近日，公司与前述6名股东均签订了《表决权委托协议》，协议约定该等股东将其所持铝宝科技股权对 应的表决权不可撤销地委托给公司行使。前述6名股东中，游向阳先生系公司的董事、副总经理兼财务 总监，强晓阳先生系公司前任独立董事，属于公司的关联自然人，公司本次接受游向阳先生和强晓阳先 生的表决权委托事宜构成关联交易。强瑞合创与强瑞共创系公司员工成立的投资平台；肖辉先生系公司 员工；张国胜先生与公司不存在关系。前述6名股东将所持铝宝科技股权对应的表决权委托给公司的交 易。 接受前述主体所持铝宝科技股权对应的表决权后，公司合计可以控制铝宝科技股权对应的表决权比例为 51.00%。为此，公司拟按照会计准则的规定将铝宝科技纳入公司合并报表范围。公司本次接受铝宝科 技部分股东的表决权委托，有利于公司对铝宝科技实施控制，从而使得公司后续可以更加顺畅地挖掘业 务和管理协同效应，对于各方合力做强做大铝宝科技和公司的业务，深化公司在液冷散热领域的业务布 局，丰富公司液冷散热产品线，提升公司股东价值具有重要意义。本次交易不会对公司及全体股东权益 造成不利影响，亦不存在损害中小股东合法权益的情形。 格隆汇1月7日丨强瑞技术(301128.S ...

王辉向上市公司偿还的近2亿元资金分别来自姚成岭和上海元卓提供的借款，三方曾约定，积极推 动上市公司的业务恢复，作为一致行动人共同推动上市公司的持续健康发展，上海元卓将帮助王辉偿还 所欠姚成岭的大部分借款。但随着上海元卓方面提名的两位董事被踢出董事会，曾经三方合作的设想化 为泡影。 表决权委托浮出水面 2025年12月16日，ST银江收到深交所监管函：ST银江控股股东银江科技集团有限公司及实际控制 人王辉存在未履行信息披露义务的行为。这张监管函掀开了ST银江控制权争夺战的底牌。 监管函显示，银江集团及王辉与其他相关方签订了《合作框架协议》及相关补充协议、《表决权委 托及一致行动协议》《合作备忘录》等系列协议。但上市公司董事会决议公告却出现信息披露内容"打 架"：据银江集团函告，银江集团自主行使ST银江控股股东权利，自主履行控股股东义务，未授权任何 第三方行使所持ST银江股份表决权，亦不存在将所持ST银江股份进行表决权委托、协议转让或变更实 际控制权的计划。 中国证券报记者独家获悉的《表决权委托及一致行动协议》《合作备忘录》等协议显示，为了解决 占用上市公司非经营性资金的问题，2024年下半年，王辉大举借债将资金 ...

有钱可以豪横，钱少就得靠"想象力"，尤其是面对巨额财富诱惑时。 今年，A股上市公司易主大潮波澜壮阔，涉及上市公司已超300家，在上纬新材(688585.SH)、胜通能源（001331.SZ）等一系列标杆案例 的"示范"下，易主概念股行情热度不断抬升。但同时， 上市公司的易主门槛却不断"刷新下限"，甚至不到1亿元资金或持股未达5%举牌线 都可撬动上市公司的控股权，其中的杠杆正是表决权委托、表决权放弃等设计安排。 籍此"财技"，一些资金实力存疑、产业实力不明、技术实力虚无的"玩家"方能以低廉的价格，转动起易主的轮盘。 据财联社记者统计，今年以来，涉及表决权让渡的上市公司易主案例已有约80起， 比上一年激增了两倍多。这些案例里，有近30家上市公 司，出现"控股权倒挂"，即新控股方持股占比低于原控股方表决权委托或放弃的股份占比。 从以往的实践看，此种"控股权倒挂"存在多重 风险隐患。而易主风潮炒作过后，那些缺少实力控股方支持，经营状况持续恶化、公司治理隐患突出的概念股，往往会从股价"巅峰"迅速滑 向深渊。 对于易主大潮下的泥沙暗涌，监管的态度已经明确：将于明年1月5日结束征求意见的 《上市公司监督管理条例》规定，"股 ...

