《办法》明确，房地产开发企业或者房地产中介机构（统称为房地产从业机构）不得向身份不明的客户 销售房屋或者提供经纪服务。客户拒不配合提供身份证明材料等信息的，可以拒绝向其销售房屋或者提 供经纪服务，并根据情况向中国反洗钱监测分析中心提交可疑交易报告。 房地产从业机构发现或者有合理理由怀疑客户拟进行的房屋交易与洗钱等犯罪活动相关的，应当及时向 中国反洗钱监测分析中心提交可疑交易报告。 21世纪经济报道记者 张敏 8月26日晚间，住房城乡建设部、中国人民银行印发《房地产从业机构反洗钱工作管理办法》（以下简 称《办法》），对房地产领域的反洗钱工作做出规定。 《办法》还规定，房地产从业机构应当采取妥善措施，完整、准确地保存获取的客户身份资料和交易记 录，保存期不少于十年。 相比此前保存客户资料"不少于五年"的规定，延长了一倍。 这也是迄今为止，主管部门出台的对房地产反洗钱工作最细致的一份文件。 有分析人士指出，近年来，房地产行业洗钱手段日益复杂多样，新问题不断涌现，现有法律法规难以完 全覆盖和有效应对。《办法》的推出，对于规范房地产交易、遏制洗钱及相关犯罪有着积极意义。 为加强房地产领域的反洗钱工作，2017年，住建部 ...

E J 同 石 I H SECURITES 反洗钱利国又利民 00 Ext PROMETICS 4 指挥 Erit The S FIERE FEBER 3 LETE 洗钱犯罪对老百姓个人的利益造成的损害 是间接的,它主要对社会带来四种直接危害: (0) 第三,洗钱犯罪给银行及其他金融机构带 来巨大风险，损害金融体系的信誉; 第四,洗钱会导致资金外流,影响国家的外 e 汇储备和税收，甚至会危及国家的经济安全。 第一,危害经济体系的稳定,造成经济扭 曲和经济秩序的混乱; 第二,洗钱为其他严重犯罪活动"输血", 日益成为贩毒、恐怖活动、走私、贪污、诈 骗、涉税等犯罪活动的伴生物; 2024年8月19日,在《关于办理洗钱刑事 案件适用法律若干问题的解释》（以下简称《 解释》）的发布会上,最高检经济犯罪检察厅 副厅长张建忠介绍,最高检自2020年部署推 进反洗钱工作以来,全国检察机关反洗钱工作 措施有力,成效明显。2023年共起诉洗钱罪 2971人,是2019年起诉洗钱罪人数的近20倍。 2024年上半年起诉洗钱罪1391人,同比上升 28.4%，对洗钱犯罪的打击力度持续加大。 那么对于"洗钱罪"的定罪是依据哪些法 律 ...

Core Points - The case involves a trust loan of 15.5 billion yuan provided by Zhongrong International Trust Co., Ltd. to Shanxi Transportation Investment Group, facilitated by Minsheng Bank's Taiyuan branch, with allegations of bribery and money laundering [2][4][5] - The court has gone through multiple rounds of trials, with the latest ruling resulting in prison sentences for the involved parties, including Liu Yang receiving 11 years for bribery [2][13][14] Group 1: Case Background - In 2013, Shanxi Provincial Transportation Department initiated a financing project through Shanxi Transportation Investment Group, using Minsheng Bank for loans [4] - Liu Yang, the general manager of Minsheng Bank's Taiyuan branch investment banking department, facilitated the introduction of trust loans totaling 23.47 billion yuan [4] - Zhongrong Trust was involved in setting up 12 trust products to provide 15.5 billion yuan in loans to Shanxi Transportation Investment Group [4] Group 2: Allegations and Charges - Liu Yang allegedly received 85.5 million yuan as a "consulting service fee," which prosecutors claim was a bribe [2][5] - The prosecution accused Liu Yang of non-state staff bribery, while Gai Qijun was charged with money laundering, and Zhou Bailin with bribery [8][9] - Liu Yang argued that the funds were legitimate service fees, not bribes, and claimed the bank's role was as an intermediary [3][8] Group 3: Judicial Proceedings - The case has undergone six rounds of trials, with the latest ruling affirming the sentences for Liu Yang (11 years), Gai Qijun (5 years and 6 months), and Zhou Bailin (3 years and 7 months) [2][13][14] - The court's decisions have been challenged multiple times, with Liu Yang planning to apply for a retrial based on his defense that the funds were not illegal [3][15] - The latest ruling increased Liu Yang's sentence by 2 years compared to the initial judgment [13]

