 ...

国芯网[原:中国半导体论坛] 振兴国产半导体产业！ 不拘中国、 放眼世界 ！ 关注 世界半导体论坛 ↓ ↓ ↓ 半导体公众号推荐 半导体论坛百万微信群 3月3日消息，据外媒报道称，美国联邦采购规则委员会（FAR Council）已于2月17日发布《拟议规则制定通知》。 通知提议修订《联邦采购规则》（FAR），以落实2023财年《国防授权法》第5949条关于特定半导体采购禁令的规定。 该规定禁止行政机构取得可追溯至特定中国企业半导体零件、产品或服务，而"关键系统"限制则更加严苛，不仅禁止直接采购这些企业的芯片，甚至还包 括使用这些芯片设计、生产或提供相关服务的产品。 换句话说就是，美国正计划进一步收紧对中国半导体产品的采购限制，拟限制政府机构采购使用中芯国际或长鑫存储、长江存储生产的半导体产品与服 务。 对于美国在芯片上的各种限制，半导体行业协会 (SIA)总裁兼首席执行官John Neuffer发布声明称，反对《芯片安全法案》，内容如下： SIA成员完全致力于遵守出口管制规定，我们强烈反对非法转移和滥用我们的芯片技术。我们理解政策制定者关注这一问题的意愿，但我们不能支持对未 经测试、可能不切实际的新型芯片机制 ...

Core Viewpoint - Nvidia is facing significant challenges in the Chinese market due to security concerns related to its H20 graphics cards, which have been flagged for potential backdoor risks by U.S. authorities [1][4]. Group 1: Legislative Actions and Implications - U.S. lawmakers are advocating for advanced chips to be equipped with tracking capabilities, which has been incorporated into the proposed Chip Security Act [6][11]. - The Chip Security Act aims to implement location verification technology in chips to prevent them from being smuggled into restricted areas, particularly China [11][13]. - The act requires manufacturers to provide evidence of the chips' location and allows for remote disabling if they are found in prohibited regions [11][13]. Group 2: Impact on Nvidia - Nvidia's CEO, Jensen Huang, is reportedly frustrated with the U.S. government's actions, which complicate the company's efforts to sell its H20 graphics cards in China [4][32]. - The implementation of the Chip Security Act could impose additional operational costs on Nvidia, estimated at around $1 million for software updates and between $2.5 million to $12.5 million annually for establishing a network of trusted landmark servers [30][31]. - The situation presents Nvidia as a victim of U.S. government policies rather than a perpetrator of wrongdoing, complicating its business prospects in China [32]. Group 3: Technological Aspects - The proposed location verification technology is based on a mature, hard-to-crack method known as Ping-based positioning, which could be implemented in existing AI chips [21][26]. - This technology allows for the calculation of distances between devices and servers, enabling location tracking without the need for GPS [24][26]. - The requirement for AI chips to send verification information to landmark servers could render them unusable if disconnected from the internet, raising concerns about operational feasibility [26][30]. Group 4: Industry Response and Future Outlook - The article suggests that the ongoing developments highlight the need for domestic innovation in chip technology, with companies like Huawei making strides in this area [34]. - The potential for the Chip Security Act to become ineffective hinges on the advancement of domestic alternatives, which could mitigate reliance on U.S. technology [34].

Core Viewpoint - The U.S. government is intensifying its efforts to regulate the export of advanced chips to China, particularly through the proposed Chip Security Act, which mandates the inclusion of tracking mechanisms in chips to prevent unauthorized transfers and usage [2][3][8]. Group 1: Legislative Developments - The Chip Security Act is currently under discussion in the U.S. Congress, requiring companies like NVIDIA to embed location tracking modules in their chips [2]. - The Act aims to establish security mechanisms in exported chips to prevent unauthorized transfers, with specific provisions for location verification [2][4]. - The U.S. Department of Commerce is tasked with creating implementation guidelines within 180 days of the Act's passage, focusing on the feasibility of location verification technologies [2]. Group 2: Technological Mechanisms - The proposed tracking mechanism, referred to as "digital leashes," would allow for remote disabling of chips if illegal transfers are detected [4][5]. - A "security module" would be installed on AI chips to ensure they operate with authorized software and firmware, enabling remote verification and control [5]. - Current technologies for remote verification are already implemented in some CPUs and GPUs, suggesting a potential for easy adaptation to AI chips [5]. Group 3: Market Implications - The introduction of the Chip Security Act may negatively impact NVIDIA's business, as customers may be deterred by the perceived lack of privacy and control over their purchased chips [8]. - The Act could provide an opportunity for Chinese semiconductor companies, as they may not need to implement such tracking mechanisms, thus appealing to customers seeking trust and privacy [8][9]. - The scrutiny of NVIDIA's H20 chip security risks by Chinese authorities may further diminish its market share in China, aligning with China's push for domestic semiconductor alternatives [9].