Core Viewpoint - The regulatory letter from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange reveals a power struggle over ST Yinjian, with the controlling shareholder, Yinjian Technology Group, and its actual controller, Wang Hui, failing to fulfill information disclosure obligations [1] Group 1: Control and Financial Issues - Wang Hui has borrowed nearly 200 million yuan to repay funds owed to ST Yinjian, with the loans coming from Yao Chengling and Shanghai Yuanzhuo [2] - The urgent need for Wang Hui and Yinjian Group to return occupied funds to ST Yinjian is highlighted, as failure to do so could lead to delisting [3] - The total amount of non-operating fund occupation reached 663 million yuan in 2023 and 435 million yuan in the first half of 2024 [3] Group 2: Agreements and Commitments - A series of agreements, including the "Voting Rights Entrustment and Joint Action Agreement" and "Cooperation Memorandum," were signed to address the occupied funds [1][6] - The "Cooperation Memorandum" stipulates that Yinjian Group will delegate voting rights of its 10.3% stake in ST Yinjian to Yao Chengling and Shanghai Yuanzhuo [6][7] - Shanghai Yuanzhuo has committed to providing additional loans to Yinjian Group to facilitate the repayment of debts to Yao Chengling [4][6] Group 3: Board Dynamics and Governance - The board of directors faced controversy over the process of electing new members, with two directors nominated by Shanghai Yuanzhuo being removed [8][9] - The board's decision-making process has been criticized for lacking transparency and failing to allow all directors to participate [9][11] - The ongoing disputes regarding the delegation of voting rights and the legitimacy of board decisions indicate significant governance challenges within ST Yinjian [11][12] Group 4: Business Outlook and Performance - ST Yinjian's financial performance has deteriorated, with a reported revenue of 548 million yuan and a net loss of 941 million yuan in 2024 [14] - The company is exploring business recovery strategies, including leveraging artificial intelligence and optimizing existing operations [13] - Shareholder concerns about internal conflicts and governance issues are prevalent, with calls for improved management to stabilize stock prices [15]

Core Viewpoint - The regulatory letter from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange reveals a power struggle over ST Yinjian, involving undisclosed agreements between its controlling shareholder, Yinjian Technology Group, and other parties, raising concerns about governance and financial stability [1][7]. Group 1: Control and Governance Issues - The regulatory letter indicates that Yinjian Group and its actual controller, Wang Hui, failed to fulfill information disclosure obligations, leading to a conflict regarding the control of ST Yinjian [1]. - Agreements such as the "Voting Rights Entrustment and Joint Action Agreement" and "Cooperation Memorandum" were signed, but the board's announcements contained conflicting information [1][9]. - Wang Hui's alleged misuse of non-operating funds led to a significant financial shortfall, necessitating borrowing to repay these funds to maintain ST Yinjian's listing status [2][3]. Group 2: Financial Transactions and Borrowing - Wang Hui repaid nearly 200 million yuan, primarily sourced from loans provided by Yao Chengling and Shanghai Yuanzhuo, to address the company's financial issues [2][3]. - Shanghai Yuanzhuo has committed to providing additional loans to Yinjian Group to facilitate the repayment of debts owed to Yao Chengling [3][4]. - The total amount of non-operating fund occupation reached 663 million yuan in 2023 and 435 million yuan in the first half of 2024, indicating a severe liquidity crisis [2]. Group 3: Board Dynamics and Conflicts - The board of ST Yinjian faced criticism for procedural irregularities during the election of new directors, with two directors nominated by Shanghai Yuanzhuo being removed [7][8]. - The board's decisions have been challenged due to the lack of transparency regarding the agreements that affect voting rights and control [8][9]. - The ongoing disputes and lack of clarity regarding the control structure have raised concerns among minority shareholders about the company's governance and future direction [11][12]. Group 4: Future Prospects and Market Reactions - Despite efforts to stabilize the company, ST Yinjian's financial performance remains poor, with significant losses reported in recent quarters [11]. - The potential for a shift in control dynamics exists as individual shareholders are increasingly buying into ST Yinjian, which could lead to a coalition that challenges the current governance structure [12]. - The company aims to leverage strategic partnerships and technological advancements to improve its business outlook, but uncertainties surrounding governance persist [11].

炒股就看金麒麟分析师研报，权威，专业，及时，全面，助您挖掘潜力主题机会！ 愿意付出显著成本、用实质性的股权收购拿下控制权的收购方，往往与上市公司的长期发展绑定更深。 来源：市值风云 作者 | 贝壳XY 编辑 | 小白 2025年12月5日，证监会发布《上市公司监督管理条例（公开征求意见稿）》，其中明确规定"股东不得 通过任何形式将表决权交由他人按照他人意志行使。"这一条款如同一记重锤，直接改变了资本大鳄们 惯用的"玩壳"伎俩。 （来源：《上市公司监督管理条例》） 常读风云君文章的车主们都知道，过去那套"协议转让+表决权委托"的把戏，不过是一场低成本的权力 游戏。资本玩家只需出点小钱，再借一纸委托书，就能轻松掌控一家上市公司。 就在大家还在揣摩新招数时，俞浩的逐越鸿智带着22.82亿现金，计划以"协议转让+表决权放弃+主动要 约"的组合方式，拿下嘉美包装（002969.SZ）的控股权。 这是一次简单的股权交易，也是新规下的第一场大戏。 监管重塑：表决权委托走向终结 天下没有免费的午餐，这种招数省去了收购的血本和麻烦，却埋下了无数祸根。 说白了，这就是一场"控制权租赁"——虽然钥匙在手，但房东也能直接换锁。一旦利 ...