Core Viewpoint - The article discusses the procedures and opinions regarding the handling of "self-laundering" issues discovered during the investigation of职务犯罪 (职务犯罪) cases by supervisory and prosecutorial authorities, emphasizing the need for coordination between these entities in both the investigation and prosecution phases [1][5]. Group 1: Case Summaries - Case 1 involves Zhang, who accepted bribes totaling 10 million yuan and subsequently laundered the money through multiple bank transfers and property purchases [2]. - Case 2 involves Liu, who accepted 3 million yuan in bribes and laundered part of it through transfers to family members' accounts and then to an overseas account, amounting to 1 million yuan [2]. Group 2: Divergent Opinions - The first opinion suggests that evidence collected during the investigation can be shared to save resources, allowing for simultaneous prosecution of both bribery and money laundering [3]. - The second opinion argues that since money laundering falls under police jurisdiction, evidence should be transferred to the police for further investigation before prosecution [4]. - The third opinion supports the idea that if evidence of money laundering is clear and sufficient, it can be included in the prosecution submission for both crimes [4]. Group 3: Evidence Collection and Use - Evidence related to "self-laundering" collected by supervisory authorities can be used in court as it meets criminal trial standards [10]. - If the prosecutorial authority finds the evidence from supervisory authorities insufficient, it can either supplement the evidence or transfer the case to the police for further investigation [11][12]. Group 4: Prosecution Procedures - If the supervisory authority has established the facts of "self-laundering" and believes it meets prosecution conditions, it can include these facts in the prosecution submission [13]. - The prosecutorial authority can directly add charges of money laundering if it finds sufficient evidence and has consulted with the supervisory and police authorities [14][15].

Core Viewpoint - The case highlights the complexities of defining the legal status of specific relations involved in bribery, particularly focusing on the actions of Wang and Chen in the context of bribery and potential money laundering [1][2][3][4][5] Group 1: Bribery and Legal Implications - Chen's actions clearly constitute bribery as he used his official position to assist Company B in securing a project, subsequently facilitating the transfer of benefits to Wang, who is his son-in-law [2][5] - There are differing opinions on Wang's legal culpability; one view suggests he does not meet the criteria for joint bribery due to lack of direct involvement in the initial bribery scheme, while another view argues that he acted in concert with Chen, thus constituting joint bribery [2][5] Group 2: Money Laundering Considerations - Wang's actions do not align with the criteria for money laundering, as his intent was not merely to conceal the source of illicit funds but to actively participate in the receipt and management of the bribe [3][4] - The involvement of Wang was crucial in completing Chen's bribery act, indicating that his actions were part of the bribery rather than a separate money laundering offense [4][5] Group 3: Conspiracy and Collaboration - The concept of "conspiracy" in this context can occur either before or during the bribery act; Wang's knowledge of the bribe's nature and his actions to facilitate it suggest a collaborative effort with Chen [5] - Wang's engagement in signing false contracts and investment agreements under Chen's direction indicates a clear understanding of the bribery scheme, thus supporting the argument for joint bribery [5]

Core Viewpoint - The case involves a public official and a private company owner colluding to force businesses to pay for a service that should be free, leading to charges of bribery, money laundering, and abuse of power [2][5][15]. Summary by Sections Basic Case Facts - The public official, identified as the head of A Maritime Bureau, sought to have a private company, controlled by a close associate, handle a new port's electronic data interchange (EDI) declaration services, which are typically free [2][3]. Actions Taken - The official organized a meeting to designate the private company as the EDI agent and pressured other businesses to pay for this service, threatening to deny their EDI applications if they did not comply [3][9]. Financial Transactions - From December 2021 to March 2024, the private company collected over 4.9 million yuan in fees, with the official receiving over 2 million yuan in kickbacks, which were then laundered through various financial maneuvers [3][10]. Divergent Opinions on Legal Classification - Three opinions emerged regarding the classification of the actions: 1. The first opinion suggests the actions constitute forced trading [5]. 2. The second opinion argues for classification as bribery, emphasizing the coercive nature of the actions [6]. 3. The third opinion supports the second but also includes money laundering due to the subsequent financial transactions aimed at concealing the source of the funds [6][11]. Legal Analysis - The actions of the public official and the private company owner are seen as a clear case of bribery, as they exploited the official's position to extract payments for a service that should be free [8][10]. - The laundering of the proceeds through investments and fictitious loan agreements indicates a deliberate attempt to obscure the origins of the illicit funds, fulfilling the criteria for money laundering [11][14]. Abuse of Power - The public official's actions not only violated legal standards but also severely damaged the reputation of the public institution, leading to widespread complaints and media coverage, which constitutes abuse of power [15][16].