愿意付出显著成本、用实质性的股权收购拿下控制权的收购方，往往与上市公司的长期发展绑定更深。 作者 | 贝壳XY 编辑 | 小白 2025年12月5日，证监会发布《上市公司监督管理条例（公开征求意见稿）》，其中明确规定"股东不 得通过任何形式将表决权交由他人按照他人意志行使。"这一条款如同一记重锤，直接改变了资本大 鳄们惯用的"玩壳"伎俩。 （来源：《上市公司监督管理条例》） 就在大家还在揣摩新招数时，俞浩的逐越鸿智带着22.82亿现金，计划以"协议转让+表决权放弃+主动 要约"的组合方式，拿下嘉美包装（002969.SZ）的控股权。 这是一次简单的股权交易，也是新规下的第一场大戏。 监管重塑：表决权委托走向终结 常读风云君文章的车主们都知道，过去那套"协议转让+表决权委托"的把戏，不过是一场低成本的权 力游戏。资本玩家只需出点小钱，再借一纸委托书，就能轻松掌控一家上市公司。 天下没有免费的午餐，这种招数省去了收购的血本和麻烦，却埋下了无数祸根。 说白了，这就是一场"控制权租赁"——虽然钥匙在手，但房东也能直接换锁。一旦利益分赃不均，委 托方翻脸收回表决权，公司便可能陷入无休止的内斗，最终受伤的一定少不了中小股 ...

Core Viewpoint - The actual controller of Guoao Technology has changed from Chen Chongjun to Xu Yinghui, who will exercise voting rights over 67.69 million shares, representing 24.41% of the total voting rights after the agreement takes effect [2][5]. Group 1: Shareholder Changes - Chen Chongjun signed a voting rights delegation agreement with Xu Yinghui on December 12, transferring the voting rights of 67.69 million shares unconditionally and irrevocably [5]. - After the agreement, Xu Yinghui directly holds 4.50% of the shares and, through the delegated voting rights, controls a total of 24.41% of the voting rights [5][6]. - The stock of Guoao Technology was suspended from trading before the announcement and surged by 8.9% to 13.7 yuan per share before resuming trading on December 15 [2][3]. Group 2: Capital Increase Plan - Guoao Technology plans to issue up to 40 million shares to Xu Yinghui at a price of 10.8 yuan per share, aiming to raise no more than 432 million yuan, which will be used to supplement working capital [5][6]. - After the completion of this issuance, Xu Yinghui's voting rights in Guoao Technology could increase to 32.36% [5]. Group 3: Company Performance - Guoao Technology reported a revenue of 109 million yuan for the first three quarters of 2025, a year-on-year decrease of 49.58%, with a net loss of 164 million yuan [6]. - In the third quarter, the company achieved a revenue of 37.24 million yuan, down 47.92% year-on-year, with a net loss attributable to shareholders of 50.82 million yuan [6]. Group 4: Company Overview - Guoao Technology specializes in providing comprehensive solutions for smart financial systems and financial software products, serving clients including banks, securities firms, and other financial institutions [6].

停牌一周的古鳌科技将复牌，公司新实际控制人将变更为一"80后"算力企业老板。 12月14日晚间，古鳌科技公告了此事项，公司实际控制人陈崇军与徐迎辉签订《表决权委托协议》，上 市公司实际控制人变更为徐迎辉。徐迎辉控制的核心企业包括北京光辉世联科技有限公司（以下简称光 辉世联）等，光辉世联已在全国14个城市布局算力中心。 此外，徐迎辉不排除在未来12个月内继续增持上市公司股份的计划，同时，在未来12个月内对古鳌科技 没有更改主营或者重组的计划。 新实际控制人去年战投入股一科创板企业 12月14日晚间，古鳌科技披露多份公告，主要针对控制权变更。 公司实际控制人陈崇军与徐迎辉签订《表决权委托协议》，陈崇军持有的古鳌科技6769.35万股股份的 表决权委托给徐迎辉行使。《表决权委托协议》生效后，徐迎辉新增持有上市公司的表决权比例为 19.91%。截至协议签署之日，徐迎辉直接持有上市公司股权比例为4.50%，合计持有上市公司表决权比 例为24.41%，上市公司实际控制人变更为徐迎辉。经公司申请，公司股票自12月15日（星期一）开市 起复牌。 不过，徐迎辉未来12个月内对古鳌科技没有更改主营业务计划或者资产重组计划。 另外 ...

北京商报讯(记者马换换王蔓蕾)12月14日，古鳌科技（300551）披露公告称，公司实际控制人由陈崇军 变更为徐迎辉，公司股票将于12月15日起复牌。 公告显示，12月12日，古鳌科技实际控制人陈崇军与徐迎辉签订《表决权委托协议》，陈崇军持有的古 鳌科技6769.35万股股份的表决权委托给徐迎辉行使。 《表决权委托协议》生效后，徐迎辉持有上市公司的表决权比例为19.91%，截至协议签署之日，徐迎 辉直接持有上市公司股权比例为4.5%，徐迎辉合计持有上市公司表决权比例为24.41%，上市公司实际 控制人变更为徐迎辉。 同日，古鳌科技披露定增预案显示，本次向特定对象发行股票的发行对象为公司实际控制人徐迎辉，本 次发行的募集资金总额不超过4.32亿元(含本数)，并以证监会关于本次发行的注册批复文件为准。本次 发行所募集资金在扣除相关发行费用后将全部用于补充流动资金。 ...